DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Architectural Emptiness

On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling.

Williams, Aidan

Award date:
2013

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University of Dundee

Architectural Emptiness:

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a dissertation by

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at

The University of Dundee

Supervised by

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October 2013

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors Lorens Holm and Mary Modeen to whom I am gratefully indebted for their always insightful and inspirational support over the past few years. My thanks should also be extended to the University of Dundee for funding my tuition during this research.

Additionally I would also like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues Cameron and Alex for our productive disagreements, amongst many other things. Finally I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Emily for her continual intellectual and emotional support.

Declaration

I, Aidan Williams, hereby certify that this thesis, Architectural Emptiness: On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, has been written by me; cites references that unless otherwise stated have been consulted by me; is a record of work carried out by me; and has not been previously accepted for a higher degree.

Abstract

Architectural Emptiness:

On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.

This thesis reinterprets the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. In particular it stresses the importance of the concept of *poetry* on dwelling that was outlined in ‘... Poetically Man Dwells ...’. This essay from Heidegger’s late period has been less frequently quoted in the literature of the architectural profession than some of Heidegger’s more well known essays. The importance of poetry is developed in this thesis through creative practice explorations of Heidegger’s philosophy supplemented by deep textual analysis.

By developing Heidegger’s concept of poetic dwelling, it is possible to reinterpret his ideas about building in richer ways than have previously been carried out in architecture. We will discover that space has a particular kind of emptiness that allows for poetic experience. Ways of building that manifest this emptiness can be considered building *for* dwelling.

The focus on poetic dwelling unravels previous architectural interpretations of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling. These interpretations tend to focus on the creation of a certain type of *product* rather than on enabling the poetic dwelling *process*. Consequently, by shifting this understanding of dwelling new links can be suggested to the work of architectural writers and practitioners who hitherto have not been considered to be Heideggerian.

Introduction - Architectural Emptiness

On a reinterpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling.

Preface

This thesis reinterprets the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. This reinterpretation is developed through a study of Heidegger's essays on dwelling in conjunction with an analysis of spatial experiences through creative practices. These creative practices explore philosophical concepts through an architectural lens. These are two disciplines that are perhaps more closely related than might at first seem. Although it is true that philosophy is often thought of as being about ideas and architecture about space, when we think of the philosophy of place and particularly the feeling of being at home, the mental and the spatial cohabit. We can extend this to the feeling of belonging in any place, thus all architecture can, to some extent, be seen as an exercise in philosophy. Additionally, exploring philosophical concepts through observations of the physical world can give form to ideas, deepening the potential to critique and develop them.

As we shall see in Chapter One, Heidegger's primary focus in his later period of work was with the problem of a feeling of homelessness. In the wake of the post WWII housing shortages he perceived an increasing sense of alienation from place due to rapid technological and societal changes. His essays on dwelling are a call to remember the ways in which we relate to places and find a sense of belonging, of home. For Heidegger, dwelling is a dynamic and continuous process of 'being' by which we bring places 'near' to us. However, his philosophy states that we no longer build as though we are dwellers. The way in which we construct buildings in modern times is, he writes, removed from the way that we mentally construct nearness to places. This disconnection means that we no longer concern ourselves with how we dwell in the environment. This gulf is, in his view, the root of our feelings of existential homelessness.

Heidegger's work on dwelling has often been discussed by architects. However, this thesis argues that his work is often misunderstood as a call for the creation of a certain type of *product*. This thesis is a reappraisal of Heidegger's thought that stresses the importance that the concept of poetry has on dwelling. A focus on poetry emphasises that dwelling is an engaged, creative and ongoing *process* and the architectural

implications are that we should construct to encourage this. Poetry in the sense of this thesis is comparable to the creative act that we engage with when reading a poem. Poetry is lived rather than passively taken on board. Similarly our encounters with the environment should be seen as poetically engaged rather than passive.

In Chapter Two we will see that, with this idea of poetry in mind, it can be argued that Heidegger advocated a process of individuals building buildings for themselves, piece by piece, in response to their own dwelling. We will observe that Heidegger sees this as having occurred in the past in his example of a farmhouse in the Black Forest. However, we can develop the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling further.

In Chapter Three this thesis argues that the impact of Heidegger's concept of dwelling is that environments with a particular type of emptiness more fully allow potential for our poetic dwelling process. This new observation connects various architectural practitioners and theorists to Heidegger who might not have previously considered themselves Heideggerian.

Setting the scene: the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut, a tent, and a bus shelter

The feeling of belonging in a place is one that transcends objective measurements of spaces. My interest in experiences in architecture that were in some way supersensible, such as this feeling of belonging in place, began several years before the commencement of this research.

As an architecture student I had found the challenge of designing a place that was intended to foster belonging fascinating. I was required to consider my own experiences in meaningful places and use these in the design of imagined constructions. Edward Relph phrases it well, writing that a study of 'place' is useful in and of itself and as a means for manufacturing new places. "There are two major reasons for attempting to understand the phenomenon of place." He suggests,

> First, it is interesting in its own right as a fundamental expression of man's involvement in the world; and second, improved knowledge of the nature of place can contribute to the maintenance and manipulation of existing places and the creation of new places. (Relph. 1976. 44)

It seemed self-evident that the places in which I felt a sense of belonging were not experienced as such only due to their qualities but also due to my own experiences, memories, and associations. I wondered how architecture can aid one's feeling of belonging when this seems so particular to the individual. A few examples from a trip I once took, a cycle pilgrimage to Le Corbusier's chapel of Notre Dame du Haut near Ronchamp in France, can be used to illuminate this.

Figs 1 & 2: (Williams. 2013). Beautiful moments in the environment. Sometimes a sense of belonging in a place comes unbidden and unexpected. It can be more to do with the moment, one's own particular state of mind, and whatever subtleties of spatial perception, than with the space itself as an objective entity.

The French language expresses the idea of belonging to a place with the word '*pays*' which means more than its basic translation to our word 'country'. As Graham Robb writes in his book of French travel and history *The Discovery of France*, the word refers,

> to the tangible, ancestral region that people thought of as their home. A *pays* was the area in which everything was familiar: the sound of the human voice, the orchestra of birds and insects, the choreography of winds and the mysterious configurations of trees, rocks and magic wells. [...] To someone with little experience of the world, the *pays* could be measured in fields and furrows. To a person far from home, it might be a whole province. (Robb. 2007. 28)

Place, belonging, knowledge and perception, are linked in this concept of *pays*. While I was travelling through France I was continually finding places in which I felt at home and others in which I felt like an outsider.

Le Corbusier's chapel sits atop a large hill in the French countryside. It is regarded as one of the greatest accomplishments of Le Corbusier's career and has been described as "one of the twentieth century's greatest sacred structures" (Foges. 2011. 36). Sarah Menin and Flora Samuel note in *Nature and Space* that in this chapel Le Corbusier "sought to engender a feeling of bodily wellbeing, which would in turn be spiritually uplifting" (Menin & Samuel. 2003. 106). This is manifest in the unearthly atmosphere of the chapel's interior. Of his experience there Steven Holl writes, "It was completely silent inside, except for the crackling of candles, all of which were mysteriously aglow. [...] The red light that filtered down from the nave, had a different type of light captured by 22m half-dome scoops." (Holl. 1994. 123-124). I was lucky enough to be there in a thunderstorm. Sitting inside in peace and contentment I was aware of the changing light quality outside as clouds passed overhead. The few people inside looked around suddenly at each instance of changing light. I was aware of rain hammering on the flagstones outside and the hot, wet, smell. A flash of lightning illuminated the space at the foot of a light scoop and thunder rolled around the surrounding landscape.

This was a beautiful moment in one of the world's most highly acclaimed buildings. It invigorated my passion for what architecture can be capable of and how it can affect one's emotions. However, after this I became unsatisfied with other works of architecture that were equally highly acclaimed. Mies van der Rohe's Neue Nationalgalerie in Berlin, which I visited shortly after, conjured no such feelings of belonging on the particular moment I visited. I saw it simply as a keen architectural game. Its elemental display of the constituent parts of architecture - plinth, supports, and roof - didn't touch me in any emotional way and as such for me in that moment remained hollow.[1] Equally, I visited Daniel Libeskind's Jewish museum, also in Berlin, and was unmoved. Whereas the chapel at Ronchamp had been an experience of belonging in a place, this museum, full of its own symbolism and discussed more fully in Chapter Three, to me felt exclusionary.

1 It should of course be noted that this was equally a personal reaction to the building and is not, of course, to say that others are not profoundly moved by it.



Top - Fig 3: (Williams. 2013). The inside of the chapel. Etherial lighting seduces the viewer and reverberant acoustics amplify footsteps constructing an atmosphere of quietude.

Bottom - Fig 4: (Williams. 2013). Light scoops from the outside. Facing different directions the light inside shifts from corner to corner of the space.

While I was travelling towards this chapel near Ronchamp two other spatial experiences stand out in my memory as formative of my architectural interests, though it look longer for me to recognise their importance.

I was at that time either camping wild or in the many designated campsites in rural France. I began to notice an unforeseen relationship and fondness for my tent's interior. Despite being in a different location each night the place of 'inside the tent' became my home wherever the 'outside the tent' happened to be. Each evening this heterotopic place would be created, inflating into the world, claiming a volume of space and redefining it in a different way that I found familiar and knowable. In the mornings it would be deconstructed, packaged in its bag and, like the memories of it that I held, would be carried with me till its next incarnation.



Figs 5 & 6: (Williams. 2013). My bike and my tent, both movable places that, in a country in which I did not belong, became my home.

At around the same time, an experience very similar to the peace and belonging I felt in the chapel occurred in a very different setting. Whilst cycling one day I was almost caught by a thunderstorm that rolled over the landscape behind me on a previously pleasant day. With the first raindrops brushing my shoulders I managed to reach a small village and took refuge in a concrete bus shelter. On the edge of danger but just safe from the storm I watched uplifted in awe by the thunderstorm in front of me. The rain pounded down and the gutters overflowed. Safe in the shelter I waited till the storm passed and the water drained away.

These experiences illustrate the difficulty of discussing supersensible experiences such as the phenomenon of belonging in a place if we limit ourselves to only considering architectural examples. Neither the bus shelter nor my tent - both of which I found to be emotionally stimulating in a manner equally as profound as my experience at the chapel - are, according to general architectural discourse, to be considered ‘architecture’ at all.



Fig 7: (Williams. 2013). A section of a storm experienced from what has become to be seen, in my mind, as *my* bus stop.

This raised an interesting question for me about the nature of what to consider as architectural and how we should value experiences in spaces.

Nikolaus Pevsner suggested a hierarchical distinction between architecture and building. He begins his *An Outline of European Architecture* by saying "A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture." This might at first seem to be true, and with good reason, Lincoln Cathedral *is* beautiful. He goes on, "Nearly everything that encloses space on a scale sufficient for a human being to move in is a building; the term architecture applies only to buildings designed with a view to aesthetic appeal." (Pevsner. 1943. 15). In light of my observations about the bus shelter (a building) and my tent home (not even a building) this, to me, seemed an impoverished view of the environment. If an experience of finding refuge - surely a primary impulse in the evolution of architecture - such as I felt in the bus shelter is not considered 'architecture' at all, then surely there is a flaw in our conception of architecture. Or at the very least our concept of architecture is less rich than it could be. And if a feeling of a home - another primal architectural impulse - could be found in a placeless object such as my tent but *at the same time* not deemed worthy of the title 'architecture' I decided that *my* architectural study of belonging in place needed to be broadened from a study of the architectural object to a study of spatial experiences.

For this reason, this thesis studies real world spatial practices rather than just architectural theory. This includes the realm of architecture but also of day to day experiences in space. That which affects one's journey through space is considered as having interesting merit. In my thinking, then, and in my research, both Pevsner's cathedral and bicycle shed (or indeed, my bus shelter), come to be seen as equally valued sources of spatial insight. Similarly my use of first person examples through this thesis is unapologetic. In order to describe moments of belonging and the immeasurable qualities of first-hand experience, from time to time I rely necessarily on first person narrative.

A brief outline of Heidegger's influence

In beginning this thesis I therefore had an existing interest in experiences of spaces, in a heightened awareness of the world, and in a feeling of belonging in places.

From the sense of belonging in the moment found in the above examples it was a short step to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Although having a career spanning five decades it was particularly his later work in the early 1950's on dwelling and place that deepened my appreciation and understanding of being in the world. This is the point at which this thesis really begins. I began to study my experiences in space through a Heideggerian lens using sketches, montages, and models. This was a process of understanding my feeling of belonging in places and of deepening my understanding of Heidegger's texts, a process that will be discussed in detail in Chapter One. My work celebrates the feeling of belonging in place and the way we construct this in our minds.

Any discussion of places, particularly one concerned with subjective experience rather than objective measurement, must include reference to Heidegger at some point. Stephen Mullhall in the BBC radio 4 series *In Our Time: Greatest Philosopher* advocated Heidegger's position as the greatest philosopher of all time due to his influence of "putting human beings firmly back in the natural world without reducing them to it." In Heidegger's unifying worldview we do not exist as separate entities from the world. This rejects what Mullhall sees as the increasing tendency toward the categorisation of things. In addition, his effect on philosophy was to "reject [...] the accelerating decomposition of philosophy into its separate branches." This similarly served to unify the already existing categorisation of parts and subsequently, Mullhall states, changed the philosophical map of the second half of the 20th century (Mullhall. 2005).

Consequently Heidegger's work, particularly his early work in *Being and Time* has influenced the field of philosophy to such an extent that Edward S. Casey in his book *The Fate of Place*, puts Heidegger alongside Aristotle as key to the philosophical understanding and discussion of place (Casey. 1997. ix). George Steiner notes, in *Heidegger,* that Heidegger can be considered as "not only the most eminent philosopher

or critic of metaphysics since Immanuel Kant but one of that small number of decisive Western thinkers which would include Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Hegel." (Steiner. 1992. 4). Some of his direct influences are listed by Steiner as the existentialism of Sartre that is explicitly influenced by *Being and Time,* and the work of Gadamer and Derrida who were each influenced by Heidegger's textual interpretive ideas.

However, although some people hail Heidegger as the most important philosopher of the 20th century, others dismiss the value of his work entirely. It's not just those who consider his philosophy to be tainted by his association with National Socialism who dismiss his work, although this does occur. Rather, as Steiner notes, although everyone agrees on Plato's importance regardless of their adherence to his ideas, Heidegger's situation is uniquely different. Some say that "His writings are a thicket of impenetrable verbiage; the questions he poses are sham questions; the doctrines he puts forwards are, so far as anything can be made of them, either false or trivial (Steiner. 1992. 4). Many others (Steiner notes that Bertrand Russel's *History of Western Philosophy* omits any mention of Heidegger) ignore him completely.

As we shall see throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapter One, although the style of Heidegger's rhetoric is deliberately oblique his philosophy is one of a simple unifying message. We have, he says, in the history of Western thought often discussed what something *is* but have always neglected to ask what the nature of 'is' *is*. This leads to a position where everything that we think we understand is based on weak foundations. His philosophy places the individual at the centre of the world and states that one's subjective appreciation of being is the most important factor in determining what is. Our own perception is consequently, not simply something flavouring an otherwise objective reality. Instead our own perception is what is real and the viewing of the world as science does is an abstraction, a useful tool. His philosophy is one that unifies rather than categorises, everything exists within one's perceptual realm.

Heidegger's concept of dwelling, which is the major focus of this thesis, is a continuation of this paradigm-changing philosophy. It is a concept that has aided how we think about our place in the world and how we relate to our built environment.

This work on dwelling has influenced academics and professionals in various disciplines. Heidegger helped anthropologist Tim Ingold form a different view of the way we understand the relationship that individuals have with their environments in Ingold's essay *Building, dwelling, living: how animals and people make themselves at home in the world.*

Influenced by Heidegger, in Ingold's view "The most fundamental thing about life is that it does not begin here or end there, but is always *going on.*" (Ingold. 2000. 172). However, his concern was that much anthropological work contradicts this with a world view based on a mind/world duality. This duality, to which we will return time and again in this thesis, places humans on one side of a veil and the world on the other. It aids a categorisation-obsessed view of the world, as opposed to the analogue reality of life going on. Ingold breaks down the essence of this worldview stating that in essence it prescribes that "worlds are made before they are lived in." (Ingold, 2000. 179). There is, in this view, always a world that is outside of us and we must go through a process of intellectual interpretation in order to have a relationship with it. There is always a screen between an individual and the world. Ingold suggests that in anthropology this leads to a conflict between considering humans as part-organism, part-intellect. Simply put, Ingold sees the flaw with the separation of mind and world in that it suggests that "the only way to understand our own creative involvement in the world is by taking ourselves out of it." (Ingold. 2000. 173).

One of the methods he uses to liberate himself from this problem is through reliance on Heidegger's philosophy. For Ingold, it is Heidegger's placing of the *individual in the world as active agent*, rather than as a separate receptor of a world 'out there', that permits a different perspective on our place in the environment.

Heidegger's placing of the individual in the world as an experiencing being helps Ingold to argue that what an individual creates - whether buildings, things, or memories - comes to some extent out of the relationship that they have with the environment. He says, "the forms of buildings arise as a kind of crystalisation of human activity within an environment" (Ingold. 2000. 186). This contrasts with a view that suggests one creates forms as idealised realisations of intellectualised intent. We will come back to this idea, that what we create in the world is directly influenced by our being in the world, again and again throughout this thesis.

Heidegger used in architectural circles

Heidegger's philosophy of dwelling has frequently been used in the architectural profession, and will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three. In some cases, as with Neil Leach's *Forget Heidegger,* Heidegger is used in a pejorative sense. For others, such as Christian Norberg-Schulz, Heidegger's work on dwelling forms a base on which to develop their own ideas.

With Heidegger's emphasis on place in his later essays, it was perhaps inevitable that this work would be appropriated by the architectural community. "Responses to Heidegger were numerous," writes Adam Sharr in *Heidegger for Architects,*

> in writing from Christian Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, Dalibor Vesely, and Alberto Pérez-Goméz, among others, and in building from Hans Scharoun, Christopher Alexander, Colin St. John Wilson, Steven Holl, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Peter Zumthor. (Sharr. 2006. 7)

However, although Heidegger has been discussed much by architects, their focus is often not on the personal processes that form the focus of this thesis but on an inherent quality of space that can be accessed as inspiration for good buildings. It is always the product that is the goal in these cases, rather than the process. The following quote from Norberg-Schulz, who has used dwelling as a central part of his work, is typical:

> A place is a space which has a distinct character. Since ancient times the genius loci, or "spirit of place", has been recognised as the concrete reality man has to face and come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture means to visualise the genius loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell. (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 5)

This focus is on finding the pre-existing essence of place and making this manifest in the building. Whilst bolstering architects' claims for a privileged position in the building process, this undermines Heidegger's essential understanding of how we dwell poetically. In any case one of the things that is unsatisfactory about referring to an 'inherent' spatial quality is that it ultimately depends on the subjective response of the architect.

A slightly different interpretation by architects is through the use of tactile materials and designing rich environmental experiences. For instance, contemporary architects Stephen Holl and Peter Zumthor both quote Heidegger as influencing their work. Whilst these interpretations succeed in enacting a situation demanding of engagement that might be seen as dwelling, their focus is again on the building, not as process but as product. Thus, although they are offering a possible interpretation in building form, they are creating one that omits the most important aspect of Heidegger's concept of dwelling, namely the importance of lived experience as poetic process. In doing this they enact, not Heidegger's concept, but precisely the opposite: the split of the mind and world that Heidegger so rejected. From a position of detached intellect they apply an end product to the external world, stifling the potential for dwelling.

Finally, Heidegger is sometimes used by architects aiming to apply a veneer of philosophical insight to a scheme. The 2008 RIBA Stirling Prize winner, the Accordia scheme published under *Dwelling Accordia,* references (without clarification or exposition, presumably to add some intellectual weight) Heidegger's "Only when we are capable of dwelling can we build; dwelling is the basic property of existence." (Bradley. 2009. 19). Of course, the term 'dwelling' is in common use and is not owned by Heidegger. The book *Dwellings - The House Across the World* (Oliver. 1987), makes no reference to Heidegger whatsoever, so cannot be accused of misunderstanding him. However, the assumptions outlined above of genius-loci, product creation, and lazy appropriation, should be challenged.

A reinterpretation

A reappraisal of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling should not be dismissed. Although his work has been around for 60 years and discussed by many people we can still derive new insight from it. As George Steiner points out in *Heidegger,* less than one third of Heidegger's writings exist in any definitive form. The rest includes unpublished work and various translations. Steiner states that as a result "any account of our judgement on Heidegger's thought must, at present, be provisional." (Steiner. 1992. 2-3).

Additionally, it is clear that the problems of mass housing leading to alienation, as discussed by Heidegger in the early 1950s, are still relevant. We still build houses according to concerns other than the process of our dwelling. Consequently we still need to address our understanding of how to build to encourage our dwelling process.

Furthermore, we can see inherent architectural problems that Heidegger leaves unexplored and unanswered in his texts. These are discussed further in Chapters Two and Three. It is therefore important to discuss a connection between Heidegger and architecture that accurately addresses his philosophy while acknowledging his reluctance to claim architectural prescription.

In this thesis I will argue that by linking Heidegger's thoughts with contemporary architectural theory we can develop from Heidegger's view of how we dwelled in the past to how we might build for dwelling in the future.

This thesis aims to provide an *alternative reading* of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. It stresses the poetic nature of dwelling that Heidegger discussed in his less often quoted essay *...Poetically Man Dwells...* This emphasises that dwelling, like the act of reading a poem is in fact a continual process of creation, of engaged involvement with the environment. Consequently this thesis suggests that *if Heidegger is to continue to be used in architectural situations* the poetic nature of dwelling should be recognised and brought to the foreground.

In Chapter One Heidegger's texts which are pertinent to the topic of dwelling will be discussed. The insights gained from these texts occurred through deep textual analysis but also through creative practice methods, particularly from sketches, montages, and models. These explorations through creative practice served to explore Heidegger's texts in another mode - through experiences in spaces. These Heideggerian works are quintessentially about experiences in spaces. This relates directly to his assertion that we are in the world first before any process of intellectualisation. It was the contemplation of these processes that illuminated the observation of dwelling as a continually ongoing poetic process.

Furthermore the process of creating these artefacts illuminated ways in which buildings could be built to improve our relationship with places. In Chapter Two an elaboration of the methods of building that Heidegger saw as occurring in the past will be explored. This, as with the creative practice artefacts, and indeed as with our dwelling, is a creative practice that occurs continually, always accumulating and changing. Heidegger's example is a farmhouse in the Black Forest that stands as a palimpsest of the history of the families who have lived there. This will be explored as will an urban manifestation of this logic, as in a shanty town for example. However, this leaves a lacuna that requires further study. Building *by* dwelling in this way guarantees one's dwelling in that process but doesn't necessarily, in the form of the building, provide any guarantee of any future dwelling once the building process ceases. With this example Heidegger is only interested in the process of building the farmhouse, not the ongoing poetic process that may or may not occur in subsequent years and for subsequent owners.

Consequently, in Chapter Three this thesis revisits the nature of my creative practice artefacts to explore the ways in which they are, as artefacts rather than processes, conducive to encouraging dwelling, not just for me, but also for others.

This idea develops by drawing from Roland Barthes's *The Death of the Author*, in which a text is determined to have more potential to engage with if we consider it as 'authorless'. Barthes develops the idea of a text's openness to continual recreation

by re-reading. Relating this to some of Heidegger's comments it will be determined that a particular kind of *emptiness*, found in what we will call a language of multiple fragments, is required in order to allow the dwelling we do as part of our being. This emptiness allows the dwelling process to continue unsuppressed. This observation serves to link various figures in the architectural profession to Heidegger's texts despite their lack of awareness of this fact.

The titles of these three chapters are: Heidegger's Dwelling and Poetry; Building Buildings *by* Dwelling; and Buildings *for* Dwelling.



A pictorial outline of the thesis including the three main chapters, introduction, and conclusion. Chapter One relates to Heidegger's texts and my creative practice explorations of the same. Chapters Two and Three relate to the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling as understood by this thesis. Chapter Two focuses on an extrapolation of Heidegger's building ideas and Chapter Three develops an architectural approach that aims to compel one's own experience of dwelling.

Chapter One: Heidegger, Dwelling, and Poetry

An exploration of Heidegger's texts on dwelling through creative practice



Fig 8: (Heidegger. 1971). *Poetry, Language, Thought.* Front cover. Photograph (Williams. 2013)

Chapter introduction

Thinking by making

Dwelling

Etymology of *bauen* (building)

Poetry

- Portfolio One - Experiences of poetry/Poetry of experiences

Etymology of *wohnen* (dwelling) and the fourfold

Preserving memories and perception

- Portfolio Two - Montages

Nearness to things

The emptiness of the jug

- Portfolio Three - The preserving of Perth Road

Concluding remarks to the chapter

Chapter introduction

This chapter is concerned with understanding and exploring Heidegger's concept of dwelling.

This thesis will outline a way of thinking of the architectural implications of Heidegger's discussion of dwelling that differs from previous interpretations. These insights came as a result of exploring Heidegger's texts through focussed observations arising from creative practice. These creative works illuminated and embodied the fundamentally *poetic* nature of Heidegger's dwelling concept that has hitherto been underrepresented by the architectural profession. Should the architectural profession wish to continue to use Heidegger as inspiration then this interpretation, more focussed on processes rather than products, should be understood.

The reason that Heidegger's philosophy is being discussed here is its central relation to the concept of 'place', to built form and dwelling, and consequently to architecture. The discussion of dwelling illuminates the way in which individuals make sense of their feeling of belonging in places. Heidegger, more famous for his work *Being and Time* on the nature of being-in-the-world, believed that his career could be divided into three chronological periods. He said, "Three terms, which carry each other forward even as they mark the stages of the path of [my] thought: Meaning – Truth – Place." (Casey. 1997. 279). It is in this third period that Heidegger's work on dwelling took place.

The book *Poetry, Language, Thought* consists of a collection of seven essays written in this latter, place-based, stage of Heidegger's career. Each is chosen, according to the translator's introduction, because in them Heidegger connects his earlier ideas of the nature of being to artefacts found in the world. These essays,

> fit together to bring out the main drift of his thinking that relates poetry, art, thought, and language to Being and to man's existing as the mortal he is. (Heidegger. 1971. xxiii)

This chapter is concerned with those essays that relate to built form and dwelling. I follow the lead of Adam Sharr (2007) in saying that these are, *Building Dwelling Thinking*, *The Thing*, and *...Poetically Man Dwells...* Each of these were presented as talks and published in the early 1950s. Hofstadter, the translator of *Poetry, Language, Thought* notes that,

> [Heidegger] is thinking always of the opening up of the possibility of authentic human existence—of a life in which man does not merely go on blindly, writhing in the grip of a basically false meaning of being, [...] but rather a life in which man truly *dwells*. (Heidegger. 1971. xiii)

It is the study of what it is to *truly dwell* that this chapter is concerned with.

Heidegger's philosophy has been of influence to a great many philosophers. Charles B. Guignon writing *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* in 1993 notes that "As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is increasingly clear that Heidegger will stand out as one of the greatest philosophers of our times" (Guignon. 1993. 1). He elaborates,

> His thought has contributed to phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), existentialism (Sartre, Ortega y Gasset), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur), political theory (Hannah Arendt, the early Marcuse), psychotherapy theory (Madard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May), theology (Rudolph Bultmann, Paul Tillich), as well as current postmodern and "new pragmatist" trends. (Guignon. 1993. 2)

Additionally, there have been various attempts to discuss Heidegger's dwelling in architectural terms in the 60 years since he presented *Building Dwelling Thinking* for the first time. His work here has been equally influential. As Adam Sharr notes in the introduction to *Heidegger for Architects* Heidegger was one of very few philosophers to write specifically for an audience of architects (Sharr. 2007. 1). Sharr goes on to list Zumthor, Norberg-Schulz, Pallasmaa, Vesely, Harries, and Holl each as "establishment figures [who] are responding in some way to Heidegger and his notions of dwelling and place." (Sharr. 2007. 1). This book by Sharr and Pavlos Lefas's *Dwelling and Architecture* (2009) shows the continuing appeal of Heidegger's philosophy to the architectural profession.

Heidegger's dwelling is not about occupying a house but is a more fundamentally human experience of being. How the built environment can contribute to dwelling is a question that has had various answers.

For Christian Norberg-Schulz, to be discussed more fully in Chapter Two, architects encourage dwelling by building buildings in keeping with local conditions. This allows one to more fully understand one's location. For Peter Zumthor our dwelling can be enhanced through bodily interactions with sensorially stimulating environments. His buildings' rich textures and materials ask us to engage with spaces.

Whilst dwelling has been explored before by architects the interpretation of Heidegger provided in this thesis recontextualises dwelling into its *poetic* context. The focus on dwelling becomes the process of experiencing the environment rather than concentrating on products in the environment. To some extent this focus on process removes the dwelling conversation from the hands of the architectural profession, so it is not surprising that it has so far been underrepresented in the relevant literature. A discussion of Heidegger that points more to rules for building products is always going to remain more appealing to an audience of builders. This thesis discusses dwelling's poetic nature and how we might build to encourage this process with the knowledge that it can never be guaranteed. Consequently, whilst some arguments will no doubt be familiar from other interpretations of Heidegger this thesis provides a new understanding of dwelling as a creative process.

Heidegger's texts alter our understanding of words such as dwelling, nearness, poetry, and building. Through this we come to see that the essence of dwelling is a poetic engagement with spaces, and that by continually constructing memories and associations in our minds we make places meaningful. Our dwelling is a poetic process of bringing places near to our hearts and this bringing near is a kind of building that we do continually.



Fig 9: (Williams. 2013). For Heidegger we are always *in* our image of the environment. Our being is a fundamentally spatial phenomenon.

These observations of Heidegger's texts were made through close reading of his texts in conjunction with a variety of creative practices. These creative practices were intended to study Heidegger's concepts through engagement in the world that reflects a central focus of his thought; that a study of experience should begin with experiences. Through this process of creating his philosophy was brought by this thesis into a physical state and so became relevant for architectural discussion. Extrapolating Heidegger's texts through physical examples and artefacts can alter the way that both Heidegger and our relationship to the environment can be understood.

Frequently throughout this chapter I will attempt to illustrate Heidegger's thoughts with examples and insights of my own. Due to the subject matter these necessarily have an autobiographical aspect. Dwelling is a subjective process. The subjective nature of dwelling was not seen as a barrier to the relevance of this research. Instead, the understanding of the subjective nature of what it is to dwell is a strength of self-reflective research methods. There is a long precedence for the auto-ethnographic method. Freud for example establishes an entire field of enquiry on his reflections and thoughts about his own experience.

The reasons for this practice-led research will begin this chapter. The area in which the study took place and the particular methods of sketch, montage and models will be outlined in the section *Thinking by making.* Following this, Heidegger's arguments will be discussed in successive sections interspersed with portfolios of the creative practice that helped illuminate his philosophy.

The section *Dwelling* will discuss that Heidegger's focus on homelessness frames the importance of the need for a reappraisal of the state of dwelling in contemporary times.

Heidegger's methods will then be explored in the section *Etymology of bauen (building)*. Heidegger here traces the linguistic roots of 'building' and 'dwelling' to 'being', at which point this thesis briefly explores Heidegger's earlier work *Being & Time* (1927) for which he is most famous.

A discussion about poetry will make clear the importance of a lived re-engagement with space in the section *Poetry*. A portfolio of work including sketches and documentation of habitual walks will follow in which some of my experiences of the poetic will be discussed in the section *Portfolio One - Experiences of poetry/Poetry of experiences*.

Heidegger's difficult concept of the fourfold will be explored in the section *Etymology of wohnen (dwelling) and the fourfold*. Here, Heidegger's focus on the perceptual rather than the abstractions of measurements is most clear. The building and preserving of our memories is seen to be the essence of dwelling.

A discussion of the role of poetry in preserving the memories of experiences will follow in the section *Preserving memories and perception*. The exploration of this will be documented in *Portfolio Two - Montages*.

Where we fix memories we feel near to, in the same way that we can be 'near' to a friend who lives many miles away. The section *Nearness to things* will discuss this in more detail. These 'built things' can sometimes be regarded as 'places' in the architectural sense and those which are near to me will also be discussed.

Heidegger argues that there is an essential emptiness to things that we are near to. It must be this way for us to 'fill' them with our personal interpretation, just as is the case with a poem. How this positions us as always inside something, never outside, will be discussed in the section on *The emptiness of the jug*.

An example of this poetic preserving of memories and experiences, building, dwelling, thinking, and being, will be explored in *Portfolio Three - The preserving of Perth Road.* Poetic preserving may be visualised in my creative responses but this section goes further and asks how the artefact aids the poetic experience of others as well.

In the chapters that follow, this theory and creative practice will be woven into an architectural discussion. Firstly by exploring Heidegger's solutions to the fact that dwelling is being misunderstood and why this is often at odds with the way that the architectural profession conceives of building buildings, discussed in Chapter Two. And practice and theory merge when these two modes of inquiry meet in Chapter Three.

Thinking by making

Fascinated by the idea of home, so clearly a physical entity but also with an emotional and philosophical depth that few other structure types possess, I began this research with a view that non-objective qualities of space were those that were most important. However, aiming to study these is inherently difficult. A magnifying glass focussed on this subject misses significant details at the periphery. Specifically, there are memories and associations that dance on the peripheries of perception. In thinking about my *own* subjective responses, the reasons I feel at home are not quantitative, they are not due to the dimensions of the room alone. Gaston Bachelard puts it well when he says that,

> the real houses of memory [...] do not readily lend themselves to description [...] All we communicate to others [about a memory of a home] is an orientation towards whichever is secret without ever being able to tell the secret objectively. [...] What would be the use, for instance, in giving the plan of the room that was really my room [?] (Bachelard. 1958. 13)

I was inspired by the work of architects who discussed the idea that there is a richness in architecture that transcends the measurable: people like the architect Peter Zumthor, for example, who writes “Quality architecture to me is when a building manages to move me. What on earth is it that moves me? How can I get it into my own work? [...] One word for it is atmosphere.” (Zumthor. 2006b. 10); or writers on architecture who emphasised the feelings of things, like Juhani Pallasmaa who states that,

> Standing barefoot on a smooth glacial rock by the sea at sunset, and sensing the warmth of the sun-heated stone through one’s soles, is an extraordinarily healing experience, making one part of the eternal cycle of nature. One senses the slow breathing of the earth. (Pallasmaa. 2005. 58)

Through these qualitative observations I was drawn to the idea of Heidegger’s later period philosophy. This work shares with architecture an interest in the subject of ‘place’. The essay *Building Dwelling Thinking* was of particular interest and had been referenced by each of these architects. The idea of the word ‘dwelling’, so frequently

used in terms of housing, having a philosophical depth was something I felt unavoidably drawn to. In the title, ‘building’, ‘dwelling’, and ‘thinking’ are written without commas. This was not intended as a list but, intriguingly, a tripartite singularity.

Heidegger’s texts seemed to imply that dwelling was something that occurred not only in one’s own home but also inherently concerned personal relationships with places. His work on being suggests that we are not an abstract intelligence perceiving an external world. Instead, we are *always* in the world before we analyse our experience of it. For Heidegger, this undermines the importance given, in Western society, to a dimensional view of space since this not only ignores aspects of embodied perception but through its totalitarian assertion of objective truth can serve to suppress the validity of experiential judgements.

Consequently, Heidegger’s work alters the way we can think of our relation to the world. The world should, according to Heidegger, be understood in terms of our relationships to artefacts encountered experientially. This experience is not as a detached intellect engaging with a world ‘out-there’. For Heidegger, it is not that we are a mind and have a body but that we are a mindful body. This perceptual flip serves to demand that our encounters with the world are physical. In the body-first mode of thinking we are always primarily perceiving the world as experienced. We experience the world at eye level and with kinaesthetic sensations in our legs, our balance, in our sensitivity to temperature and with all our memories and associations affecting what we perceive. Consequently any abstractions of the artefacts we encounter, measurement being critical amongst these, come as secondary. These abstractions in fact are a step away from lived experience.

Adam Sharr notes that Heidegger often used the idea of walking along a path as representative of thought. This path may or may not lead to a solution but along its route side branches might appear to allow one to alter course. Thought is therefore considered by Heidegger as a fundamentally experiential phenomenon. Sharr says that,

> For Heidegger, the scientific method of investigation which subjects an object to a system was alien to human experience [...] The scientific approach would, perhaps, be like exploring a forest by striking out according to a compass bearing. The compass suggests no attempt to understand how people have engaged with the forest intuitively before. (Sharr. 2007. 85)

Heidegger's text was so clearly about the physical world yet his writing style is so convoluted that it is difficult to comprehend for the casual reader. Or perhaps as Theodor Adorno acidly states in *The Jargon of Authenticity*, in Heidegger's texts, "[...] jargon overflows with the pretence of deep human emotion [...]" (Adorno. 1964. 6). In any case, in order to explore dwelling, the methods involved in this thesis explore my own sense of dwelling through a study of experiences carried out through creative practice. I was, like Edward Relph in *Place and Placelessness,* trying to "explore place as a phenomenon of the geography of the lived-world of our everyday experiences." (Relph. 1976. 6).

Fig 10: (Williams. 2013). I used sketches, montages, and models as methods of exploring Heidegger's concept of dwelling in places in which I dwelled.

Through creative practice one is placed firmly *in the world*. This follows Heidegger's texts that advocate understanding our fundamental in-worldness. Consequently creative practice is especially suited to this personal study of dwelling. A degree of this type of thinking through physical engagement was beneficial as a complement to Heidegger's philosophical thinking. This benefit comes from the fact that although Heidegger's text is strongly involved with the physical world it engages with it only through thought.

The importance that Heidegger places on the lived experience suggests that a study of his texts *through* lived experience would be more educative than merely studying them as abstract, un-lived, theory. Whilst one way of exploring lived experience is through thought - this is after all the mode in which Heidegger worked - another method is through creative practice. In the context of this thesis creative practice is seen as a type of thinking that occurs through making.

In *The Thinking Hand,* Juhani Pallasmaa discusses creative practice with a similar premise to Heidegger. Pallasmaa writes that in contemporary society we have become convinced that a disjunction exists between the mind and the body in the world. He argues for a connected understanding of the relationship between mind and body in the environment stating that "The senses are not merely passive receptors of stimuli, and the body is not only a point of viewing the world from a central perspective. [...] *The human body is a knowing entity.*" (Pallasmaa. 2009. 13. My italics). Once we begin to think of knowledge held *through* the body the distinction between mind and world becomes blurred. One walks up stairs without thought, it happens without any analysis of treads and risers. A stone weighs about as much in one's hand as one might expect. In fact, an excess of conscious thought might serve to impede experience. The mind, therefore, *is* the body in the world, or at least one aspect of it.

When it comes to creative practice Pallasmaa continues, the use of a pencil, he states, "is a bridge between the imagining mind and the image that appears on the sheet of paper [...]." The act of drawing for Pallasmaa, it seems, offers a direct line to one's mind unmediated by interpretation or spin. Through creative practice mind, body, and world, come together. The world is 'seen' differently in that moment and portrayed through

the work. “All art forms – such as sculpture, painting, music, cinema and architecture – are specific modes of thinking,” says Pallasmaa, “Creative work calls for a double perspective: one needs to focus simultaneously on the world and on oneself, the external space and one’s inner mental space.” (Pallasmaa. 2009. 19).

Creative practice entails a level of thought that demands engagement. One must by definition make something new. When carrying out a creative response with an agenda one’s observations cannot be ambivalently held because by externalising them they become illuminated. In the case of my work exploring my sense of dwelling, I was forced to ask how the creative practice was educative of my relation to space not simply representative of spaces. One might go so far as to say that the act of drawing, for example, can ‘draw forth’ attitudes and buried thoughts by making visible that which is repressed in other states. Consequently the resulting artefacts from this creative practice can be seen as exercises in *exploring sensitivity to spaces*. Creative practice in this context served as a mode of thinking rather than as a method of creating a product.

There is something inherent in the nature of making a physical artefact that demands thought and introspection. The process of using one’s hands entails a direct communication with the product. French art historian Henri Focillon in *In Praise of Hands* states that,

> Knowledge of the world demands a kind of tactile flair. Sight slips over the surface of the universe. The hand knows that an object has physical bulk, that it is smooth or rough, that it is not soldered to heaven or earth from which it appears to be inseparable. [...] Surface, volume, density and weight are not optical phenomena. Man first learned about them between his fingers and in the hollow of his palm. He does not measure space with his eyes, but with his hands and feet. The sense of touch fills nature with mysterious forces. (Focillon. 1934. 28)

It is the tactile experience of being in a space that is explored in the creative practice of this thesis. The quality of the artefacts was not, to begin with, considered as particularly relevant, what was important was the process of making them. The experience of thoughtfully making something by hand forces one to engage with the artefact. This engenders a relationship with the artefact that would never be possible if it were simply

given. Everyone can understand the romance involved with crafting a table or building one's own home. These artefacts created in the course of this research, whilst never going to be considered high art, are for me embodiments of care and memory.

The creative work carried out during the course of this research formed the primary mode of thinking about dwelling. Insights gained through the process of creative practice, and reflections upon this process, were developed in tandem with a close reading of Heidegger's texts. Thinking through *practice* and thinking through *theory* did not occur in isolation from one another.

I began to read Heidegger as saying that dwelling is a creative process by the individual rather than a passive reception of the space's inherent qualities. Although places *can* be described in terms of their inherent qualities, perhaps their dimensions or colour, one's nearness to a space is built through one's experiences and does not exist entirely within the space itself. This observation begins a distinction between space as a product and as a process. On the one hand space is a product, a fixed entity with qualities inherent and immutable. On the other hand, following Heidegger, we have individuals in space, flexible and complex, accumulating space perceptions. Following this latter interpretation of space, we can see that instead of the built environment being dominated by architects, individuals are the makers and builders of the interpretation of the environment.

Heidegger states that there is a gap in modern life between dwelling and building buildings, and by engaging with his texts in a physical way I hoped to begin to develop a method in which to bridge this gap. I began to pursue a self reflective study of these ideas in the area in which I lived. This area would be my laboratory for exploring dwelling.

By this point I had lived in Dundee for several years. Having recently moved into a new area, a study of how my feelings of home were experienced and how they developed seemed like the perfect opportunity to explore Heidegger's philosophy. I was keen to see how consciously exploring this relationship would in turn affect it.

The major access roads to Dundee consist of five arterial roads leading to nearby towns. The names Arbroath Road, Forfar Road, Strathmartine Road, Coupar Angus Road, and Perth Road each reflect their destinations. Perth Road begins at the edge of the town centre and heads west for several miles. The area along this road particular to my study begins at the university's Matthew and Crawford buildings, where the architecture studios are, and ends at the Sinderins junction just south of the flat that I had just bought. This section of road between the two points forming my habitual walk to and from work, consists largely of four storied, stone built, tenement buildings around a century old, with shop fronts at ground level and flats above. These shops form one of the satellite zones for grocery shopping from Dundee's central hub. To the south of Perth road is the Roseangle area.

Fig 11: (Williams. 2013). Dundee showing the Tay rail and road bridges to the south. The five arterial roads are highlighted in red, the area of study, Perth Road, is highlighted in yellow.

Looking at old maps reveals that the area was once made of ropework and mill buildings for Dundee's jute, jam and journalism trades, interspersed with large houses. It is now a fascinating residential area consisting of a warren of interconnected streets, some still cobbled. The large gardens of the houses have over time been sold off for building plots but some still remain hidden behind large walls, secret gardens that only a very few ever see despite the heavy footfall on the narrow streets.

The streets running downhill from Perth Road, through the Roseangle area, lead towards the Tay estuary. These are, from east to west, Westfield Place, Westfield Lane, Seafield Road, Seafield Lane, Thomson Street, Paton's Lane, Step Row, Union Place, and Shepard's Loan. Some of these offer spectacular views of the Tay and the famous Tay rail bridge, and to Fife beyond.

Along the northern edge of Perth Road the line of tenements opens at several points into 'squares' that offer respite from the urban enclosure.



Top - Fig 12: (Williams. 2013). Perth Road, highlighting my home and my work
Bottom - Fig 13: (Williams. 2013). Perth Road, views and 'squares'

By exploring my relationship to this area through creative practice responses I hoped to more fully understand the way in which I dwelled there. The projects that follow consist of a variety of methods which can be seen as broadly psychogeographical. Defined by The Situationists psychogeography is “The study of the specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organised or not, on the emotions and behaviours of the individuals.” (Ford. 2004. 34).

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The process began in the most simple of ways, by walking into work each day and thinking about the area. This soon developed into sections, plans, and photographs of the walk that provided a survey of the area with traditional tools of the architectural profession. Sketching spaces in the area was carried out with the intention of focussing attention on aspects of the space through increased engagement. Photomontages were used to represent spaces in a way that could incorporate perception. Collages and screen prints of these montages were then used as a further layer of analysis. Finally models of the whole area were created, both as scale models with representative materials or as models that perverted the true form to convey my impression of the place.

These various methods were used because I felt that a single viewpoint could never be enough to explore the richness of reality. Instead, by attempting to explore my perception of spaces through various attempts I was forced to look again and again at the same space, questioning and rethinking it each time thereby building on my

Fig 14: (Williams. 2013). Photo series representing my habitual walk.

relationship. Ideas were explored and explored again through repeated attempts and in different media. Each project was concerned with the whole concept of dwelling as it stood in my mind at the time, rather than about distinct ideas separated from one another. I found that the period of engaged contemplation during the creative process often brought about ideas that were not previously evident as my understanding of dwelling developed.

This did not occur, however, in a neatly organised world of linearity but in a cyclical loop of initially interrelated ideas through which an intellectual path was necessarily traced in order to construct a cohesive argument. Through periods of contemplation both in creative practice and after the act, I attempted to situate the work – discarding some ideas, building others up – within my developing understanding of dwelling.

I was, at this time, not sure how the creative practice would relate to the research: whether it would be a mode of thinking explored in an appendix; a site survey for a design project which I would later call the *real work;* or, as it turned out, a key step in developing the understanding of dwelling's poetic nature.

What developed was an understanding of dwelling that focussed on poetic experience. This is a process of repetition and engagement. Through this work it was clear that the places on Perth Road were brought emotionally close to me. I began to understand that the place making we do every day as dwellers is a repeated process of poetic engagement, through which we accumulate memories and associations and construct a sense of nearness with places.

What I eventually realised was that my creative process mirrored the dwelling process and I was therefore enacting the process of dwelling in a physical fashion. This work would go on to become a bridge into the world of the physical from the way we dwell psychologically, discussed more fully in Chapter Two, that Heidegger had stated was unbridged in modern times.

With this creative practice in mind, at this point we should delve into Heidegger's texts on the topic of dwelling.

Dwelling

The essay *Building Dwelling Thinking* (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*) was first presented in Darmstadt, Germany on the 5th August 1951 at the conference "Man and Space" to an audience of architects, engineers and philosophers (Sharr. 2007. 36). In its densely packed pages Heidegger questioned the relationship that exists between people and spaces. He set out a deepened understanding of what it means to dwell that is based on being and building as processes. Heidegger's aim with this essay was to make this true nature of what it is to dwell more prominent in our thoughts.

For Heidegger dwelling doesn't just relate to housing. The term 'a dwelling' was in his view a noun that represented a more modern, in Heidegger's mind a lesser, understanding of a primal verb 'to dwell'. The verb *dwelling* is for Heidegger an act that we carry out continually, we are dwellers. Through dwelling we come to feel belonging in places.[1] We have, he argued, begun to concern ourselves more fully with the noun form than the more important verb form. We are more concerned with the acquisition of buildings to house us than with understanding the process by which we come to belong somewhere. Bluntly put we are more concerned with houses than homes. This is, in Heidegger's view, a reason for many people in contemporary society's sense of alienation, what he calls 'homelessness'. As with Heidegger's earlier work, that will be discussed in due course, this act of dwelling is predicated on the observation that we are not separate from the world. We are not an abstract intelligence perceiving a world out-there. Instead, we are in the world first before we analyse our experience of it and subject this experience to abstractions like measuring. Any judgement of the environment, including a study of dwelling, must begin with an awareness of this unity.

1 A note on the translation of the text: Heidegger uses the words 'Ort', 'Platz', and 'Raum' in his text. Hofstadter translates these as 'location', 'place', and 'space' respectively. However the German word 'Ort' would be a better translated as 'place' since it better conveys notions of belonging and concern. 'Platz', in turn, is in fact closer to the English for 'site' or 'area'. Following Adam Sharr (2007. 51) this thesis will use the term 'place' as meaning both 'Ort' and 'Platz'. This is also in keeping with other English language traditions of Norberg-Schulz and Seamon.

Set against the backdrop of post WWII housing shortages Heidegger emphasised ‘homelessness’ as a key issue of concern. Ultimately this focus on homelessness comes as a result of what Heidegger saw as the widespread ambivalence with which we think of our being-in-the-world.

He was not interested in physical homelessness. This problem would be solvable simply by building more houses, an issue that was already of great importance to the country at the time. In the mass housing and sprawling placelessness of post WWII Germany Heidegger saw no authentic human existence, no dwelling occurring. He discusses mass housing being built on a vast scale as consisting of houses that “may even be well planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light, and sun” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). These are of course important aspects but Heidegger’s fear was that they did not answer our need to dwell and in fact become all that is considered to be important, thereby stifling true dwelling. He goes on to ask rhetorically, “but – do the houses in themselves, hold any guarantee that *dwelling* occurs in them?” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). Heidegger’s homelessness is a lack of feeling at home. This is a feeling of alienation, a distance between the individual and their environment that cannot be bridged by proximity. These were problems that Heidegger saw resulting from the large quantity of cheap post-war housing but remain familiar problems in today’s society.

The main tendency toward this homelessness occurs, as Heidegger sees it, because we have lost concern with our dwelling, we have stopped thinking of the act of dwelling as being related to our being. Thus the philosopher’s concern was with *the essence of what it is to dwell* as opposed to the constructions of dwellings.

Heidegger evidences a lack of interest in architectural style or solutions, his aim is instead to articulate the problem. He clearly notes that he “does not presume to discover architectural ideas” but instead that, “Enough will have been gained if dwelling and building have become *worthy of questioning* and thus have remained *worthy of thought.*” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158).

The problem of our dwelling is, for Heidegger, not the production of more buildings, but the truer engagement with the process of what it is *to dwell,* "the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. [...] The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell." (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). Heidegger is saying that the reason that we become homeless is that each of us must concern ourselves with our own dwelling and continue repeating this mindfulness. This is something that is smoothed over and ignored by the focus on aspects of mass housing that are only well planned, easy to keep, attractively cheap, open to air, light, and sun. In actuality the relationship we have with our environment is never given to us fully formed, instead we are always learning, and re-learning this. Heidegger says that we *try* to solve our homelessness with the acquisition of products, by "planning the whole architectural enterprise" (Heidegger. 1971a. 158), but this is always a misunderstanding of what it is to dwell.

One's perception of places is changeable; somewhere that was once home can become semi-forgotten as we dwell somewhere else. We find a feeling of belonging in other places after a memorable experience or an accumulated relationship. This can occur as much in a building called 'a dwelling' as it can in a factory or a public park but the relationship must be maintained through our engagement. We can see then that true dwelling must be in a fragile state, never fully attained but constantly sought. By saying that we 'must ever learn to dwell', it seems that Heidegger is saying that we are always slipping toward homelessness, disorder is always increasing and it is through the process of our dwelling that our perception of the world holds together. However, we have forgotten to dwell. Thus he identifies dwelling as an act that each person must attain toward themselves. In order to combat one's own existential homelessness one must give thought to the process of dwelling. "What if man's homelessness consisted in this," he says, "that man still does not even think of the *real* plight of dwelling as *the* plight? Yet as soon as man *gives thought* to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer." (Heidegger. 1971a. 159).

The way we *perceive* places can be seen as a personal nebula of memories and associations that we superimpose upon spaces. We each perceive a different reality due to our individually unique pasts. Some spaces become close to us and we consider them to be meaningful places, others do not. This is ever changing, accumulating and eroding with each new experience. We keep on making places through our continued negotiation with them, making them anew with changes.

However, this is not to say that one's particular perception of a space is any more or less 'true' than any one else's, or indeed the objective measurements of the space. Individuals are not controlling the environment by building and preserving their memories in places, simply responding to it in the manner of a dweller. As is stressed throughout this thesis the anthropocentric impulse - to put humans on a higher level

Fig 15: (Williams. 2013). Through this research I have studied my changing relationship to a place through giving it thought in the form of walks, sketches, montages, and models. In the beginning Perth Road was a place that I did not feel any particular connection with. Through the series of projects however it has become a place with a particular series of individual memories and associations that I hold near. My homelessness in this place has been replaced with a feeling of belonging and a fondness that I had not thought possible. Rather than this occurring through the addition of a new building, an architect "planning the whole enterprise", this occurred through my shifting perception of the area. Heidegger in *Building Dwelling Thinking* calls for individuals to concern themselves more fully with their own dwelling. "But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on *their* part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling." (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). Only in this way, with mental rather than physical changes, can one's homelessness be reduced.

than the world which becomes their subject - is one that Heidegger's philosophy rejects completely. We are always part of the world through our mindful body, never separate from it.

The way that an accumulative building of images affects our unconscious mind is described by Freud in the introduction to *Civilization and its Discontents.* Freud provides us with an image of Rome, but not of contemporary Rome, nor of Renaissance Rome, nor even of the Rome of the Roman Empire, but of Rome *throughout all time,* overlaid upon itself with different buildings existing simultaneously (Freud. 1929. 7).

This serves as a model through which Freud sees the difficulty of discussing the richness of the unconscious mind in simple terms, consisting as it does of layers and layers of experience, memory and associations. We 'see through' these accumulated layers of experience to a coloured perception of our personal reality. Where in Rome "... the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero's vanished Golden House." (Freud. 1929. 7). In our mind the space before us contains all our previous

Fig 16: (Williams. 2013). We perceive all out memories and associations superimposed seamlessly upon all space. For each person these are different based on their unique lives.

experience. Perceiving the world thus consists of one's ineffable nebula of memories and associations projected upon all space. It is an ever changing and incomplete perception of space which allows for the potential of new experience. Every act affects the relationship with that place through additional layering.

Freud also develops an understanding of the weight that our memories and associations have on our perception of a space in *A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis* (1936). In this short letter he discusses an old memory that he has been studying.

Once, when he and his brother were on holiday in Greece, they received an opportunity to visit the Acropolis. Oddly, before they agreed to go, they spent the morning dejected but neither discussing their feelings with the other. He describes two competing feelings when they finally arrived. Firstly he expresses the surprise that the Acropolis did in fact exist and was more than just images in books, "When, finally, on the afternoon after our arrival, I stood on the Acropolis and cast my eyes around upon the landscape, a surprising thought suddenly entered my mind: 'So all this really *does* exist just as we learnt at school!'" (Freud. 1936. 241). Secondly, he realises with surprise that he had doubted it at all. His memories and associations altered the way that this place was perceived.



Fig 17: (Williams. 2013). We see through these layers and layers of perception to a coloured view of reality.

He traces their feelings of dejection earlier that morning to the fact that the opportunity was unexpected and tinged with a feeling of it being ‘too good to be true’. They had expected the confrontation with one of the most famous remnants of antiquity to be ‘unreal’ since it existed, till then, only in books. Additionally they had had no time to prepare for this confrontation. Further to this he expresses that there was also a personal sense of repressed guilt for surpassing his father’s achievements, in both the extent of his travels and the extent of his education that allowed him to fully comprehend the importance of the Acropolis. This is a famous place, one that Freud was clearly aware of beforehand. The fact that his response to it could be so idiosyncratic shows to what extent our memories and associations play on our perception of any experience. If a place that has been discussed many thousands of times can be so personally affecting, other places must also be open to vast discrepancies in an individual’s perception.

Bachelard too discusses the weight of memory in our perception of spaces. His book *The Poetics of Space* delves into the ways in which we perceive significance. For Bachelard places that are near to our hearts and changeable, breathing, entities. “It is a strange situation.” he says, “The space we love is unwilling to remain permanently enclosed. It deploys and appears to move elsewhere without difficulty; into other times, and on different planes of dream and memory” (Bachelard. 1958. 53).

As with my repeated walks along Perth Road every day, the relationship we have with places is built up *piece by piece and step by step* through experience. It is a repeating process of engagement. I aimed to manifest this process in the artefacts. Each of my projects consists of another look, another iteration of experience. Step by step and project by project my relationship to Perth Road developed.

Fig 18: (Williams. 2013): My own confrontation with Ronchamp that began this discussion was coloured by my prior knowledge of it and the fact that I had travelled so far to see it just as remarked by Freud. The first day felt like an enormous let down due to the busy crowds and my own raised expectations. It wasn't till the second day, under more peaceful circumstances that I was able to feel its incredible nature.

Fig 19: (Williams. 2013): Each reflection on Perth Road added another layer of experience to see through, altering the way it was perceived each time.

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Asking “What is it to dwell?” Heidegger states that although we don’t term all buildings dwellings - his examples are bridges and hangars, stadiums and power stations - they nonetheless all belong within the domain of our dwelling. Therefore dwelling is not only to do with houses. All buildings belong in the realm of dwelling. Hinting that he means to elaborate on what dwelling’s true nature is, Heidegger says, “These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means merely that we take shelter in them.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). This rhetorical style, so typical of Heidegger, implies that *to dwell* in fact means more than taking shelter. We can feel ‘at home’ in our house, but also in the places with which we have a relationship such as places associated with a fond memory. He lists truck drivers who are “at home on the highway”, the working woman who is “at home in the spinning mill”, and the chief engineer who is “at home in the power plant”. None of these people would call these places their dwelling place (noun), however they do dwell there (verb).

Heidegger begins to elaborate. “Dwelling and building are related as end and means.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). It appears for a moment that Heidegger has settled on a statement: ‘we build in order to dwell’. However, as he goes on we see that their essential nature is yet more complicated,

> However, as long as this is all we have in mind, we take dwelling and building as two separate activities, [...] by the means-end schema we block our view of the essential relations. For building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling – to build is in itself already to dwell. (Heidegger. 1971a. 144)

For Heidegger, building and dwelling are not separate activities, nor is one purely a way to achieve the other. Instead they exist as mutually supporting experiences of being. The way that we are, the way that we exist in the environment, is a balance between building-then-dwelling-amongst-our-buildings, and dwelling-that-defines-how-we-build. Adam Sharr gives a concise explanation of this with regards to a dinner table (Sharr. 2007. 41). He notes that the way a table is used can be a metaphor for dwelling, and setting the table is a kind of ‘building’ that is carried out in order to satisfy the

requirements of the diners. The way that people use the table, that is to say how they dwell with the table, is directly linked to how the table was set. But the way in which the table was set was directly linked with how the builder envisioned the dwellers using it. There was no means-end relationship since the processes of building and dwelling were linked. Sharr goes on to describe the idea that building a house is conceptually not too far from this process. As one's requirements change one might alter the house to reflect this. Similarly the arrangement of the house will define how one lives. "To the philosopher, this would be the same activity as the arrangement and rearrangement of the dining table, but on a larger scale." (Sharr. 2007. 42). This is an idea that we shall return to with greater focus in Chapter Two.

How Heidegger comes to know this entwined relationship between building and dwelling is through a study of language. "Who gives us a standard at all by which we can take the measure of the nature of dwelling and building?" he asks, "It is language that tells us the nature of a thing, provided we respect language's own nature." (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). In respecting language's 'own nature' Heidegger believes that by tracing the etymology of a word we can retrace the original impulse behind its meaning, clouded and corrupted by time and misuse. Heidegger's use of words in seemingly unconventional ways that result from his etymological studies was due to his desire to discuss more specifically aspects of experience that were hitherto not possible. This previous inability was due to the clouded and imprecise way that language is frequently used. By tracing the etymology of a word we gain insight into its roots, we glimpse where the word originated, how it developed, and in what context it was used. When Heidegger uses an etymological study of building (*bauen*) and dwelling (*wohnen*) he believes that this illuminates the original impulse behind these acts. Heidegger traces both words back to a relation with *being*. To build and to dwell are, he says, *to be.*



Fig 20: (Williams. 2013): An etymological diagram of the roots of the word *bauen*. Through his study, and elaborated by this thesis into Scottish Gaelic, Heidegger relates building to dwelling and to being.

Etymology of *bauen* (building)

Heidegger begins by tracing the etymological roots of the word building (*bauen* from the title *Bauen Wohnen Denken*). He says "What, then, does *Bauen*, building, *mean*? The Old English and High German word for building, *buan*, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to stay in a place." (Heidegger. 1971a. 144).

Researching this etymology confirms that the Old High German *būan*, from where *bauen* originated, means to build, as does the Old Saxon *būan*. Old English's *būan* however means 'to live or dwell' and each of these comes from the Proto-Germanic *būanan* which also means to dwell. Interestingly the fact that 'to dwell' therefore means "to remain, to stay in a place" can also be seen in a contemporary English use of dwell (to dwell on a topic) and in the contemporary Scottish Gaelic use of the word *buan* meaning long-lasting and durable. Consequently, Heidegger argued, the contemporary German *bauen* came from words relating to building, dwelling, and remaining. Shadows of this connection remain in a few words like 'neighbour' which comes from words relating to "*neah*, near, and *gebur*, dweller. [...] the Nachgebaurer, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby." (Heidegger. 1971a. 145). However, apart from a few exceptions the link Heidegger made, he states, has almost completely been forgotten.

Taking the exploration further, Heidegger says that we can find out *how* this building/ dwelling relationship occurs. He traces *bauen* further to *bin*, as in, *ich bin*, I am. This tells him that we are always dwelling, as we are always being. Thus we can see that 'to be' also means 'to build' and 'to dwell'. The three are linked as variations of the same impulse.

Heidegger's linking of building to being is not intended to be read as saying "when one says 'building' one really means 'being'" in a manner of sub-conscious word association. Instead, it suggests that in the evolution of language when a verb describing the act of 'building' originated it came out of a pre-existing verb meaning 'being'. This implies for Heidegger that at one time humans related the act of building to the act of being. We are and we build. This fundamental use of building has been corrupted to the point where 'building' is understood as a particular act; we now express that one is either 'building' or 'not building' at any one time. Heidegger sees the value of reminding ourselves that we are in some sense *building* all the time, as we are *dwelling* all the time, as we are indeed *being* all the time, not as synonymous activities, but as quintessentially linked activities.

If we trace further the etymology of the word '*būanan*' (to dwell) we see that it has roots in a proto-Indo-European word b^huh that means to become, to grow, to appear, so Heidegger's assertion could well be correct. We find that to build and to dwell are manners of being. He says "I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans *are* on the earth, is *Buan,* dwelling." (Heidegger. 1971a. 145). To be, to build and to dwell, are verbs that we are enacting continually. No matter what else we are doing, we are always being, building, and dwelling. In contemporary times we think of the word building as solely a physical act but through this connection to dwelling, Heidegger shows that it was once conceived of as an action that defined our being. The noun, 'a building', came after this original impulse and became associated with the meaning, *to build.* The result of this is that all of the original overtones of 'building' as 'dwelling' and 'being' have been lost, "The real sense of *bauen,* namely dwelling, falls into oblivion." (Heidegger. 1971a. 146). The problem that

this misunderstanding causes is, Heidegger says, that we never think of dwelling as "the basic character of human being." (Heidegger. 1971a. 146) and so we do not act in a way that considers our dwelling as important.

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This connection of 'building' and 'dwelling' to 'being' links back to Heidegger's earlier work in *Being and Time.* Various sources discuss this period, Steiner's *Heidegger* (1992) for example, or Casey's *The Fate of Place* (1997) which places Heidegger alongside other philosophers who have discussed the idea of place. For a discussion of this period of work with a creative angle, Mitchell's *Heidegger Among the Sculptors* (2010) is a good example.

Heidegger's main focus in his earlier work was on the question of being. Despite the fact that we are surrounded by things we forget to question the fact that there is something at all. We do not study our being or take joy from the is-ness of things. The history of much Western thought makes it seem odd to even question this. How one conceives of the world is reinforced from all sides by a tradition of thought that discusses what things are, but not what *is* is. The question of being, in Heidegger's mind, should be addressed by poets discussing *that* things exist, a celebration of the mindful, rather than a study of the matter of things. Aristotle stated that all things have both 'substance' and 'attributes': what something is, its substance, and a description of it, its attributes. But, although this now seems perfectly reasonable and obvious, Heidegger questioned the fact that 'the thing is', is also a statement that can be made that is neither about substance nor attribute. Similarly, concepts such as numbers are real and without inherent substance. Our emotions are real and without substance also. For Heidegger, a philosophy that didn't discuss these is indicative of an impoverished world view. Heidegger's observations can be seen as suggestive of an alternative way to conceive of our world view. In doing so he undermines thousands of years of post-Platonic philosophy arguing that the discussion is constructed of terms that are predicated upon a system that fundamentally misunderstands our being.

Heidegger's work is predicated on the observation that we are in the world, experiencing it before we abstract observations about our experience into quantifiable data. This emphasis on the importance of our lived perception is key to understanding Heidegger's philosophy. This idea dramatically re-imagines our world view from a perspective that places us as detached observers, objectifying reality. Mitchell in *Being and Time* states that,

> Heidegger explores the existential nature of *Dasein* (literally "being there") as a being-in-the-world. This is surely a departure from the metaphysical tradition of objectivity and the idea of a self-present subject independent of the world around it. [...] Heidegger argues against the primacy of a detached or isolated subject that would regard the world around it as objects of scientific observation or investigation. (Mitchell. 2010. 3-5)

This is Heidegger's paradigm shifting focus. We perceive the world before any process of abstraction. His philosophy explicitly places the individual in the world. As Steiner notes "To be human is to be immersed, implanted, rooted *in* the earth, in the quotidian matter-of-factness of the world. ("human" has in it humus, the Latin for "earth")." (Steiner. 1992. 83). By considering our being-in-the-world Heidegger raises individuals from being subject to the world. Due to the fundamentally different conception of being that Heidegger outlines it is no wonder that his work has been appropriated in ways that do not fully fit his ideas. Architects have attempted to use his ideas but do so from a position of detached intellect. If we are to reinterpret Heidegger's theory we must join him down in the dirt of our being-in-the-world.

Marcel de Certeau in *The Practice of Everyday Life* echoes Heidegger in saying that "the everyday has a certain strangeness that does not surface, or whose surface is only its upper limit, outlining itself against the visible." (de Certeau. 1984. 93). He contrasts this experience against the view of a city from a removed position, for instance at the top of a skyscraper where, the distanced voyeur "must disentangle himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviours and make himself alien to them." (de Certeau. 1984. 93).

Any philosophical view that, like Platonic essentialism, or Cartesian dualism, or Kantian theory of knowledge, removes the individual from direct and immediate contact with the world is of no use to a study of our being. Heidegger uses the phrase being-in-the-world to reiterate the fundamental presence of being.

As Steiner notes, Heidegger's title *Being and Time* is a manifesto. Our being is a temporal experience. Investigating being was traditionally thought of, post Plato, as an investigation of immutable essence. This is a view of being that is constant. In Steiner's words the search for being prior to Heidegger was "precisely a quest for that which is constant, which stands eternal in the flux of time and change." (Steiner. 1992. 78). But Heidegger places temporality alongside being. Steiner writes that, "We do not live "in time," as if the latter were some independent, abstract flow external to our being. We "live time"; the two terms are inseparable." (Steiner. 1992. 78). Again, instead of considering ourselves as separate from the world, living-in-time as it were, we are part of the goings on of the world. Any attempt to see something as having an immutable essence distances us from experiential judgement and the realisation of the fact that our being is temporal. It makes any being an "objective entity." Steiner states that this view of the world, as consisting of objective entities and resulting in our sense of alienation, is seen continually throughout Western thought (Steiner. 1992. 79). "This conceptualizing impetus edges [Western thinkers] away from the genuinely ontological to the merely theoretical, from immersion in being to a technical diagnosis of the concept of existence." (Steiner. 1992. 79). For Heidegger this is unacceptable. In terms of our perception of a place, were were to only consider the theoretical we might overlook the influence that one's real experiences have. Only through engagement can we understand our relation to reality.

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With the expanded concept of dwelling that relates to how we feel near to places. Heidegger elaborates on what it is that we are continually building as part of our process of being, “The making of such things [places that are near to us] is building.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 156). Thus building can be understood as the mental construction of memories that make places feel near to us. Heidegger extrapolates on this idea of making. This making is not the making of something physical but a mental construct.

> Usually we take production to be an activity whose performance has a result, the finished structure, as its consequence. [However, through this we] never touch its nature, which is a producing that brings something forth. (Heidegger. 1971a. 157)

What we are making, building, here is an ongoing experience of being. We make places meaningful to ourselves in our minds. Heidegger writes that only if we dwell can we build this relationship, “Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then do we build.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 157). We build places through our dwelling, our being. This is temporal, continuous, and accumulative, “building and thinking – belong to dwelling.” says Heidegger, “one as much as the other comes from the workshop of long experience and incessant practice.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 158).

In doing this, we build our relationship to places. This, as we will now see, is a fundamentally poetic experience of engagement and recreation.

Poetry

For Bonfires

The leaves are gathered, the trees are dying
for a time.
A seagull cries through white smoke in the garden fires
that fill the heavy air.
All day heavy air
is burning, a moody dog
sniffs and circles the swish of the rake.
In streaks of ash, the gardener drifting
ghostly, beats his hands, a cloud
Of breath to the red sun.

(Morgan. 1973a. 62)

The interpretation of dwelling that occurs in this thesis is one that strongly emphasises Heidegger's focus on poetry. Reading *Building Dwelling Thinking* without reading *...Poetically Man Dwells...* could result in an appreciation of dwelling that does not fully understand its fundamentally poetic process. Heidegger's concept of poetry firmly places the discussion of dwelling as being a highly personal lived experience. Although *...Poetically Man Dwells... (...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch...* presented as a lecture October 6 1951) is a later text than the essays *The Thing* and *Building Dwelling Thinking.* An understanding of the focus of *...Poetically Man Dwells...* is required in order to see dwelling's true essence. Through poetry we see that the architectural implications of dwelling places a focus entirely on engagement, through one's body, with spaces. Dwelling poetically is a creative process of engagement rather than a passive reception of the environment. Recognising this opens up the associations of spatial dwelling in a manner akin to reading poetry with focussed concern.

The phrase 'poetically man dwells' comes from a late poem by the German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) entitled "In lovely blue". Heidegger analyses this poem, using it to gain insight into the truth of dwelling. However, Heidegger begins by attempting to clarify some potential misunderstandings. He considers the thought that dwelling and poetry might be seen as incompatible since dwelling is a physical

Fig 21: (Williams. 2013). An etymological diagram of the root of the word *poesie* (poetry).

experience and poetry is words written on paper. Dwelling he says "is harassed by the housing shortage. Even if that were not so, our dwelling today is harassed by work, made insecure by the hunt for gain and success" (Heidegger. 1971c. 211). Heidegger scorns the fact that whenever dwelling *is* considered 'poetic' all that is of concern are the aesthetics of the building product. We can see that Heidegger has higher aims than surface aesthetics. Concerning the common understanding of what poetry is Heidegger writes that "Poetry is either rejected as frivolous mooning and [...] a flight into dreamland, or is counted as a part of literature." (Heidegger. 1971c. 211). Indeed, as Heidegger points out, poets do not make tangible things. However, we can see that Heidegger has a broader definition of poetry than this suggests. Poetry for him is something that doesn't simply involve words on paper. With another, albeit briefer, etymological study, he links poetry, through the Greek *poiesis*, to 'making'. All poetic acts are a kind of making. Dwelling becomes a type of *poiesis*, a creative act. Perhaps, Heidegger suggests, poetry and dwelling are less incompatible than one might at first say. If we look at the "essential nature" of these terms - dwelling as a process of being, poetry as a creative act - we find that they are in fact linked to the point that the dwelling process relies entirely on poetry and our being is a creative poetic act. We recreate the world continually by building new layers of memories and associations through which we perceive all spaces. What we perceive is not just the space - its size, its material qualities - but we also bring a lifetime's collection of experience that affects how we think of the space.

Heidegger continues his study of the poem. He expands the phrase ...*Poetically Man Dwells*... into its proper context within the poem.

> Full of merit, yet poetically, man
> Dwells on this earth. (Heidegger. 1971c. 214)

Heidegger points out the implicit understatement in the phrase, “Full of merit, yet [...]”. The way that we dwell *is* full of merit, we build buildings to house us and our families, but it is *also* true that we dwell in some way poetically. Poetry is more important than dwelling’s merititious pursuits. He says that “Merits due to this building, however, can never fill out the nature of dwelling. On the contrary, they even deny dwelling its own nature when they are pursued and acquired purely for their own sake.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 215). If we concern ourselves too fully with the acquisition of products then we deny dwelling its own nature. Whilst dwelling and building of the kind we normally consider as dwelling and building *are* merititious *something else* remains true too: we dwell poetically.

However, this poetry isn’t some empty fantasy, “[...] on this earth.” is, in Heidegger’s view, an advocation of seeing poetry as having a fundamentally grounded nature. It is not that dwelling poetically is something that takes one away from the world. One might be tempted to think this, since poetry is sometimes considered as belonging to the realm of dreamers. Instead, Heidegger and Hölderlin are saying that our poetic dwelling is *on this earth* (Sharr. 2007). The idea of our poetic dwelling is therefore not something that need only be available to the romantic dreamer in an exceptional moment but is common to everyone’s daily experience at all times.

This is understood because Heidegger states that poetry’s original meaning is that of *creation*. A poem cannot be skim read, it is not read with ambivalence and nor is it suitable for easy summation. The poem above by Morgan *demands* one’s engagement. We are asked to consider a similar experience, for me it conjures memories of similar bonfires that I experienced many years ago in the heavy autumnal air of the Scottish Borders’ countryside. For Morgan it is entirely possible that it was a more urban scene, probably Glasgow. He was “a poet of urban life” says Robyn Marsack in *A Declaration of Independence: Edwin Morgan and Contemporary Poetry,* but one who focussed most on the human story (1990. 31). What distinguishes Morgan from his contemporaries is, in Marsack’s view, “the unembarrassed, true voice of feeling, the life of the community beating in his poems.” (Marsack. 1990. 37). Whatever Morgan’s view was, his interpretation is less important than my own creation. The reader becomes

part of the scene, drawn into the poem making its recitation a new act. The reading of the poem is itself a creative act. In the same way that reading poetry in this way demands an active engagement with language, a poetic act is an active engagement with space. The opposite of poetry is not prose, but something like ambivalence. In this way all thoughtful creative acts can be seen as poetry. Painting is poetic. Our being is poetic. In the poetic act we recreate something for ourselves and inhabiting the space of recollected experience is also poetic.

Dwelling ("The basic character of human existence." (Heidegger. 1971c. 213)) is poetic, a creative act in the environment with every step, every new memory. Poetry is no longer seen as "merely an ornament and bonus added to dwelling. [...] Poetry is what really lets us dwell." (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). How do we make a dwelling place, asks Heidegger before answering, "Through building. Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building." (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). This process of making something, building, is not how we usually conceive of production that results in a finished product at the end. Conceived of in this way, Heidegger states, we will never touch the true nature of making. What we make, are experiences in spaces. A poetic engagement with a space builds memories. Heidegger is reminding us that the nature of our dwelling and building is creative. At the root of Heidegger's concept of building is the focus that dwellers poetically build their own perceptions of places. Now we can see how it is that *building* is something that is continually ongoing, since it is the building of poetic engagement with spaces.

When we think of poetry in its usual context, relating to poems, a few extra insights arise about the poetic experience of the environment through our dwelling. Tied in with Heidegger's view of our being as a fundamentally embodied in-the-world experience, reading a poem is something that must be lived actively rather than passively. What is poetic in a poem is the recreation by the reader who gives over a little of themselves. Our own memories and associations form a uniquely personal interpretation of the poem. The poem is nothing without its reiteration by the reader. What is poetic in the poem is like a genie in a lamp, waiting.

Additionally, a poem is rarely unilateral in its possible interpretations. Shria Wolosky writes that,

> poetry is a language in which every component element – word and word order, sound and pause, image and echo – is significant, significant in that every element points toward or stands for further relationships among and beyond themselves. Poetry is a language that always means more. (Wolosky. 2001. 3)

This can happen *precisely* because of the aforementioned embodiment of the poetic recreation. Although each poem has, of course, its own subject matter the reader brings something of themselves into each recreation. Consequently we can see the poem as, in some way, incomplete. It has a space that allows us to inhabit. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three with regards to Roland Barthes's concept of the death of the author.

In the experience of poetry these two, embodiment and interpretation, have a symbiotic relationship. If it weren't for our embodiment we wouldn't see various interpretations but if the poem was so closed that interpretations weren't possible then we would not be able to 'live' the poem, so to speak. We can see this same experience occurring in Heidegger's concept of poetic dwelling. The environment can be seen as fundamentally 'lived' and having a rich set of possible interpretations and emotions. It is this rich potential that allows us to see ourselves as embodied in the environment.

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By expanding the context of the poem still further Heidegger elaborates on what poetry is in essence. He states that poetic experiences in a way aid our understanding of our place in the world. We can look up from our place on earth toward the sky ('heaven' in some translations, as the German word *Himmel* means both sky and heaven), from the merititious pursuits to something loftier. Heidegger goes on, "The upward glance spans the between of sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling of man." (Heidegger. 1971c. 218).

Heidegger is saying that we measure ourselves against the heavenly when we are poetically dwelling, it is a continual creative gesture of measuring ourselves in the world. He says that this is what makes us what we are, “Man does not undertake this spanning just now and then; rather man is man at all only in such spanning.” (Heidegger. 1971c. 218). This measure of our place, it will be no surprise, is not considered by Heidegger to be quantitative. Normally we think of measuring as an act where we multiply or divide something known to ascertain a quantitative knowledge of something unknown. For instance we know that a metre is one ten-millionth of the distance from the North Pole to the equator. This is, Heidegger says, not the *nature* of measure, it is not how we measure our being-in-the-world with the emphasis on experience over abstraction. The fact that we have begun to dwell unpoetically, Heidegger suggests “derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating” that separates us from experience (Heidegger. 1971c. 226).

The fact that the heavenly against which we measure ourselves is absent by definition is fundamental to this understanding. Were it a knowable entity we could measure it in its dimensions. By saying we measure ourselves against this immeasurable entity Heidegger emphasises the worth of experiential measuring, itself a creative act.

Adam Sharr comments on the essence of poetry and measure,

> To Heidegger, when someone with poetic inclinations submits themselves to the world and deliberately or instinctively takes measure of its things and phenomena through creative acts, she or he creates poetry themselves. For the philosopher, any outcome of this poetry also becomes a measure, added to a reservoir of human measures. (Sharr. 2007. 82)

However, Heidegger is not saying that this is only for those who have poetic inclinations as Sharr suggests. Instead, “on this earth” places poetry down in the dirt of the everyday. We all dwell poetically, it is the way we *are.* In terms of our being and dwelling, we are all poets. Poetic inclinations and poetic actions define our dwelling and, consequently, our being.

Portfolio One - Walks and Sketches

Experiences of poetry/Poetry of experiences

This poetic nature of dwelling, that gives so much importance to one's individual interpretation, is the key element that is so often omitted in discussions of Heidegger's dwelling. This is perhaps because observations of poetry in practice serve to undermine much of the importance that architects place on the designs of buildings as the sole influence on our perception of the environment.

My experience of the city is, however, drastically changed by things that are not generally considered as of architectural merit. These can be poetic moments. When on my habitual walk a seagull has ripped apart a bin bag and strewn rubbish across the pavement I interact with the moment with a changed perspective. The city is a different city experienced from under an umbrella on a windy day than on a warm summer evening. Puddles in the pavement, and those that risk splashing up from passing cars, require circumvention. They act not dissimilarly to impassable permanent objects. Temporary or not they affect passage through space in much the same way. Over time I discovered that some areas are more likely than others to have litter on the pavements and interact with the area differently, eyes lowered. These are the invisible poetics of the city: poetic because they are fundamentally experiential, not because they are necessarily beautiful. Of course, many of these poetics are found in buildings too. Passing by the place where a friend once lived conjures memories of times spent there, a red door set back from the street is indefinably appealing, the views towards the Tay are unlike any experience I've ever come across in a city.

These experiential poetics of the city are in many ways the defining aspects of the city since they alter the way the city is experienced. This observation places all spatial conditions on equal levels. What is 'architecture' becomes uncertain. As does the question of who is the author of space.

Walking through the city again and again I began to find distinct zones within the whole. Turning the last corner before home can be a very happy moment. Even though nothing much has changed in the form of the street, and many other people would barely notice, it feels to me like a weight has been lifted and I'm firmly back in *my* place. These invisible thresholds occur throughout the city. Sometimes their boundaries are physical,

like crossing a busy road or the Tay estuary. Other times they are less so. Walking the entire length of Perth Road, three miles in total, the feeling of the area changes a dozen or so times. At one point it is bounded by bars and galleries, at another it becomes shops and tenements, at another schools and hospitals. Often the threshold between these zones is barely perceptible; there is no exact moment where the change is clear, instead it changes by gradient. When walking through the city these might relate to the uses of the area, such as shopping or industrial areas. When I cycle the topography has a greater impact, the thresholds between areas relate to the effort I'm putting in. When I'm driving the thresholds are traffic lights, junctions and the width of the road.

In the BBC series *Civilisation,* Kenneth Clark describes the Romantic movement's quiet submission to things-as-they-are. Their opinions of beauty were a big change from the way that civilisations had previously perceived beauty from cathedrals, monasteries, and city squares. Beauty became available from a cottage. Walking was seen as a means of connecting with the place that you were in and was linked to this appreciation of things-as-they-are and consequently beauty. Clark says that "for over a hundred years, going for a walk was the spiritual as well as the physical exercise of all intellectuals, poets and philosophers." (Civilisation. The Worship of Nature. 1969).



Fig 22: (Williams. 2013). Photo series from my habitual walk.

My exploration of Perth Road through creative practice began with documentation of my daily walk by taking a series of photographs along the route. As in Cullen's *Townscape* (1961) in which he coined the term 'serial vision' to describe a series of perspective drawings illustrating the temporal aspect of moving through a space, in this project we see a storyboard of spaces from start, at my home, to end, at the University of Dundee. Relph says of these serial visions that Cullen "analyses the experiences we have of urban space from the perspective of the person in the street, and seeks to establish the fundamental components of that experience, noting particularly the importance of serial vision, of places or centres, and of the content of those places." (Relph. 1976. 18). In my series we pass friends and neighbours, the local greengrocer and butcher. I speculate that I cross the roads at the same points each day. Day by day this walk is repeated, step by step, accumulating experiences. The spires of Perth Road's five churches come into view, come closer, and pass. Open spaces occur at various points along the north side of Perth Road, breaking up the otherwise continual urban edge. These form seating areas, graveyards, car parking or wider pavements.





Top - Fig 23: (Williams. 2013) The route of my walk.
Bottom - Fig 24: Cullen's Serial Vision (Cullen. 1961. 17).

The artist Janet Cardiff explores poetic qualities of spaces through audio walks, ideas behind which are documented in *The Walk Book*.

> Cardiff's voice takes charge. She tells us which way to go, where to fix our gaze. At the same time our ears are filled with remarkable sounds. They might evoke a sense of the improbable, like the beating wings of a swarm of flies, or the curiosity concerning the scraps of conversation from a nearby bench. They might point out the rustling noise of leaves crushed underfoot, or bring back the drifting notes of a long-forgotten piece of music. While guiding us gently across an invisible stage, Cardiff's audio tracks transform the world around us. (Schaub. 2005. 14)

The audio walks themselves are temporal events and so cannot be documented fully in the book. A user wears headphones and follows a route narrated by Cardiff and a selection of auditory stimuli. One is drawn into the work, unsure if what is being heard is in the recording or reality. Cardiff draws the listener into the poetics of the experience, the smells, the idiosyncrasies, the invisible stories swimming beneath the visible surface.



Fig 25: (Schaub. 2005. 50). A screen shot of the audio editing process that Cardiff undergoes in the creation of her multi layered immersive walks.

Through creative involvement with a place, Cardiff was able to look intently and capture an aspect of her response to it. To deepen my involvement with Perth Road and echoing the repeated walks I began to draw sketches of my walk through the area.

Creative practice not only requires engaged contemplation but is also an experience itself. What began to be evident was that through creative practice relating to place, my relation to that place was changing. When making a representation of a place I was inherently questioning and looking at that place in a way that does not happen through mere thought. Consequently making and thinking about a place changes one's relationship with it.

Sketching is a temporal act, both chronological and mindful. A pencil makes a mark on the blank page, forever altering the potential for all future marks. Each subsequent mark is influenced by each preceding and each that follows is in turn influenced by all that happened before. Additionally the sketch is a physical act, the marks on the page are made by the sketcher. None of the experience is given without effort. Consequently the

Figs 26-29: (Williams. 2013). In the same way that we build spatial experiences in our mind through creative engagement, creative practice can form another layer of spatial knowledge. These layers of experience and layers of creative practice can continue to affect our unconscious perception of places as we build them up time after time.

experiences one has of the place are added to by the act of drawing. This interpretive act that occurs through creative practice affects the way that the place is remembered. The experience is reinforced by the drawn image, in effect, the memory is doubly reinforced.

By limiting myself to short periods per sketch the major aspects of the scene were focussed on. One also ‘discovers’ what the unconscious prioritisation has been in one’s perception. Photorealism was not the goal here. The intention was to examine the feeling and focus and to increase my relation with the place through accumulative action and experience. When one is sketching one is forced to think about the place. Paul Laseau in *Graphic Thinking for Architects and Designers* describes the act of thinking through sketches as “a conversation with ourselves in which we communicate with sketches.” (2001. 8). Through the process of creating something by which to explore spatial experience, I found that I was forced to give serious thought to the nature of the experience itself. The memories, associations, and emotions that I had were examined and externalised. In doing so, they were strengthened. Through engagement with place I more fully dwelled by preserving my memories. As the drawing proceeded, so my perception of the place changed. It was no longer only the place, but was now seen through the lens of the sketch.

Fig 30: (Williams. 2013). The act of drawing a sketch was, in my mind, originally conceived as forcing the act of looking intently at the surrounding environment. Through this I was trying to increase the level of experience that I had with Perth Road. The act of sketching alters the way that the place is perceived.

Figs 31 & 32: (Williams. 2013). The place of the creative act becomes altered. One perceives the place with an additional layer of experience upon it. This is also exactly the process of an engaged interaction with place that occurs through dwelling.

What was particularly important was that the engaged aspect of creative practice added a layer of experience to the area being studied. This is also exactly the experience of a poetic involvement with a place. After a memorable experience the place is fundamentally altered in one's minds eye. Creative practice therefore altered the way that I understood dwelling to be taking place. With this chronologically iterative and temporal view of the sketching process we can see the act of sketching as embodying the poetic process of dwelling. Sketching the same place many times is a metaphor for the creative practice of dwelling and building memories.

Thus the worth of creative practice in the context of this thesis is *not just* the resulting product. This can be seen as a testament to the experience in space that is the *real work*. The worth of the real work is the engagement with space that occurred in the creation of the work. The process was the goal, not just the product. What was illuminated by this study was that this process of documenting my experience is also the same as the process of dwelling. Consequently the work takes on a new meaning. It was built *by* my dwelling in that moment, not simply in response to it, as it were, after the fact.

The research shines light on how Heidegger's emphasis on the poetry of dwelling is not strictly to do with buildings being in themselves poetic.[2] Instead poetry is understood as our own involvement with spaces, ongoing, open-ended, and continually revisited.

We exist poetically and poetic actions (through the experience of making places meaningful to ourselves) "causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us dwell." (Heidegger. 1971c. 213). Were we not creative, we would not dwell. Consequently, an exploration of poetic process became key to the rest of the projects.

2 perhaps by having beautiful richly tactile materials as suggested by Zumthor's interpretation of Heidegger.



Fig 33: (Williams. 2013): An etymological diagram of the roots of the word *wohnen*. Heidegger links dwelling through words that mean 'to remain' to an idea of 'sparing' and 'preserving'.

Etymology of *wohnen* (dwelling) and the fourfold

Having linked building to dwelling and to being in *Building Dwelling Thinking*, Heidegger then traces the etymology of the word dwelling, *wohnen* (again from the title *Bauen Wohnen Denken*). He moves quickly and laterally through his etymological exploration this time to the Old Saxon *wuon* and Gothic *wunian* which, like *bauen* he says also mean "to remain, to stay in place." (Heidegger. 1971a. 147).

But *wunian* says more too. He claims that this comes from the word 'peace' and the contemporary German word for peace, *friede*, comes from *fry* meaning sparing from harm and danger.

So, if we follow Heidegger, to dwell means to remain, which comes from 'to be at peace', which came from the sparing from harm. "Real sparing is something *positive* and takes place when we return it specifically to its being, when we leave something beforehand in its own nature" (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). This is allowing something to be: a positive sparing, not sparing through inaction but preservation. When we dwell, we are allowing everything its own nature, not imposing restrictions or significance, or being prescriptive of how to interpret it. Fundamentally what comes out of this dance through a maze of linguistics is that "*The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving.*" (Heidegger. 1971a. 147).

But what is it exactly that we are sparing and preserving? It has been suggested that Heidegger is advocating a low impact lifestyle (Seamon) or preservation of local conditions (Norberg-Schulz) but considering the focus on poetry taken by this thesis, meaning a focus on creativity, perceptual interpretation, and engagement, we can deduce that he is talking about the sparing and preserving of our memories and associations of spaces that give us a uniquely personal interpretation. Dwelling and building, in their fundamentally poetic sense, preserve our perceptions of spaces through their re-creation time and again (echoing the step by step repetition of my walks and layering of memory by my experiences and my sketches). We are not preserving something tangible, but as is so often the case with Heidegger, something mental.

Heidegger now introduces his concept of 'the fourfold' as the psychological construct which is being preserved. The fourfold is perhaps one of Heidegger's most complex concepts and is frequently ignored by studies of Heidegger. In his essay, *The Fourfold* in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Julian Young states that,

> Among the many mysteries surrounding "the fourfold" is the almost total absence of any attempt by Heidegger scholars to explain what it is. Usually the topic doesn't even make it to the index [...] Baffled by Heidegger's poetic brevity, commentators have consigned it to the silence of the too-hard basket. (Young. 2006. 373)

Similarly, Sharr notes that this "probably marks the moment of furthest distance on Heidegger's travels outward from conventional philosophy into free-fall writing from his own experience of his own being." (Sharr. 2007. 33). If this is the case then it also marks the point at which Heidegger is most Heideggerian, fully committing to observing the world as poetically engaged inhabitant seeing the world as it is interpreted by the individual through lived experience.

The fourfold is the 'earth', the 'sky' (or heavens), the 'mortals', and the 'divinities' (or immortals). This thesis interprets these as belonging in the realm of personal interpretation of perception.[3] In the fourfold Heidegger therefore places the spiritual

3 This is not to be considered perception in the empirical sense but instead concerns the idea that how we perceive spaces alters as a result of new experiences.

alongside the physical. Earth is related to the heavens, mortals to the immortals, and all four belong together in a oneness. This is Heidegger's poetic view of our experience suggesting, like in much art, that there is something outside our sensory understanding that is always just on the edge of our perception. Although we perceive the world's physical artefacts we also perceive that something greater is just out of view. We project meaning onto the heavens' constellations and, in the tradition of the Ancient Greeks, pray that the Gods will intervene. Heidegger keeps his description deliberately vague, as if he were aware that to pin it down exactly is not only not possible but any attempt would be to trivialise the experience of being-in-the-world. Additionally, we can suggest that the fourfold is intended to be vague so as to be interpreted and embodied in a poetic fashion. Were it explicitly stated (if it could be) then the text would be closed and lifeless. By keeping the text open to interpretation Heidegger allows us to live amongst it and try to consider our own interpretation of our perception.

The use of the fourfold makes no absolute distinctions between individuals and the things in the environment. From a Western perspective this is hard to conceive but relates to long traditions of mind/world connections in other traditions. The phrase *Tat Tvam Asi*, for instance, in certain Hindu philosophies translates as "Thou art that". It suggests that what is the self is indistinguishable from reality. What we are and what we perceive are one and the same. On the other side of the world a similar unity is found. Discussed by David Orr in *The Nature of Design*, Native Americans,

> made no clear distinctions between themselves physically and the land in which they dwelled. Land contained the memory of past deed and the spirits of their ancestors. […] We who regard land as a commodity to be bought and sold or as a resource can scarcely comprehend such a view. Our lack of comprehension is, in the view of tribal people, a mark of our adolescence and immaturity. (Orr. 2002. 11)

Heidegger is arguing for a similar or parallel - possibly more mature - view of the world in which we are placed. By recognising that how we perceive is inherently tied with our worldly experiences rather than being empirically reducible Heidegger's emphasis on individual experiences being of central importance is continued. Seen through the lens of individual experience the fourfold encompasses all things. It is a way for Heidegger

to ignore distinctions that he believes are petty. By doing this the distinction between man-made or natural, old or new, is eliminated since all things become unified within one's perceptual realm. When Heidegger says dwelling 'preserves' this reading suggests that dwelling preserves perception, that is to say, memories of experiences in spaces.

Of the earth Heidegger says, "[it] is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal." (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). The earth can be seen as not just the literal earth, the solid stuff at our feet, but is extended to everything that is tangible and touchable. It is earth as in soil that provides nutrient for life. We dwell in that we 'save' the earth where, as before, 'saving' is positive and active, "Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation." (Heidegger. 1971a. 148).

Where the earth is that which is solid, the sky (heavens) is all that which is not and everything that occurs in that realm. "The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of the ether." (Heidegger. 1971a. 147). Equally possibly translated as 'the heavens' this one of four comprises that which is out of our control. We cannot affect any change on the heavenly realm, it exists outside of our influence yet still in our perception as something supersensible. We still gaze up at it, and exist beneath it naming constellations and giving them stories.

Connected inseparably are the divinities. If there is a seeming opposition between the earth and the sky, then we can also see that there is an opposition between the mortals and the divinities (In *The Heidegger Reader,* the translator translates the fourfold as earth, sky, *immortals*, and mortals (Figal. 2007). This is an interesting difference that adds to the indeterminacy and interpretability of Heidegger's texts). If we had no concept of death then there would have been no need to invent the divinities. "The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment." The hardest to understand of the fourfold, particularly from a "secular Western outlook"

(Sharr. 2007. 44) the divinities are perhaps understood as the great unknownability of life and the feeling that the world in some way speaks to us, that it has a message. We "await" these divinities says Heidegger but it is important to realise that they never appear.

Tying the four together in "simple oneness" are the Mortals. "The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die." (Heidegger. 1971a. 148). This knowledge of mortality separates us from the animals that are found in the earth. The discussion of us as 'mortals' and not 'people' for example, places our being and our perception firmly on a temporal continuity. We are mortal because we will die. This again relates to the temporal and incompletable nature of dwelling. The concept of mortality, rather than humanity for instance, announces our brief presence on earth. If it were not for our knowledge of mortality our measure of our passage through life would be very different. Our mortality in Heidegger's fourfold is not something to be feared or to be overcome but a fact to be embraced. As mortals we remain "on earth, under the sky, before the divinities." (Heidegger. 1971a. 148).



Fig 34: (Williams. 2013). The earth, sky, divinities, and mortals make up the fourfold as the constituent parts of what we perceive. A blend of the physical and metaphysical, and completely unmeasurable in objective terms. Heidegger places the focus of our existence in a spiritual realm that we are each faced with in the course of our lives.

Although placed into categories the fourfold exists “in primal oneness”. Dwelling is the sparing and preserving of this fourfold. The preservation of these in our mind occurs through the act of dwelling, recalling them into existence whilst sparing them from change. We hold onto our memories unmolested and although they continually decay, we preserve them through dwelling with them, bringing them up to the surface again and again.

Due to the fundamentally embodied nature of Heidegger’s philosophy there can be no such thing as a memory without it being physical in some way. The essence of what we remember is the physical place in which the memory was made. Consequently we *preserve our memories in places*.

This can perhaps be seen as similar to the traditions of aural storytelling before literacy. In *Songlines* by Bruce Chatwin (1987) the aboriginal tribes he comes into contact with are deeply connected to their environment. They identify with the land through songs and as they walk from place to place the landscape forms cues to the song. It is believed by the tribes that through this action the landscape is *sung* into existence. They preserve their memories, and metaphorically the physical land itself, through their actions of remembering and engaging.

We carry out a similar act. We remember our perception of places thereby preserving them in our minds. What is preserved are our memories, held in places that we consequently come to think of as meaningful places. These are like anchors onto which we know our environment and ourselves. It is easy to imagine the environment around a memory of a meaningful place, this is the preservation of perception, the preservation of the fourfold. We remember ourselves (mortals), the place (earth), the atmosphere of the place (heavens) and perhaps a profound sense of otherness (immortals). In doing so we remember, measure, and understand our place in the world.

Heidegger’s thoughts on memory should here be expanded upon by drawing from a later work *What is Called Thinking?* Here, Heidegger notes that the way we are near to memory is not strictly the remembering of a single moment, this becomes remembrance, but is instead the constant revisiting of myriad memories bringing them up to the

surface of our attention over and over. This memory, thinking of our memories, is a form of thanks, we honour that which we remember. In the focus of this thesis we see that we are *near* to these memories.

Heidegger begins *What is Called Thinking?* by saying that "We come to know what it means to think when we ourselves try to think" (Heidegger. 1954. 3). In order to understand thinking we must already be thinking. This reminds one of the argument from *Building Dwelling Thinking* in which we are all always building and dwelling as we are always being. We are always present in the world. This adherence to the idea that one must be 'in' the world in order to study the world's effects was described by a biographer as "studying the laws of free fall whilst falling" (Safranski. 1998. 107). Heidegger therefore reiterates that whatever follows in his discussion remains in the immediate and the personal, "Meaning is the gathering of thought" he suggests (Heidegger. 1954. 3). Again, as with the fourfold, Memory is a gathering act, inclusive rather than exclusive. To remember is not to single out a moment but, when we think of memory as something that we are doing continually, it gathers all previous memories and brings them together in nearness.

Heidegger notes the complexity of the question, 'what is called thinking?'. He remarks that it is in fact four questions: "what is it that we call 'thought' and 'thinking,' what do these words signify [?] how does this traditional doctrine conceive and define what we have named thinking? [...] what are the prerequisites we need so that we may be able to think with essential rightness? [and finally] what is it that calls us, as it were, commands us to think?" (Heidegger. 1954. 113-114). For our purposes it must be the third, "what are the prerequisites we need so that we may be able to think with essential rightness?" that is surely the most interesting of these. What conditions must apply in order for us to think and to dwell.

What we think of, Heidegger calls 'memory' and he arrives at this through a typically etymological route,

> ‘Memory’ initially did not at all mean the power to recall. The word designates the whole disposition in the sense of a steadfast *intimate concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us in every thoughtful meditation.* (Heidegger. 1954. 140. My italics)

Memory for Heidegger is a focus on meaningful things, things that are *near* to us. He goes on, “Originally, ‘memory’ means as much as devotion: a constant concentrated abiding with something - not just with something that has passed and with what may come.” (Heidegger. 1954. 140) Memory is not a passive recollection but, in a manner that is by now familiar, an active creation. Memories are not the exceptional moment or the nostalgic but the accumulation of many that we then see through to experience spaces.

He distinguishes memory from retention which “is mostly occupied with what is past, because the past has got away and in a way no longer affords a lasting hold.” (Heidegger. 1954. 140) We have to try to retain these recollections. In contrast memory, for Heidegger occurs continually, it “recovers again and again” (Heidegger. 1954. 140). We know that memory is more complex that recalling the past, at arms length as it were, by our need to coin a word for the specific act of retention and recovery, that is to say, “remembrance” (Heidegger. 1954. 141).

Heidegger develops the honour of that which we remember. He suggests that the Old English for ‘to think’ *thencan* and ‘to thank’ *thancian* are closely related, to give thanks is also to give thought (Heidegger. 1954. 139). Therefore the memory that is brought up and re-lived, we may remember that it is *near* to us like my bus shelter, is also that which we would suggest we are *thankful* for, “Original thanking is the thanks owed for being” (Heidegger. 1954. 141). This linking of think, thank, and memory is a much richer understanding of the terms than their current use. In Heidegger’s understanding perhaps “The supreme thanks, then, would be thinking? And the profoundest thanklessness, thoughtlessness?” Memory, the gathering of thinking, is the highest sort of thanks. We bring up again and again, re-living and re-experiencing our memories

making them near to us. We do this to that which we are most near, giving thanks to that which we care most about. The places we are most near to are where we gather our memories, recreating anew, are a physical form of our thanks.

Preserving memories and perception

Various people have discussed the ways that we can understand our place in the world. For instance Kevin Lynch in *The Image of the City* argues that,

> A good environmental image gives its possessor an important sense of emotional security. He can establish an harmonious relationship between himself and the outside world. This is the obverse of the fear that comes with disorientation; it means that the sweet sense of home is strongest when home is not only familiar but distinctive as well. (Lynch. 1960. 4)

The degree to which we have a strong environmental image Lynch says, comes from the nature of the environment. In the context of this thesis Lynch's studies of a city's image can be seen as suggesting that the anchors onto which we fix our memories come in a variety of forms. His studies relate to the legibility of the city form based on information gathered through interviews with city residents. From these interviews Lynch discerns different types of element that one perceives in the environment such as paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks.



Fig 35: (Lynch 1960. 147) Lynch's image of Boston derived from interviews with locals. The map shows paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks illustrating how people relate to the places within the whole. A stronger mental image, argues Lynch, gives a stronger feeling of belonging.

Paths are the routes along which an individual moves, these are often the primary ways that people perceive their city. For instance, my choice of Perth Road as an area of study is a path from my home to my work. When we experience a place we are always experiencing it in relation to what happened before and where we plan to go next.

Edges are the boundary between one thing and another but not normally conceived of as routes. These can be physical boundaries, such as the edge of a river bank or edges that link two zones.

Districts are zones within a larger area identified by character. For instance the area of Perth road that formed the study of this thesis is a distinct district for me. It has a character that is different from the adjacent areas and has a different character even from the further ends of the same road.

Nodes are distinct points into which an individual can enter; these can be junctions, like the Sinderins junction of Perth road, or focal points, like any of the squares along the length of Perth road.

Finally, landmarks, like nodes, are points of interest that occurred in the environment. In the study of Perth road the landmarks I used would be my home, my work, particular shops, or friends' apartments.

Lynch states that it is not necessarily the simplicity of a system that makes its imageability, instead it is the strength of these anchoring elements. As with Heidegger's thought it is the elements with which we engage our experience that are remembered and dwelled with.

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The act of constructing buildings can also be a method of anchoring oneself physically and mentally in place. Witold Rybczynski, an architect documenting his building process in *The Most Beautiful House in the World* writes "Each shovel of gravel, each nail hammered, each board sawn, settled me more firmly in the meadow […] I was now rooted in place." (Rybczynski. 1989. 192). Throughout architectural theory buildings have attempted to construct miniature worlds that protect against, and make sense of, the larger world outside whilst not removing completely, like my bus shelter in the storm. "Building by hand was a romantic idea" notes Rybczynski,

> When we were finished, this place, this particular place, would be changed: the meadow would be occupied. It was the reenactment of a primeval process that began with the first hut erected in a forest clearing, and it gave me the feeling of playing out an ancient ritual. (Rybczynski. 1989. 129)

Aben and de Wit's *The Enclosed Garden* chronicles the "ever rejuvenating tradition in which man tries to reconcile himself with his surroundings by bringing these within the closest proximity." (Aben & de Wit. 1999. 11). 'Reconciling' here can be seen as a method of Heideggerian measuring, we are trying to find our place by making the world understandable. They say that,

> The garden gathers the landscape around it (garden) and at the same time shuts itself off from it (enclosed). The enclosed garden is as broad as the landscape, in that it incorporates the expansiveness of the sky, and as contained as a building. Thus it is an intermediary between man and landscape. (Aben & de Wit. 1999. 10)

This is shown beautifully if we think of Robert Frost's poem *Atmosphere - Inscription for a garden wall* (Frost. 1928. 146),

> Winds blow the open grassy places bleak;
> But where this old wall burns a sunny cheek,
> They eddy over it too toppling weak
> To blow the earth or anything self-clear;
> Moisture and color and odor thicken here.
> The hours of daylight gather atmosphere.

This small place gathers the surrounding landscape in a variety of ways. It slows the wind which hints at the bleak fields around, the sun's heat becomes stored in the weight of the walls. The sun vaulting overhead reminds the inhabitant of the world around them outside of the garden whilst bringing it into immediate and personal contact. The idea that "Moisture and color and odor thicken here," suggests that for the inhabitant these things are experienced more fully, and remembered more fully afterwards.

The measuring of our place in the world that Heidegger says we do continually is maybe an attempt to confront our feelings of inadequacy in the face of the world. We are merely mortals standing in the face of the heavens and gods. This is exactly how I experienced the bus shelter that provided refuge from a storm. Here I experienced a confrontation with the awesome power and scale of the world, manifest in a thunderstorm, but was sufficiently removed, yet not too far, so as to feel safe and able to feel joy rather than fear. The measuring of our place, as mere mortals against the world, becomes not terrifying as it perhaps should, but something beautiful and life affirming. What was nearly a sense of fear was transformed into a sense of connection. In understanding the world we face a confrontation with the sublimity of nature, even at the distance of remove we have in our contemporary urban culture.

We can perhaps read Heidegger, by placing us as mortals in the face of the gods and heavens, as bringing religious awe into the everyday experience of being. That same experience of uplifting connection usually reserved for buildings like cathedrals, is, through Heidegger, seen in the everyday. Relph notes that "When the fusion of dwelling and building, of the earth and the sky and the gods and mortals, is total, then geographical space is essentially sacred." (Relph. 1976. 18).

Florentine Sack in *Open House* discusses architecture that is connected to nature as giving similar sensations, "I suddenly became aware of the unity of all things." she says of a beautiful experience in a building,

> I realised at this point that I was part of a great, overall connection without beginning or end. [...] Here, I discovered an architect's highest aim: giving human beings the opportunity to enter this dimension. (Sack. 2006. 8)

We anchor ourselves mentally in spaces by dwelling, the ‘preserving and sparing’ of our fourfold perception of the world. This can be a beautiful experience of oneness with the world, as suggested by Sack, but it can also be the general day to day experience of being. This is always a creative act, whether through building, sketching, walking, or simply being.

Portfolio Two - Montages

I began to develop my poetic engagement with places. If we can interpret Heidegger's measuring of our place in the world as being an uplifting sense of connection (to the earth, gods and heavens), that we carry out at all times, I was keen to explore this in places along my habitual walk. Since the layering of repeat experiences in a place accumulates I decided to attempt another method of spatial representation to add another type of layer onto my perception of the spaces. To achieve this I experimented with montage photography.

I began with a concern that a photograph did not embody the same poetic engagement that I had found with a sketch. Like Henri Focillon I felt that my conception of photography was not one of temporal engagement. He writes that "Even when the photograph represents crowds of people, it is the image of solitude, because the hand never intervenes to spread over it the warmth and flow of human life." (Focillon. 1934. 35). It was precisely this warmth and flow that I wanted to explore.

Exploring the potential of photography David Hockney developed a method of photomontage that he referred to as 'joiners'. In *Hockney's Photographs* this was described as follows,

> By now it is well-known that Hockney finds the still photograph still to the point of being frozen, that a photograph excludes more than it reveals and is constructed in ways that are contrary to natural vision and traditional art. On the face of it, his solution seems simple. Over the last two years he has been adding a photograph to a photograph to a photograph - or scores of photographs to each other - as a challenge to conventional photography. (Hockney & Haworth-Booth. 1983. 2)

These photomontages, the first exhibition of which was titled 'Drawing with the camera', show a sense of temporality and a variety of perspectives that might be equated to cubism's portrayal of reality.

Inspired by the temporal embodiment of these joiners, particularly their reflection of the multiplicitous nature of memory I began to produce a series of photomontages of places along Perth Road. These would embrace the fragmentary and incomplete nature of memories and associations.

The fact that these montages are comprised of a series of photographs imbues each with a temporal aspect. The light quality changes, the same pedestrians occur in several images as they walked along the pavement. I allowed the composition of the montages to follow lines of sight and single point perspective.

To reinforce the idea that it was my dwelling that was being studied, not the place itself, I decided that I would make it evident that I was also a subject of these images and place myself somewhere in each scene even in only by implication. Consequently, my feet and legs are included in many scenes. Additionally, in many of the scenes there is a focus of one kind or another from where perspective lines project, drawing in the viewer. In some cases this is a view, as in the scenes depicting the streets facing the Tay estuary, in others, as in the scenes depicting the series of spaces along Perth Road, the focus is the perception of the space and its context.

Fig 36: Luncheon at the British Embassy, Tokyo. (Hockney. 1983. 28). Time and fragments of perception are made evident by Hockney. What results is a representation of a moment that is in many ways more true than a conventional image.

After taking all the photographs on site and having them developed, the montages of Perth Road were arranged by hand. This demanded a level of engagement recalling Focillon, the hand was intervening to spread human warmth. The photographs could no longer be considered as the passive ‘click’ of the shutter but were now deliberate arrangements. Thoughtful time spent turns into relationship, poetic inhabitation of the artefact makes it personally meaningful.

Fig 37: (Williams. 2013). Adding another layer of interpretive action I pasted characters as representative of aspects of the place. This space provides little more than an apathetic backdrop on which to plant advertisement billboards. Cursory seating has been provided but it exists in limbo, partly owned by Perth Road but cut off by recycling bins and gravel, partly its own entity but exposed rather than enclosed by the retreating heights of the buildings behind and the constant stare of those passing by.

Fig 38: (Williams. 2013). Another scene depicts St. Peter's graveyard on the north side of Perth Road. The church, set back from the road, overlooks the space populated with historical figures at a wedding who pose for my photograph from the opposite pavement. The trees form a focus and respite from the street edge that extends both to the east and west. From these directions two models dressed in white approach. Perth Road can be seen as a historical artefact evidencing the changing nature of Dundee, old tenements with shop fronts cut into their sides exist alongside new housing. Church spires along the length signify graveyards, community centres, and apartments. The young student population, drawn by the proximity to the university campus, walk on the surface of the historical depth. This place along Perth Road forms a threshold between the eastern and western sections of my walk. It is unusual for the area, the pavement is narrower, the buildings on the south edge are lower, the openness and intrigue of the graveyard is counterpointed by its fenced inaccessibility.

Fig 39: (Williams. 2013). From my position at the Sinderins junction of Perth Road, Hawkhill, Shepard's Loan, and Blackness Avenue the open sky is allowed access whilst the character of the road is retained. Edges are held and one's eye is drawn up to the sky. In the manner of Turner's *Fighting Temeraire* (1838) an elderly man and a young child set the sky in relation to the road.

Fig 40: (Williams. 2013). Looking down Taylor's Lane from Perth Road at the view to the Tay Bridge and to Fife beyond, the thin street and height of the buildings give a sense of enclosure with promise of release beyond. On another day the scene would be populated by dour faces, a grey sky and strewn litter. From my vantage point I see a couple enjoying the view and a group of picnickers claiming a place in the sun. The ramshackle nature of this area, old mills developed into flats, grand gardens appropriated by developers, country houses swallowed by the city makes a heterogeneous mix of building types hinting at innumerable stories and other interpretations of this place.

Fig 41: (Williams. 2013). Standing on Westfield Place by a handrail attached to the Kwik-Fit garage I am opposite a multi chimneyed stone built house. The cobbled street slowly descends past modern gates, overgrown buddleia, and a patchwork of different types towards a view of the Tay and an overcast sky.

Fig 42: (Williams. 2013). Smithson, Serra, and Friedrich's Wanderer look down Step Row to the sunset.
Fig 43: (Williams. 2013). The walls of Westfield Lane keep an almost continual edge. Sometimes buildings, sometimes walled gardens, some stone, some brick, the walls run unbroken occasionally punched through by walls and doors. On the other side of these rational walls the scramble for space reasserts itself.

Fig 44: (Williams. 2013). The weak corners by the police station swim with uncertainty.

Fig 45: (Williams. 2013). Diagrams of each of these eight scenes showing their true dimensions. As will be discussed later, these diagrams are only representative and should not be confused for the real artefact.

These photomontages began to develop a language of multiple fragments. They reflect multiple experiences, multiple viewpoints and perhaps a more natural representation of Perth Road. As opposed to a single image that appears whole, unambiguous, in which the idea of completeness is strong, the fragments of these montages seemed an appropriate visual metaphor for our incomplete dwelling process.

We can also see this idea of repeated engaged acts and multiplicity in the work of Cézanne. Discussed further in Chapter Three, Cézanne, like Heidegger, was endlessly searching and re-searching for a connection to places through his art. Hajo Duchting writes in *Paul Cézanne 1839-1906* that "he was looking for the very roots of human existence, a coherent and indestructible core where harmony prevailed between Man and the universe." (Duchting. 1989. 62).

Duchting sees an honesty in the work of Cézanne,

> our resulting impression that Cézanne by no means approaches Nature with artistic preconceptions, that he by no means has the despotic aim of subjugating Nature to some law or adapting to some formula, will inevitably be strong. (Duchting. 1989. 137)

Cézanne represents honestly, as free of artifice as possible, without preconceptions or formulaic style. In a series of painting of Mont Sainte-Victoire by looking and looking again, time after time, Cézanne constructs a hint of the experience of the place. However a letter to his son suggests that Cézanne himself seems to feel that this was a task that was never possible,

> I want to say that my vision as a painter is made keener by Nature, but recording what I feel is always an arduous process. I cannot achieve the intensity that is present to my senses, I do not have at my disposal that wonderful wealth of colour that gives Nature its freshness. (Duchting. 1989. 62)

He tried again and again, looking and re-looking, to convey this ‘wonderful wealth’. These are like the multiple experiences of walking down Perth Road, multiple viewpoints of the same trip seen again and again, endlessly. Each of the images of Mont Sainte-Victoire works independently to impress a view of the mountain on a viewer, but when seen together another layer becomes evident. The multiple nature of repetition allows the viewer a richer impression that is greater than the sum of its parts. For Cézanne this was a way of engaging with the place again and again. Merleau-Ponty, quoted by Relph, notes that Cézanne’s engagement with the place was utterly specific; he “did not paint landscapes, he painted the landscapes of Provence.” (Relph. 1976. 42).



Figs 46 - 49: (Düchting. 1989. 214-223). In looking and looking again, Cézanne portrays a richer interpretation of what this experience is than would be possible in a single attempt. Each of these images is *correct* but seen together the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Following the completion of my photomontages, and since there was consequently no continuing process going on, I aimed to reappraise them by copying them and working them through in different ways and using different methods. In doing so I aimed to deepen the study of the place. In these new works I intended to distil an aspect of the spaces I had perceived as important, in this case the sense of enclosure and exposure that I found on Perth Road. To do this I took the montages and collaged areas of sky behind the buildings, outlining different spatial volumes in each scene. I explored whether the space felt enclosed or exposed, and what thresholds occurred between spaces. These were intended as exercises in thinking through creative practice that added another layer to the experience of the places that began with walks and was developed by sketches and photomontage. Like the poetry of dwelling - piecemeal accumulation of experiences and memories that are fixed in spaces - these further layers of creative practice added to the step by step idea behind dwelling. This is an idea explored by Stuart Walker in *Sustainable by Design* where he produces artefacts then supplements these with visual analogies in poster form. He says that, "the visual piece is judged to be an appropriate rendition of an essential ingredient that was fundamental to the aesthetic definition and character of the original work to which the work refers." (Walker. 2006. 102). In the case of my work both the collages and the photomontages are intended as means of seeing to the experience of the place.

Fig 50: (Williams. 2013). A reappraisal of the montage, this time exploring the qualities of enclosure.



Figs 51 - 53: (Williams. 2013). Further collage reappraisals of the montages. Looking again and again providing layers of accumulating experience. I am here highlighting elements and enclosures in the spaces.

Figs 54 - 57: (Williams. 2013). Further reappraisals, this time by screen printing. Different colours exploring route, sky, and overlooking windows.

Nearness to things

In *Building Dwelling Thinking,* Heidegger expresses his concern that any judgement of the world must begin with an awareness of the unity between subject and world. This was a reaction against what he saw as the increasing prevalence for reductive scientific attitudes that demand the dimensioning of space. This dimensioning is obviously a useful tool but it ignores what he sees as the all important aspect of one's interpretation of perception. He warns that the "nearness and remoteness between men and things can become mere distance, mere intervals of intervening space." (Heidegger. 1971a. 153). What he means by this is that we could cease to think of dimensions as abstract tools and confuse them for the *reality* of space. Using this type of quantifiable space conception, he says, can only lead to an impoverished understanding of space whilst precluding any possibility for a discussion of experiences and memory.

Heidegger says that rather than experiencing nearness to things in a dimensional sense through the poetic dwelling process we bring things *near*.

Heidegger's concepts of nearness and thingness are discussed most prominently in the essay *The Thing* (*Das Ding,* presented as a lecture at the Beyerischen Akademie der Schönen Kunste, June 6 1950). This is again predicated on the observation that the world should be understood through lived experiential judgements. The way that we make things meaningful to us - that in this thesis we see as preserving memories - is in Heidegger's view not in the least bit measurable by abstract quantities. For Heidegger the complexity of our relationship with the world can never be reduced to objective facts. The implication of this is that the objective mode of perceiving leads to "mere objects" consisting only of quantitative values, whereas an embodied understanding of the world provides us with things that we find meaningful.

In *The Thing* Heidegger states that nearness doesn't consist of proximity. Instead we are *near* to things that we are engaged with. Thus, as with so much of Heidegger's philosophy, nearness is not concerned with quantifiable distances but with qualitative engagement. Heidegger provided a useful example in *Being & Time* that when contemplating a picture on the wall the glasses on the end of one's nose are less near than the picture engaging one's attention on the wall

> When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distancially that they are 'sitting on his nose', they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall. (Heidegger. 1927. 141)

He begins *The Thing* with a lament that distances in time and space are reducing. He mentions various technological marvels such as air travel as a way in which "Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel." (Heidegger. 1971b. 163). Similarly radio spreads news instantly to all people and is received as background noise whereas previously it had to take time and personal engagement to pass through regions. Heidegger mentions the television, "The peak of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television, which will



Fig 58: (Williams. 2013). The glasses on one's face are less 'near' than the image on the wall.

soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of communication." (Heidegger. 1971b. 163). Each of these brings immediate gratification at the cost of engagement (we can only imagine what Heidegger would think of the Internet). These technological advancements, he says, bring no sense of *nearness* "for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance." (Heidegger. 1971b. 163). Nearness it seems is something more complicated than proximity. Even those things that are aggressively proximate to us, like the television, "can remain far from us." Conversely, he says that what is objectively distant from us can be felt as near. "Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness." (Heidegger. 1971b. 163).

The artefacts that I made in the course of my creative practice research are near to me, as are the places they explored. As a way of thinking about nearness in this non-objective way we may briefly relate it to our interpersonal relationships. Deciding if one is near to a person is far more complex than studying one's family tree or measuring one's relative physical proximity. I am in relatively close proximity to various people at any one time and I am genetically close to members of my family. However, the people I describe as being most near to me need not be part of either of these groups. As it so happens, I do feel near to some members of my family and frequently those with whom I share spaces, but I am also near to individuals many hundreds of miles away. The weighting of this nearness cannot be explained objectively under any headings, it is not wholly due to the length of our relationship, the distance between us, or the time since we last met or spoke. It is due to whatever compatibilities in personality and fate led to a feeling of nearness.

What is true of our relationships with people is also true of our relationship with things. Things that I am near to need not be proximate. Nor do they need to be large or small, long owned or briefly glanced. Nearness does not consist of proximity. We are near to things that we dwell with despite any lack of proximity. Equally, and as with nearness to people, it is easy to understand what someone means when they say that they are near to a memory. This is an emotional nearness. What we are near to in Heidegger's terms are the memories that are preserved in things. When Heidegger says we are near to things and places, we can see that we are near to the relationships we have with them.

Heidegger's lament about reducing distances reflects a concern that by insisting on quantitative measurements we are in fact abolishing emotional distances by ignoring experience and separating ourselves, in mind/world duality, from reality. He believes that the abolition of distance by modernity doesn't make everything near, instead it reduces everything to a condition of being without distance. The abolition of distance results in a world of uniformly spread stuff that doesn't permit real nearness and consequently doesn't permit one to find places. This lack of nearness leads to homelessness that began his concern for dwelling. The inverse of this is that environmental engagement brings things near through the attentiveness of the lived experience.

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The artefacts that we are near to, Heidegger calls *things*.

As an example of a thing, Heidegger discusses a jug. He says that we perceive the jug "so it seems - as a thing and never as a mere object." (Heidegger. 1971b. 165). This "so it seems" as Adam Sharr so sharply notes, forms a statement of the privileging of experiential judgement. As discussed already, Heidegger's focus is always on perceptual judgements achieved via experience. When thinking of things "so it seems" is always implied.

In this phrase Heidegger also distinguishes things from "mere objects", which are distant, objectified and inherently separate from us due to being conceived through a position of detached intellect. We exist *with* things but *against* objects. Heidegger's phrase "mere object" implies a hierarchy whereby a thing is something more important than an object (so it seems).

For an example of a thing, I hold in my hand an old mechanical pencil. I repaired a crack in the side with green electrical tape which distinguishes it from all other pencils, marking it as mine. I understand the weight and texture of the pencil through my fingertips and the tape forms a pleasingly ergonomic profile. It becomes the conduit through which writing, an almost entirely cerebral process, becomes known bodily.

Even though we can represent a thing in object terms, my pencil has set dimensions for instance, this is not the essence of the thing. Heidegger says,

> An independent, self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation. However, the thingly character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object (Heidegger. 1971b. 164-165)



Fig 59: (Williams. 2013). My mechanical pencil, a thing with which I have preserved a relationship.

A thing can be seen as an object but always at its root remains a thing. That is, we can objectify something thingly by "plac[ing] it before us" and considering it as something detached but through dwelling it always remains a thing since we are in the world with it, not against it. This connects us to a discussion in *Being & Time* (1927) that has relevance in the discussions to come. Heidegger says that we exist amongst entities experienced as ready-to-hand and their present-at-hand conception is an abstraction, a useful but not entirely true tool.

For Heidegger all ways of being have an idea of *concern* at their heart. This is a concern with entities that are encountered in the environment and the way that our being is in-the-world consists of relationships to these entities. These are put into two groups by Heidegger, those that are ready-to-hand, and those that are present-at-hand.[4] The discussion of these entities is in many ways similar to Heidegger's later discussion regarding the nature of thing and object respectively.

Entities that are *ready-to-hand* are understood through experience. As an entity that is found ready-to-hand Heidegger uses the example of a hammer. One's relationship to this hammer changes through use. This is a relationship of concern that requires bodily interaction, emphasising our being-in-the-world. He says "the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become [...]" (Heidegger. 1927. 98). Swinging the hammer and feeling its weight and inertia one understands it in a different way than if just theorised. It is as though it becomes an extension of one's body.

Heidegger also discusses this ready-to-hand-ness in terms of a room. This room is encountered first and foremost as a room, as "equipment for residing" (Heidegger. 1927. 98) rather than in any dimensional sense. "No matter how sharply we just *look* [...] at the 'outward appearance' [...] of Things in whatever form this takes we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand." (Heidegger. 1927. 98).

4 On the translation: The distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand come from the words *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* respectively. The German prefix *zu* translates as a preposition including the words for 'to', 'for', 'at', 'in', 'with', and 'into'. The prefix *vor* translates as 'ago', including prepositions 'before', 'against', 'in front of', 'outside', and 'ahead of'. The English translations perhaps do not have the same grace as the German compound words but we can see that the former word includes ideas of involvement and the latter includes ideas of separation.

Instead, we understand the entity through use. Heidegger continues, “But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight [...]” (Heidegger. 1927. 98). Although the room *does have* dimensions these are not the reason for our concern.

As Steiner notes, anyone who uses tools, whether for craft or sport, will understand this idea. Equally, it could be said for the pencil in one’s hand or the house one lives in. The way one sees with one’s body can be imagined in the way one catches a ball without having to understand its velocity or trajectory in any quantifiable sense. Or the way when hammering in a nail the hammer becomes an extension of one’s elbow, arm, wrist, and fingers, capable of hitting the target more naturally even than if one was to hit it with one’s own finger. The objective view of the world in numerical abstractions, for Heidegger, undermines how the world is perceived as ready-to-hand. Steiner notes that,

> Heidegger’s differentiation is not only eloquent in itself; it brilliantly inverts the Platonic order of values which sets the theoretical contemplator high above the artist, the craftsman, the manual worker. (Steiner. 1992. 90)

Instead, Heidegger’s work celebrates engagement with entities and thereby draws the world nearer.

In contrast, entities that are *present-at-hand* are encountered as separate from experiencing. This is the mode of thinking of the modern sciences, discussing matter in terms of its aspects that are quantifiable. Whilst this inarguably forms *one* way of thinking about entities, as we see through Heidegger’s concept of the ready-to-hand, it is not the *only* way. Nor is it necessarily the most useful way, especially when studying our being (Collins & Selina. 1998. 56). As we have seen in earlier discussions, when the pursuit of the present-at-hand conception is too greatly embraced it can serve to undermine one’s engagement.

An example of the difference between these types of entity are my photomontages and their diagrammatic representations. The montages *themselves* are, for me, ready-to-hand since they formed a way of thinking about my relationship to the places on Perth Road. The diagrams serve only to provide their real life size.

Another example is the use of contour lines on an OS map. A continuous line joining the points of equal height, these are useful abstractions for understanding the reality of a hill. But it is the walk to the top that forms one's true understanding of the hill and one's relationship with the environment. The lines are present-at-hand but the mountain is ready-to-hand. Both are 'true' but in different ways. Heidegger's philosophy here is not a wholesale rejection of considering present-at-hand entities but a far more subtle statement that the world is first experienced as ready-to-hand and *then* intellectualised as present-at-hand.

Figs 60 - 61: (Williams. 2013). The artefact itself (of which this is just a copy) was a way of engaging with the place. Using creative practice as a method of thinking, making, through one's bodily interaction. The diagram is only a representation of the size of this. This distinction has relevance in later discussions on the use of the plan and section in architectural practice.

The same concepts of nearness to entities hold true for our relation to places. We can be engaged with places that are far away. As an example of how our nearness to a space is constructed through an engagement with the space we can look to *Building Dwelling Thinking.* Here Heidegger discusses a bridge 30 miles from Darmstadt that those in his lecture would have found familiar,

> If all of us now think, from where we are right here, of the old bridge in Heidelberg [...] From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge [...] From right here we may even be much nearer to that bridge [...] than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing. (Heidegger. 1971a. 154)

This is a comment on one's engagement that puts the individual in control of their own perceptual world. Rather than be near to what we are physically near to, we are near to what we think of, what engages our minds. Thus Heidegger is again emphasising that our perception is predominantly subjective and affected by all our memories and associations rather than objectively quantifiable. Or, to be more precise, that one is nearest to things that are most engaged with through a full experience of being.

Fig 62: (Williams. 2013). Nearness to places is similar to nearness to the picture on the wall. Consequently we can be in one place and be 'near' to another.

In my thinking about this topic I was aware that the places that I felt most near to were not necessarily those in which I had spent most time, or had visited most recently.

On a large map of Scotland I mapped places I knew or had memories of, and routes along which I had travelled. Some were easy to remember, places that I was near to, like my childhood home or where I currently live. Those that I was less near to came more slowly like a half remembered trip to Thurso, an impression of a loch in the north west. Sometimes when I remembered an event from long ago other memories were triggered that were related in some way. In this way I thought through places I had visited and what I remembered of their character. A hierarchy began to develop of the places that I was near to.



Fig 63: (Williams. 2013). My memory map of Scotland. Based on places that I feel close to.

I tried to draw each of those places from memory. By drawing from memory I was forced into a position of externalising and thereby testing my assumptions. Some places were very easy to draw, a strong mental image suggested a key viewpoint. Other places, despite my assumptions that I knew them well, remained elusive when I could think of little that was physical in the area on which to fix my memory. For some of these I eventually decided upon a view and I disregarded others. The hierarchy developed. Places that had the strongest mental image for me were generally those which were most familiar (and in several cases familial). However, some other places that I assumed would be less familiar also brought about strong mental images. These places have the most meaningful memories associated with them: perhaps friends live there or I spent a pleasant day there once. By drawing memories of these places I could test where I felt near to.

This began to shine a light on Heidegger's thinking about nearness. For me (so it seems) the relationship between myself and these places is not just dimensional, as in the map of Scotland on previous page. Instead, I am near to those that are meaningful to me. In addition the places I am near to are not near due to their proximity in time, nor do they necessarily relate to places where I have spent the most time.

Fig 64: (Williams. 2013). Sketch diagrams of what holds my attention in places.

The architectural survey that I carried out along Perth Road included plans and sections. Each section depicted a change in spatial conditions. These could be anything from a change in building height to a view towards the Tay. The sections show the road varying from a sense of enclosure to exposure. However, the resulting artefacts conveyed only the quantifiable measurements of the space, and these are not *things* in the Heideggerian sense. Equally, the scale plans of the area showed the spaces but not the experience. Although it is precisely seeing through this and having the empathy to imagine the experience that is the skill of a good architect the plan nevertheless remains a tool, an abstraction of ready-to-hand reality into a present-at-hand view. Again we can think of Bachelard writing that,

> the real houses of memory [...] do not readily lend themselves to description [...] All we communicate to others [about a memory of a home] is an orientation towards whichever is secret with out ever being able to tell the secret objectively. [...] What would be the use, for instance, in giving the plan of the room that was really my room. (Bachelard. 1958. 13)

However, through the action of making the sections, a poetic engagement of walking along the road and focussing my attention, the relationship I had with the area was enhanced. As with the sketches, the rigor of choosing a section at each changing condition forced me into a mode of close observation of the area. I conceived of each of the reflections on Perth Road - the habitual steps of my walk, the serial visions in photographs, the plans and sections, the sketches, the montages, and the models - as being connected. Each is concerned with a reiteration, another repeating poetic act. Each is a piece of the rhythmic progression, piecemeal, step by step accumulation, which acts as an allegory of the repetitive process of poetic dwelling. By committing this act to paper the nature of the experience was subtly changed as my understanding of the places developed.







Figs 65 - 67: (Williams. 2013). The sections were first drawn on site forcing a different type of looking at the surroundings. They are visually iterative, but also show a magnitude of experience linked by steps, engagement, and drawing.

The emptiness of the jug

Heidegger elaborates on the thing/place relationship by continuing his study of the jug to illustrate ‘thingness’. This, more than the pencil, begins to have an impact on spatial studies due to the *emptiness* that forms the jug’s centre. Heidegger explores thingness by saying that its vessel-nature is not in its *solidity* but in its *emptiness* and the engagement we have with it.

> But not so fast! When we fill the jug with wine, do we pour the wine into the sides and bottom? At most we pour the wine between the sides and over the bottom. [...] The emptiness, the void, is what does the vessel’s holding. The empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel. (Heidegger. 1971b. 166-167)

It is in the emptiness of the jug that is its use, its absence is a not a negative aspect but is a positive one. Whilst the jug does have a physical nature that we can discuss objectively, its dimensions for instance, we always perceive it in terms of its use.



Fig 68: (Williams. 2013). The jug’s essence is not its material but its emptiness

Heidegger's choice of the jug is reminiscent of a similar passage in the *Tao Te Ching* by Lao-Tze.

> The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty hollowness that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the empty space (within), that its use depends. Therefore, what has a (positive) existence serves for profitable adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) usefulness. (Lao-Tze. c.300B.C.E. 8-9)

As in the case of Lao-Tze, Heidegger's jug is connected metaphorically to the idea of space in, and around, buildings. Space in this conception becomes much more than just the void between objects. It is not the literal emptiness of the jug or apartment that forms the useful aspect of the jug and of the space. It is a figurative emptiness that allows for appropriation. It is a *particular kind of emptiness* that is more akin to an emptiness providing potential than absence. The emptiness of space is more like the emptiness of a blank sheet of paper than the emptiness of a cupboard.

Lao-Tze tells us that it is the empty space within the apartment that is the actual use of a home. We are near to this emptiness in the same way that we are near to the picture on the wall and distant from the glasses on our nose. The emptiness of the apartment has become a meaningful thing, a meaningful place.

This emptiness of space is like the emptiness found in poetry. As we will see in Chapter Three, a building that we understand as empty is open to additional interpretations. The jug may be filled with water or with wine; the apartment used however one wishes; the bus stop became an opportune refuge from a storm; Perth Road contains a thousand stories being continually redefined. A building that is 'full' is prescriptive of how we are intended to see it. Like a pristine house where each ornament has a specific place, or a shopping centre that yells adverts from every surface. Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin, also discussed in Chapter Three, is so full of its own meaning that an individual's poetic nature is overwhelmed.

Our poetic experience of the environment demands the perception of the environment as empty. Due to the embodied and interpretive nature of our poetic being we require an emptiness of spaces in which to dwell. There is an emptiness in any poem. It has symbols but is not prescriptive of how these are interpreted. The gaps that it leaves allow us, in our poetic recreation of it through reading, to get inside it and it inside us. The opposite of emptiness is not fullness as we normally think of it, but is a type of fullness of meaning that does not allow our poetry to develop. Metaphorically, our relation to places is like the emptiness of the jug and its ability to be filled by us; *spaces are fundamentally empty in some way which allows our appropriation.* Emptiness is therefore also connected to the idea of the incompleteness of our dwelling.

Heidegger elaborates on the nature of spaces and their emptiness. The word ‘Raum’, ‘space’ has in its ancient meaning a connotation of a space “cleared and free, namely within a boundary” he says (Heidegger. 1971a. 152). This tells us that space is always bounded, however this need not be a physical boundary. We can imagine that a corner of a park can be seen as different to the rest of the park; this difference can be read as a type of inside space bounded within the park, which itself has boundaries. There can be insides within insides. My desk is a zone within a room. Where I write on this desk is an inside in the area of the desk. This room is an inside of a building within an inside of a street. We are able to perceive the world as a series of insides that exist next to each other, through each other, within each other. Their edges are blurred, they form perceptual thresholds between one inside and another. This type of thinking is necessarily relational (i.e. the desk in relation to the room) and connects rather than excludes.

We can infer from Heidegger’s reference to space as cleared room that that which is bounded, namely our perception of place, is something expansive rather than constrictive. Centrifugal not centripetal. There is not a fence clearly bounding a place, as stated by Frampton in *Towards a Critical Regionalism* when, discussing *Building Dwelling Thinking,* he says that “the condition of ‘dwelling’ and hence ultimately of ‘being’ can only take place in a domain that is clearly bounded.” (Frampton. 2002b. 85). This is a misunderstanding of Heidegger’s thinking as saying we need physical

boundaries when in fact Heidegger's spatial boundaries are much more subtle and personal. Norberg-Schulz, too, suggests that there is a distinction between insides and outsides,

> Whereas landscapes are distinguished by a varied, but basically continuous extension, settlements are enclosed entities. Settlement and landscape therefore have a figure-ground relationship. In general any enclosure becomes as a "figure" in relation to the extended ground of the landscape. A settlement loses its identity if this relationship is corrupted, just as much as the landscape loses its identity as a comprehensive extension. (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 12)

Seen through this thesis's focus on poetry, insisting that we are always *in* the experience, this observation by Norberg-Schulz is fundamentally at odds with Heidegger's concept of dwelling because it removes us from being 'inside'.

This creation of these bounded insides that we feel is instead like lighting a lamp in thick fog. The lamp creates a distinct zone which was not previously apparent in the indistinct light. The lamplight has created a new place, an 'inside' zone within the fog constructed by boundaries of light. Due to the poetic nature of Heidegger's dwelling we can see that the perceptions of these insides are perceived by the individuals who happen to be within. Our experiences in spaces are like the lamp in the fog and as we engage with spaces we become aware of them more fully. The degree to which they are unknown reduces. As with the poem, space should have a propensity to be seen as empty but it is through one's experience that it becomes known. The poem becomes



Fig 69: (Williams. 2013). Understanding a place through experience.

meaningful to an individual, the place becomes near. Echoing Heidegger, Relph notes that, “To be inside a place is to belong to it and to identify with it, and the more profoundly inside you are the stronger is this identity with the place.” (Relph. 1976. 49).

Thus it is possible that we end up with a perceptual view of the world as a series of expanding insides. By definition we can never be outside of space in this poetic interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. However, as Heidegger suggests, our memory of insides is continually eroding; we must ever learn to dwell. As we forget the experiences of the insides they can become faded, as though the lamp is going out. Details become less clear in one’s memory until the space once more ceases to exist. Of course some memories hold up against forgetting better than others. By preserving our memories of insides we continue to dwell in them (“the nature of dwelling is this sparing and preserving”). We thereby continually keep places and memories near through our ongoing engagement, by keeping ourselves ‘inside’ them. I think I will always remember and remain near to my bus stop that sheltered me from the storm, not least because I have spent several years discussing it. We preserve these memories, their fundamentally spatial nature transforms the space into a meaningful place. A *place* for Heidegger is a personally meaningful area of space that one feels near to despite any intervening distance. Much like the way that we construct nearness to things in our



Fig 70: (Williams. 2013). We can claim a place through our actions, redefining it in our perception.

minds we construct nearness to places through our dwelling. Places act as nodal points that form the skeletal structure of our perception of the world. Like an inflated balloon these retain the boundary of space even when we are not present.

As an example, for many years my impression of Dundee showed this occurring. My main navigation through the city was based on the routes along which I habitually travelled. As shown in the figure below this linked the area of Perth Road with the centre of the town, to the area around Baxter park to the east. However, I had little conception of other areas. My understanding of the city was as a strip running parallel to the Tay bounded by an unknown mystery to the north. Gradually over the years, with both a deliberate effort and many summers spent as a gardener, my understanding of Dundee has expanded greatly. Through experience one's mental construct of that space, that was previously undefined, becomes formed.

Our poetic process of dwelling is the means by which we continually revisit experiences so that they do not disappear from memory. Dwelling continues indefinitely, continually accumulating spatial experiences. This is the repeating poetic engagement shown through my creative practice. Step by step, looking again and again. Our dwelling as a continual reengagement preserves the essential emptiness of the environment.

Fig 71: (Williams. 2013). An image of Dundee exploring the routes along which I habitually walked. Those areas that I felt I knew the character of the buildings are built up, those that were a mystery were not. The limited boundaries of my perception of Dundee several years ago are clearly shown.





Figs 72 - 74: (Williams. 2013). Various studies of areas in which I preserved memories in Dundee.

In *Heidegger's Topology* Malpas notes that "a central if neglected, concept at the heart of philosophical inquiry is that of place." (Malpas. 2006. 1) Like Edward Casey he notes that "Heidegger's work is of special relevance to any place-oriented thinker." (Malpas. 2006. 3). In terms of the relationship between 'place' and 'space' Malpas references Casey noting that,

> the history of place within the Western philosophical tradition has generally been one in which place has increasingly been seen as secondary to space - typically to a particular notion of space as homogenous, measurable extension - and so reduced to a notion of position, simple location, or else mere "site." The way in which place relates to space, time, and other conceps and the manner in which these concepts are configured has seldom been the object of detailed philosophical exploration. (Malpas. 2006. 3)

Place is only ever considered as 'a' place, 'this' place or 'that' place. A measurable objective phenomenon. However seen via Heidegger place becomes, in the view of Malpas and this thesis, a matter of central importance. The concept of place is linked inexorably to our being-in-the-world.

Malpas distinguishes place from space but comments that in the necessarily dimensional nature of each there is a degree of overlap. Equally there is overlap between place and time. In fact he suggests that place is "a more encompassing notion than either space or time, the latter two being presented as complementary modes of dimensionality ties to simultaneity and succession respectively. (Malpas. 2006. 27-28) Space relates to place in that things happen together in proximity, and time relates in that things occur in temporal proximity.

The difficulty, for Malpas, in clarifying the place/space relationship comes not just that there is this necessary overlap but also that place has often been considered as solely a spatial phenomenon,

> place is most often treated as either a certain position in space or else as a certain portion of space [...]. This way of understanding place is itself tied to a particular conception of space as identical with physical space [...] and so as essentially articulated in terms of the measurable and the quantifiable. (Malpas. 2006. 28)

It is not that place is a point in space, ‘a place, but space and time are components of place. We experience place as our being with dimensional and temporal aspects. Place is, as I noted above, a result of the non-objective way in which we have built relationships to the things and built things in our lives, where we have preserved memories that we continually revisit while being in the world.

Portfolio Three - Models

The preserving of Perth Road

As a final study I began to explore Perth Road through physical models. These models don't show a single fixed viewpoint and consequently can be seen as thematically linked to the photomontage 'joiners'. However, these models show aspects of my perceptual image of Perth Road in its entirety as opposed to the single fixed perspective of the joiners. When we stand in one place we know well, we are aware of what lies around the corner. Consequently these models have many individual moments represented together that previously had been considered in isolation. By working through the models, once again through poetic engagement and recreation, I was again making myself more near to the places along Perth Road. This time however the places were not existing separately from one another as they had been in the photomontages but they were joined. I was therefore also considering those joining spaces, getting inside them, forming more nodal anchor points for the preservation of memories.

What was most important once again was the process by which the model was made rather than a preconceived idea of the resulting product. As before, this process allowed for my developing relationship to the places that were being represented. Model work differs from the work of the previous projects primarily in the time that it takes to complete. A sketch takes only moments. The instant of a photograph is prolonged by the engagement with handmade montaging afterwards. Models demand engagement over a longer period. One is forced to look, look again, and rethink. This continues the layering process key to my research.

I began a scale model with the street pattern of Perth Road showing the adjoining streets truncated after a few metres. Using a combination of the sections and photomontages I built up the urban edge of the road in a variety of types of timber and card. Whilst the proportions are accurate the material choice has no relation to the materials on Perth Road. Instead I was interested in studying the sense of enclosure along the route. Areas in which I felt exposed, by the police station, by the billboard seating, were built in card. White card was used to signify unused spaces, black card indicated exposed but populated spaces, perhaps for loading areas or car parks. Timber was used to show areas of enclosure and areas that I felt held to the general character of the area.

The model was built to appear incomplete. It stands on stilts and its form is spiked. This emphasises the spinal route of Perth Road and becomes visible as an inside of a space rather than an outside. In addition it creates an air of emptiness, as though more could be placed into its gaps. Like our dwelling the piece is not static but full of potential.

Fig 75: (Williams. 2013). Scale model of Perth Road exploring the feelings of the spaces along its length.

Figs 76 - 79: (Williams. 2013). Views of the street space of the model, the inside of the street

In another model I carried out an exploration where different centres and qualities were portrayed using different materials. This model perverted the scale and form of Perth Road in order to give greater importance to the meaningful places, paths, thresholds, and things throughout the domain. It consists of a series of cardboard rectangles placed unglued side by side like dominoes. My intention was that it would begin as a blank row representing Perth Road. I saw each piece of card as continuing metaphor of repeated experience as with the walks, sections, sketches, and montages. Each piece of card has the resonance of repeated footsteps and repeated experiences. In the same way that the step by step of repeating experience has been discussed throughout this chapter, the cardboard pieces are each an act of contemplation and ultimately of bringing me near to Perth Road. Over the course of making the model I would, by removing rectangles and replacing them with more detailed pieces, build up the model's complexity. In this way it is genuinely unfinishable since pieces can forever be replaced.

Fig 80: (Williams. 2013). Abstracted model showing individual footsteps, implied thresholds, squares, landmark elements, and views towards that Tay.

Through this process I built up the adjoining streets and lanes, some of which I furnished with my sketches of views along their length. The nature of thresholds between differing ‘insides’ was explored with wire arches roughly at the hazy border between perceptual zones. For instance, there is the space near my home that I feel most strongly upon entering after a long day; the space around the university is bounded by a turn in the road on one side and a park on the other. Other areas between these two are derived from views to the Tay or the width of the pavement and a variety, of other almost insignificant cues are visualised with simple wires or pieces of card.

Fig 81: (Williams. 2013). A square representative of the graveyard outside St. Peter’s church. Another manifestation of the experience that adds further layers to my perception of the reality of the place.

Fig 82: (Williams. 2013). A view all the way from the university to my home. The model shows the step by step accumulation of walks and memories and the accumulation of a variety of observations such as the sketches reprinted and attached to the model on the left hand side.

Concluding remarks to the chapter

In *Building Dwelling Thinking* Heidegger says that we have forgotten that we are dwellers. By drawing on his thoughts of poetic engagement from *...Poetically Man Dwells...* and the relationship that we have with places in *The Thing* we can see that being dwellers consists of a continual creative and engaged building of experiences in particular spaces that affects our perception of spaces in general.

For Heidegger, dwelling is a topic that stretches far beyond the discussion of houses. It goes to the heart of what it is to be. We are insofar as we dwell; the process of this consists of a building of memories and experiences in spaces, which we then remember and preserve. The nature of places is that they are near to us. They can be near to us because they have the essential emptiness found in poetry. They form centres, nodal points in which we preserve our memories. These are the skeletal frame of our perceptual image of the world, as everything hangs off the important places in our perception.

Heidegger states that we need this real meaning of dwelling and building in order to understand the nature of building buildings. We are building, adapting, and reconsidering our relationships with places continually. We do this as a repeating poetic engagement with places. My creative practice made this evident: by exploring my dwelling I was dwelling. Heidegger says “Yet as soon as man *gives thought* to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer.” (Heidegger. 1971a. 159).

My creative practice on places connected me more deeply to these places. This experience can be extrapolated to the construction of buildings and will be discussed in the following chapters. If one were to build a building in a place then the qualities of that place would become intimately known through the experience, just like my creative practice. What would have been *made* would be not only the product, the building, but first and foremost the memories and experiences in that place. Experientially one would be nearer to that place than before.

However we can go further. We continually create place associations and memories which we then reflect on and alter our actions in the future. This is an iterative process, a back and forth between creating and thinking. Like my creative practice, sometimes we build buildings in this fashion, as noted in Adam Sharr's comments about the relationship between setting and using the dinner table. In the following chapter the iterative building process will be developed with respect to a farmhouse in the Black Forest that Heidegger mentions as an archetype of the way in which buildings were built as dwelling processes in the past. This building strategy of repeated poetic engagement will be referred to as Building *by* Dwelling since it is building in a similar fashion to the process of dwelling. That is to say this is dwelling as an engaged temporal act similar to my own creative practice.

Chapter Two: Building Buildings by Dwelling

Building buildings as an externalisation of the continual process of dwelling.

Fig 83: (Sharr. 2006. 16). Heidegger's own hut.

Chapter outline

Architectural interpretations of Heidegger's concept of dwelling

Bringing places near

Cities built by dwellers

Architectural control

Providing frameworks

Building continually provides no guarantee of dwelling.

Heidegger's lack of interest in architecture

Concluding remarks - Building for Dwelling

Chapter outline

In this chapter we will begin a search for the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. In Chapter One we saw that Heidegger's texts on dwelling are a call to remember the link between building, dwelling, and thinking. These three are continually ongoing simultaneously, they "come from the workshop of long experience and incessant practice." (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). Through this thesis we can understand dwelling as a poetic process of engaging with our surroundings and bringing them near to us.

We will now see that we can bring places near to us through creative practice, as with my sketches, montages, and models. Additionally, and recalling Ingold's statement that "the forms of buildings arise as a kind of crystallisation of human activity within an environment" (Ingold. 2000. 186), we will see that by building buildings the site of the building can become a meaningful place.

Going further we will see that, by building the building as a response to the always changing needs of our dwelling, a house that suits our continual process of dwelling poetically is created. Heidegger's example of this is of a farmhouse in the Black Forest of Germany. This house, like our dwelling, can be seen as never finalised since it remains open to change and appropriation as our lives develop. This continual building process can be considered *building by dwelling*. It is a process that externalises the relationship we have with a place, building memories upon memories accumulating experiences by our dwelling.

Following this Black Forest farmhouse, Heidegger's deepest foray into architectural critique, we will extend the logic of building for oneself by proposing an urban theory. Heidegger's original problem was with the feeling of homelessness that he saw resulting from mass housing. This proposed urban theory will suggest that a realisation of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling is manifest by a society of self builders.

Architectural interpretations of Heidegger's concept of dwelling

First, however, we should explore how Heidegger has been interpreted by the architectural profession in the past. The fact that his texts have been misunderstood by the architectural community is clear. For Christian Norberg-Schulz dwelling is an act of becoming at home in an environment. In *Genius Loci - Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (1980) he states that we dwell most fully when we can both orient within and identify with our environment. That is to say when we know where we are and we understand what the environment is. The two major elements that we understand in the environment are, he says, landscape and settlement"… the structure of a place ought to be described in terms of "landscape" and "settlement", and analysed by means of the categories of "space" and "character" (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 11). Space, for Norberg-Schulz, is three dimensional actuality of the environment, character is its atmosphere. As we saw in the previous chapter however, this leads Norberg-Schulz to a distinction between the apparent solid-void relationship between settlements and landscapes. As seen by this thesis, this view places an unacceptable separation between the dweller and the environment. Seen in this fashion Norberg-Schulz is placing barriers between an individual and the world by taking an extreme birds eye view and seeing the city as solid, the environment as void.

He develops his relationship with Heidegger in *The Concept of Dwelling* (1985) saying that we understand our environment at various scales of settlement, urban space, institution and house each of which have differing degrees of personal and public interaction and differing degrees of specificity. Seen altogether, from the largest scale to the smallest, gives our impression of our place in the world. "Together, settlement, urban space, institution and house constitute a total environment. This environment, however, is always related to what is given, that is, to a landscape with general as well as particular qualities. To dwell, therefore, also means to become friends with a natural place." (Norberg-Schulz. 1985. 7) More specifically, when these environmental scales agree and support one another, so that for instance, perhaps a material on a street corner can inform one of the greater environmental situation, we feel a sense of dwelling more

fully. This connection between levels lead to his assertion, discussed in the introduction to this thesis that the task of the architect is to visualise the spirit of the place, build in accordance with this, and thereby help us to dwell.

Norberg-Schulz states that an understanding of Heidegger leads to the conclusion that the task of the architect is to visualise the "distinct character" of places. In doing so, he writes, the building will fit in with existing conditions and help individuals to sense their place in the world.

> Since ancient times the *genius loci*, or "spirit of place", has been recognised as the concrete reality man has to face and come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture means to visualise the *genius loci*, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell. (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 5)

Norberg-Schulz's aim is to tap into the qualities of places and build an architectural product that fits into the surroundings as an 'intensifier' of these existing qualities. The building will in some way make evident the beauty of the surroundings or the materiality of the local stone, for instance. This, in Norberg-Schulz's view, aids our finding an 'existential foothold' which he claims is synonymous with dwelling. Through the interpretation provided by this thesis we can suggest that this is a misunderstanding of Heidegger's fourfold which as we saw in Chapter One concerns the fixing of our memories upon things rather than fixing the local conditions in buildings. Although Norberg-Schulz's texts on Heidegger are the most common reference for architectural Heideggerians, the underlying philosophical position taken by this thesis - that if we look to Heidegger's comments on poetry as suggesting that we are actively and continually involved in the creation of our perceptions of our environment - differs so greatly from Norberg-Schulz's position that there is little more profit in continued analysis.

Heidegger writes that "*Dwelling* insofar as it keeps or secures the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, *a building*." (Heidegger. 1971a. 149). The fourfold as we saw in Chapter One is the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, an intensely difficult metaphysical concept that is ignored by many who discuss his work. It seems that Norberg-Schulz

reads the above quote as saying that buildings should secure the existing local conditions (the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals) and thereby visualise the essence of that place. However, with the focus on creating an architectural product he interprets this as securing *physical* elements.

In contrast, with this thesis's focus on poetry, the fourfold can be seen as elements of our perceptual understanding of the world. The fourfold understood in this way can not be distilled into aspects of building and placed on site, thereby making us more aware of local conditions. Instead, the securing of the fourfold in things is the securing of our perception. It is the way we fix memories of experiences in places. These 'places' are afterwards remembered as significant. We have an experience, a picnic under a tree in a field, and we secure the memories of that event - the earth, sky, unknowable divinities, and ourselves as temporal mortals - to the place, to the tree and the field. We remember this and we are near to the memory and therefore near to the place. A reading of Heidegger's quote above with this view now suggests that, "Dwelling [the process] secures [our perception of] the fourfold in things, [this is a process of] building."

Due to many architects understanding the fourfold as physical elements, Heidegger's thoughts are often used to support the advocacy of a contemporary vernacular style. In copying local styles the essence of a place is upheld and, it is assumed, dwelling proceeds. This vernacular interpretation of Heidegger's texts is augmented by the vernacular style of Heidegger's architectural example of dwelling, namely the Black Forest farmhouse, despite the fact that this style was not what Heidegger sought for architects to emulate. He clearly states that "Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that *has been* how it was able to build." (Heidegger. 1971a 158). We will see later that the farmhouse in the Black Forest can be seen as a metaphor for the way that we dwell poetically.

Given Heidegger's use of historical romanticism and etymological studies - as well as the appropriateness of vernacular buildings to the local climate, local society, and a sense of place that Heidegger *is* interested in - it is seductive to link the vernacular

with an idea of Heideggerian dwelling. Were it not for a full reading of Heidegger's texts then this link between dwelling and the vernacular would seem clear. Indeed, the term 'dwelling' is frequently used in this context without reference to Heidegger at all. For example the book *Dwellings* published by Phaidon consists purely of traditional buildings from across the globe and makes no reference to Heidegger's particular type of dwelling. However, this book is a good example of how Norberg-Schulz misunderstands Heidegger's concept of dwelling. Vernacular buildings are considered here as archetypal dwellings. The igloo, for instance, is chosen since, "in its authentic form it clearly demonstrated how resources, technology, climate, environment, settlement patterns, lifestyle, values, and meanings all play their part in shaping a dwelling type appropriate to a particular culture." (Oliver. 1987. 212). This study of vernacular building is informative and well constructed and makes no reference to Heidegger so cannot be said to be misinterpreting him. However we must remember that with his concept of dwelling Heidegger is always talking of poetic experiences, not mimicking traditional styles.

Additionally, the linking of Heidegger to vernacular styles might be an attempt by architects to distance themselves from Heidegger's romanticising of rural Germany that many see as tainting his philosophy with associations of the "Volk" rhetoric of the Nazi party in portraying a particular German People. This is a topic that has been discussed in depth elsewhere, particularly by Malpas - who argues that Heidegger's philosophy on place developed long after his association with Nazism (Malpas. 2006) - and Bourdieu - who argues that Heidegger's philosophy is irrevocably intertwined with the rhetoric of the Nazi party (Bourdieu. 1991). It might be that by using the common definition of 'dwellings' - the vernacular buildings - and incorrectly assuming that Heidegger is using the word in the same way, architects can distance themselves from this discussion.

Sometimes the connection to the *genius-loci* is carried out in more contemporary styles. In the recent case of Herzog & de Meuron's Parrish Art Museum in Long Island, documented in *The Architectural Review,* this building "wants to be a matrix of the landscape itself: it makes visible what is otherwise only conceptually accessible." (Slessor. 2013. 34). This understanding comes from an interpretation of Heidegger as

saying that “nature does not simply predate the insertion of the architecture [...], but architecture frames the landscape so that it becomes, for the first time, visible with all its inherent qualities. [It] makes things accessible to consciousness and thus renders them intelligible.” (Slessor. 2013. 34). However this, as we have seen, is not what Heidegger meant. What becomes intelligible is one’s relation to that place, not the place itself.

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Another, different, interpretation of the architectural implications of Heidegger’s concept of dwelling is the way in which Heidegger’s texts are sometimes used to argue for richly sensory environments that compel one’s experiential engagement.

For instance Peter Zumthor in *Peter Zumthor Works* begins by quoting *Building Dwelling Thinking*, illustrating the influence that Heidegger’s work has had on the architect. This teaches Zumthor that, “The thought process is not abstract, but works with spatial images.” (Zumthor. 1998. 7). In his design process Zumthor suggests that he aims to draw from his own spatial experiences in order to realise a design concept,

> In my mind, I envisage what it will feel like to live in the house I am designing, I try to imagine its physical emanations, recalling at the same time all the experiences of place and space we are capable of making, those that we have made and those that we have yet to make, and I dream of the experiences I would like us to make in the house as yet unbuilt. (Zumthor. 1998. 8)

In his buildings Zumthor often uses evocative lighting and sensuous material choices. These are buildings that one wants to engage with, to caress. We will know these buildings not only through sight but through our body. His writing about his work frequently invokes subtleties of memory and association. In *Thinking Architecture* he fondly recalls a memory of a door handle leading through a house from the garden,

> That door handle still seems to me like a special sign of entry into a world of different moods and smells. I remember the sound of the gravel under my feet, the soft gleam of the waxed oak staircase, I can hear the heavy front door closing behind me as I walk along the dark corridor and enter the kitchen, the only really brightly lit room in the house. (Zumthor. 2006a. 7)

However, for Heidegger, the entire building profession separates the dweller from building. Sharr notes that although "Zumthor attempts to reconcile Heideggerian building with architecture […] the philosopher would find the role of architects and the notion of architecture unhelpful. For Heidegger, Zumthor would be part of the problem, not part of the solution." (Sharr. 2007. 98).

Zumthor's buildings, and the sensorially stimulating phenomenological branch of contemporary architecture that they represent are always objects, complete products. One's own securing of experiences in space is subdued by the intense fullness of the building. Although they are worthwhile in terms of a discussion of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling, often their influence stops at their borders and Heidegger's philosophy deserves a larger place in the study of the environment. It is more fundamental than building design and strikes at the heart of the conception of our place in the environment.

Fig 84: (Zumthor. 1998. 151). Zumthor's Thermal Baths, Vals. The enveloping nature of our environment is made especially evident here by placing the building's user in water. The building plays with the way that water sounds in different spaces, how we feel in different temperatures. The experience of different textures and sensuous materials attempts to draw us into engagement with the building.

Bringing places near

As we have learned from Heidegger, we bring places near to us through our dwelling. This is the continually repeating engaged experience of being-in-the-world. Discussing the idea of home, a place to which we are surely most near, Gaston Bachelard in *The Poetics of Space* expresses ideas that are relevant to this 'bringing near'. Like Heidegger, Bachelard believes that the measurements of a space are less interesting and less useful than an exploration of emotional responses to a space, "a house is first and foremost a geometrical object, one which we are tempted to analyze rationally." Bachelard states,

> A geometrical object of this kind ought to resist metaphors that welcome the human body and the human soul. But transposition to the human plane takes place immediately whenever a house is considered as space for cheer and intimacy, space that is supposed to condense and defend intimacy. (Bachelard. 1958. 47-48)

For Bachelard, although the house is describable by its measurements it always becomes something more, the nearness we feel towards it is immeasurable. The way that our experiences affect our relationship to the house is expressed by Bachelard when he quotes the poem 'Wind House' by Louis Guillame,

> Long did I build you, oh house!
> With each memory I carried stones
> From the band to your topmost wall
> And I saw your roof mellowed by time
> Changing as the sea
> Dancing against a background of clouds
> With which it mingled its smoke.
> .....
> Wind house, abode that a breath effaced.
> (Bachelard. 1958. 54-55)

This house represents all of our houses and all of the places to which we feel near. "Long did I build you, oh house! With each memory I carried stones." This is not the literal building of the house but the accumulation of memories in a way that we can now recognise as dwelling. We all place our metaphorical stones among the places we

experience, like Hansel leaving a trail of bread crumbs we identify meaningful places by the cairns that accumulate. Thus through experience we become near to a place through each successive use of it. However, *nearing*, that is the process of becoming near, can be more than just a coincidental nearing of places through experience and instead be something deliberate.

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Nearness also increases through creative reflections. This should be no surprise, dwelling itself, as discussed in Chapter One, is a creative act. By creating an artefact with the same engaged focus we simply give form to the act of dwelling we do always. As an example, we can see nearness increasing in the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau documented relationships with places in his *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* (1782), a series of short essays remarking on his memories of experiences. This is particularly evident in his 'Fifth Walk' when he discusses his engagement with a particular place. Made twice homeless, once by exile from his native country, another time stoned out of his home in Môtiers, and about to be deported to England, Rousseau finds a home on a small island on a lake.

> I could have desired that this place of refuge be made my lifelong prison, that I be shut up here for the rest of my days, deprived of any chance or hope of escaping and forbidden all communication with the mainland, so that not knowing what went on in the world, I should forget its existence and be forgotten by those who lived in it. [...] I could have written [a book] about every grass in the meadows, every moss in the woods, every lichen covering the rocks – and I did not want to leave even one blade of grass or atom of vegetation without a full and detailed description. (Rousseau. 1782. 82-85)

Even many years later, when writing of this time in his life, Rousseau retains a sense of nearness to this home that belies its temporal and spatial distance. "I should like to know what there was in it that was attractive enough to give me such deep, tender and lasting regrets that even fifteen years later I am incapable of thinking of this beloved place without being overcome by pangs of longing." (Rousseau. 1782. 87).

Rousseau states that the nature of writing about his experiences provides a link, despite any intervening period of time or spatial distance, back to the event. He has anchored himself in this place through the act of writing about it and the essay now forms a link back to remembering the place. He states that in years to come, “I shall recall in reading them the pleasure I have in writing them and by this reviving times past I shall as it were double the space of my existence.” (Rousseau. 1782. 34).

Rousseau’s creation of something that explores a relationship with a place brings to his mind the experience of that place and preserves the nearness that he felt. The creative act, inherently questioning and necessarily self reflective, increases the strength of the original sense of nearness by making nearness a deliberate focus of thought. This is more than Bachelard’s incidental bringing near of one’s home (Long did I build you, oh house!), it can become a *method* for nearing; for dwelling.

I have mentioned already the unforeseen fondness and nearness that I began to feel towards the interior of my tent whilst travelling. This was an increasing nearness simply through living, carrying stones with each memory as Bachelard might have put it. A similar experience occurred when attempting to draw places from memory, discussed briefly in Chapter One. Once the places had been sketched they were perceived differently when I actually revisited them. The place where I had stood, in my mind’s eye, now had an additional layer of experience upon it. The creative reflections on places, such as with these memory sketches and all of my Perth Road work, added layers of experience onto the perception of the places. I see through these, as I see through all my memories, colouring the perception of these particular places.



Figs 85 - 86: (Williams. 2013). Through my creative practice I was bringing the places nearer to me. Adding a layer of experience through which my perception of that place was altered.

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Extending this logic, we can also *build* to alter our relationship with a place. A sense of nearness can develop through a physical altering of the environment. For Rousseau nearness develops through the creating of textual responses, and for me it developed through creative practices. For Simon Unwin the familial ritual of setting up a picnic at a beach is an enactment of primal place making that we can see as making this sense of nearness. It is an example of how our reflections upon the place and our experiences there can be envisioned in buildings (Unwin. 2006). Like Sharr's example of a dining table, explored in Chapter One, the 'building' of the picnic arrangement and the 'dwelling' of individuals around the picnic area are inseparably linked.

This connection between actions and organisation is picked up by Adam Sharr as being particularly Heideggerian. The many decisions about where and how to lay out the picnic, in the sun or shade for instance, or who sits next to each other, is "a choreography of small scale place identifications." (Sharr. 2007. 53).

Figs 87 & 88 (Unwin. 2006). For Unwin these are primal place making decisions that serve to structure a relationship between place and user. They are defined by factors as large as the solar path and the flow of wind, and as small as where the sandwiches are in relation to the kids playing in the sand. The place exists in the memories of the family even after it has been deconstructed.

As with the effect of Rousseau's writings and my creative practice, the site of the picnic will be altered in the minds of the picnickers: it will have become near through their direct engagement with the site. We can imagine that the site may become remembered as 'their' corner of the park, or be under 'their' tree. This picnic construction, of incremental decisions based on foreseeing dwelling whilst remaining inherently flexible in the face of altering conditions, is a sort of building *by dwelling.* By building in a place that place becomes near to the builder. This is the same when we are 'building' memories, 'building' a creative response, 'building' the arrangement of a picnic or a dinner table, or indeed 'building' buildings.

Heidegger outlines this in his discussion of a hypothetical farmhouse in the Black Forest that forms his deepest foray into architectural critique. For the philosopher this is an archetypal example of dwelling and building having happened together in a way that he believes rarely occurs anymore. The farmhouse is shown as resulting from many years of dwelling having happened, again recalling Ingold's comments about buildings being the crystalisation of human activity. The form and character of this example was almost certainly influenced by Heidegger's own small hut in the same area of southern Germany, the relationship with which Adam Sharr discusses in *Heidegger's Hut* (Sharr. 2006). This small hut, where he frequently went to write and to think, provided Heidegger with a place that he seemed to feel nearer to than his other residence in a nearby town. In addition to his understanding of this hut, other houses in the Black Forest area provide Heidegger with a farmhouse that he sees as resulting from a long process of dwelling having happened.

Fig 89: (Sharr. 2006. 16). Heidegger's own hut.

Fig 90: A style of building typical in the Black Forest, Germany (Sharr. 2006. 69). Heidegger's example of the Black Forest farmhouse was likely derived from examples such as these two buildings.

The example of the Black Forest farmhouse comes at the end of *Building Dwelling Thinking* and encompasses all of Heidegger's views on the engaged poetic nature of dwelling including: one's increasing nearness to place through poetic actions; a rejection of the dimensional measurements of space; the preservation of memories; and the fourfold perception of oneness with the world. Although it is tempting to see Heidegger's reference to the farmhouse as advocation of vernacular building by studying the buildings that influenced it, Heidegger is clear that it is not the style of the house that is important, as we have already seen (Heidegger. 1971a. 158). The poetic interpretation taken by this thesis suggests that what is important is the process by which the farmhouse was built.

Heidegger says that this farmhouse was "built by the dwelling of peasants" (Heidegger. 1971a. 157). Note that it was not built by the usual practices of building, such as sawing or hammering. At the very least Heidegger's language suggests that these are ancillary to the *real process* of building. Heidegger is clear that *dwelling built the building.* Central to this idea is that the acts of building and dwelling did not occur one after the other, as though the building was built first and then the inhabitants began to use it to dwell. Instead the processes of dwelling and building were linked organically, as with the picnic or dining table. The requirements of life ordered the arrangement of the building, from the rooms and the roof to the paint, presumably changing over the years as family members were born, died, married, or changed their requirements in the many other ways that life demands. At the same time the building imposed conditions upon the lives of the inhabitants through its solid form. The house faces south and is sheltered from the wind. Its roof pitch holds the winter snow and protects it from stormy weather. In many ways the house is typical of the vernacular style of the area; but Heidegger's point is that it is unique to the families who lived and continue to live there, due to their influence on it through their dwelling and building. Sharr notes that in this house "Every layer of paint, every drill mark, fitted hook, or gouge in a wall is akin to the soot-blackened timbers or carved stones which provide archaeologists with clues."

(Sharr. 2007. 70). It has this archaeological potential due to the fact that it has been built over time, incrementally, as a response to the dwelling of the inhabitants. As conditions changed the building form changed and adapted. It stands as a palimpsest of their lives.

Heidegger contrasts this with contemporary buildings. His example is of mass housing, in which he perceived homelessness to be occurring due to a lack of personal poetic growth. Mass housing is not built, as it were, from the ground-up by individuals, rather it is arbitrarily superimposed from a position of detachment upon a subjugated site and people.

Heidegger's example of building buildings by dwelling is an externalisation and crystallisation of the nebulous processes of building, dwelling, and thinking that occur within us as part of our being. It is a process of incremental building over time in a physical fashion that matches dwelling's mental accumulation. We recognise that our inner self is never complete; similarly, we can see that it is impossible to complete a home in any idealised dwelling form. This iterative, temporal, process is similar to the idea of sketches developed in the previous chapter, where each action is defined by the actions it follows whilst defining the actions it precedes.

Jonathan Hill notes that, "Whether or not they are architects, when the designers are also the users of the building the building process has the potential to be not the production of a fixed object but an endless, flowing cycle of designing, making and using." (Hill. 2003. 58). The strong bond that develops between the dweller and the building is easily imagined. As we saw in Chapter One when architect Wiltold Rybczynski built his own home he noted that "Each shovel of gravel, each nail hammered, each board sawn, settled me more firmly in the meadow […] I was now rooted in place." (Rybczynski. 1989. 192). He discusses the romance of building one's own home, of "playing out an ancient ritual" (Rybczynski. 1990. 129). He goes on to describe the similarities between two families who built their own homes. One, a Swedish architect couple who built their house over a period of years, adding to it whenever necessary. The other, a relatively poor Mexican family, who built and adapted their home over a period of years. For

Rybczynski, and in a particularly Heideggerian fashion, both instances showed "evidence of how individuals can transform a place, and hence make it particular, not by grand design but by the small celebrations of everyday life." (Rybczynski. 1990. 185).

With my creative practice I was becoming near to two entities, the place of study but also the artefact itself. When a building is built, however, the place and the artefact are fully linked *in place*. By this process of engaged making one becomes near.

The concern for the task of building, both by making-an-artefact and engaging-with-a-place, is what we can learn from the farmhouse in the Black Forest. Bachelard in *The Poetics of Space* discusses the poetics of concerned actions.

> The minute we apply a glimmer of consciousness to a mechanical gesture, or practice phenomenology while polishing a piece of old furniture, we sense new impressions come into being beneath this familiar domestic duty. For consciousness rejuvenates everything, giving a quality of beginning to the most everyday actions. It even dominates memory. How wonderful it is to really become once more the inventor of a mechanical action! [...] Objects that are cherished in this way really are born of an intimate light, and they attain to a higher degree of reality than indifferent objects, or those that are defined by geometric reality. (Bachelard. 1958. 67-68)

In this he echoes Heidegger in saying how much nearer this made artefact will be to the maker and at the same time forms by implication what we might be tempted to see as a critique of mass housing or detached architectural processes.

Thoreau, too, advocated the benefits of building one's own home over purchasing ready mades as something more fully in keeping with the essence of our being.

> There is some of the same fitness in a man's building his own house that there is in a bird's building its own nest. Who knows but if men constructed their dwellings with their own hands, and provided food for themselves and families simply and honestly enough, the poetic faculty would be universally developed, as birds universally sing when they are so engaged? But alas! we do like cowbirds and cuckoos, which lay their eggs in nests which other birds have built, and cheer no traveller with their chattering and unmusical notes. Shall we forever resign the pleasure of construction to the carpenter? (Thoreau. 1854. 29)

Thoreau's hut on the edge of Walden pond was his retreat in response to his general sense of misanthropy. It was a place where he could muse on the conditions of life. In this hut, built by his own hands, he found a sense of belonging. However, unlike Rybczynski's house, Thoreau built not just with his hands, but, like Heidegger's farmhouse, iteratively in response to the conditions of life. In this process he sees beauty,

> What of architectural beauty I now see, I know has gradually grown from within outward, out of the necessities and character of the indweller, who is the only builder, - out of some unconscious truthfulness, and nobleness, without ever a thought for the appearance; and whatever additional beauty of this kind is destined to be produced will be preceded by a like unconscious beauty of life. (Thoreau. 1854. 30)

It should not be assumed that by advocating the benefits of self-building as a means of dwelling this thesis intends to extol the virtues of some imagined and idealised 'simpler time'. However, arguably, this *is* something that Heidegger was frequently guilty of. Nor is it an echo Williams Morris and the Arts and Crafts movement's desire to romanticise the humbleness of toil, however Heideggerian this attitude might be as well. In *Change by Design*, Tim Brown describes William Morris as "the most articulate spokesman for the view that the industrial revolution had ushered in a world of unimaginable riches but one drained of feeling, passion, and deep human engagement." (Brown. 2009. 113). In a similar fashion to Heidegger, Morris held an overly romantic view of the past, he "gazed backward toward a hopelessly idealised vision of the medieval craftsman producing his own goods." (Brown. 2009. 114).

Instead, we might agree with Matthew Crawford who in *The Case for Working with Your Hands* discusses the worth of manual work arguing that it is both more emotionally and intellectually stimulating than much knowledge based work. The central point of his argument is that the engagement with one's task, combined with the tangible outcome makes working with one's hands emotionally and intellectually stimulating (Crawford. 2009). Crawford states that,

> I want to avoid the precious images of manual work that intellectuals sometimes traffic in. I also have little interest in wistful notions of a 'simpler' life that is somehow more authentic, or more democratically valorous for being 'working class.' (Crawford. 2009. 6)

Nor does he believe that manual work is in response to frugality. Instead, his desire is to show, like Thoreau, that manual work can address a deeper aspect of ourselves. He says that "We want to feel that our world is intelligible, so we can be responsible for it." (Crawford. 2009. 8). In this, Crawford echoes Heidegger's idea that engagement with things allows one to make them meaningful and draw them near.

Cities built by dwellers

Putting aside for a moment the advantages of building one's own home, as seen in the farmhouse in the Black Forest, the problem that begins Heidegger's thought in *Building Dwelling Thinking* was that of homelessness caused by mass housing. Mass housing is symptomatic of a society that has forgotten that they are dwellers. Consequently this society allows the process of building buildings to become separated from the process of dwelling. Mass housing becomes symptom, cause, and manifestation of our homelessness. It fools us into thinking that we are complete when we are in fact made up of a process of fragments continually building and eroding. The homogenous sprawl provides no potential for one's own bringing places near save within the physical boundaries of one's own house and garden and within limits of DIY and redecorating.

The solution that Heidegger offers, the farmhouse in the Black Forest, has clear parallels with the beautiful house that Rybczynski built and Thoreau's hut by Walden pond. However, when we think of the architectural implications of these examples we see that they are rural solutions to an urban problem. Heidegger's concept of dwelling is of course more nuanced than a qualitative judgement between rural and urban building; however, given the distinction between urban and rural in architectural theory, this is an interesting problem. If we all remembered that we were dwellers, as Heidegger wished, then an urban solution would surely result. Primarily, the importance of this observation is that it seems it was an issue that Heidegger did not address in any way. What might an urbanism that resulted from a society of dwellers be? It seems probable that individuals building buildings as dwellers would construct a city of continually changing spaces as they alter and adjust the requirements of life, just like the Black Forest farmhouse.

Can we imagine housing on a large scale built by dwellers, like those at the Black Forest farmhouse? Houses would be built by the individuals who owned them, individuals who accumulate experiences and are incomplete. A society of builders building their own homes that would stand as a palimpsest of a lifetime of decisions. The houses would be incomplete too, developing depending on one's requirements and means. These houses would not foster the idea that the owner is complete since the owner, as a dweller, recognises their ultimate incompleteness and continually develops the house.

Freud's discussion of Rome, is again educative. Used in Chapter One to elaborate the way we iteratively construct memories and associations, and the fact that we 'see through' these to perceive spaces, Freud shines a light not only on our mental landscape, but also the nature of cities. Rome is, he says

> [...] an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development contrive to exist alongside the latest one. [...] Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero's vanished Golden House. On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find not only the Pantheon of to-day, as it was bequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the original edifice erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other. (Freud. 1929. 7)

Cities are ever changing, adapting, accumulating and de-constructing. They change and alter over time and are never finished. For instance, the constant building and rebuilding of Rome could perhaps be seen as an enactment of dwelling. Seen from a large enough scale and on a long enough time scale, cities must appear as ever changing, incomplete, manifestations of dwelling. However, these changes occur outwith the hands of the inhabitants and at scales that are large enough to be barely perceptible.

Heidegger's call is for all mortals to try "on *their* part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature" (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). The way that contemporary cities change acts upon individuals, rather than being changed by individuals. A

society of dwellers, however, might enact change and build relationships with places on comprehensible scales. This would be a society of dwellers like Thoreau and Rybczynski, building for themselves out of and for their dwelling experiences.

This urban situation already exists, although it is marred with difficulties. Rybczynski points out that building one's own home is considered by many to be a luxury but "paradoxically, it is a luxury that almost all poor people in the so-called underdeveloped world enjoy." (Rybczynski. 1989. 189). Perhaps an urban manifestation of dwelling can be seen in the shanty towns of the world. The idea of extolling the benefits of shanty towns will undoubtedly strike many as unsound. But what is of interest is the form and process of the shanty town, not the socio-economic failings that precede their creation. What is of interest is a view of building as dwellers, building by dwelling, the shanty town can be seen as experiential engagement turned into shape.

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Commonly considered to be places of negative qualities, for a variety of good reasons, the assumption that shanty towns are universally awful has been challenged in various places. Although in the forward to the UN-Habitat report, *The Challenge of Slums*, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General, writes that slums are the "urbanization of poverty" and that they "represent the worst of urban poverty and inequality" (UN-Habitat. 2003. v) it might be possible to find in shanty towns that building by dwelling evidences real benefits. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Executive Director of UN-Habitat, writes in the introduction to the report,

> Slums are also places in which the vibrant mixing of different cultures frequently results in new forms of artistic expression. Out of unhealthy, crowded and often dangerous environments can emerge cultural movements and levels of solidarity unknown in the suburbs of the rich. Against all odds, slum dwellers have developed economically rational and innovative shelter solutions for themselves. (UN-Habitat. 2003. vi)

In shanty towns building occurs as a result of individuals having control of their environment. In *Slums of Hope?* Peter Lloyd discusses the effect of this in the shanty town saying that there are frequently strong communities present where care is taken by many individuals to uphold the area, "such areas often report strong feelings of corporate identity and well-developed local organizations." (Lloyd. 1979. 163).

In *Learning from Favelas* it is lamented that shanty towns are never considered as worthy of academic study. However, the fact is that they "constitute, partly because of their immense size and variety, a type of settlement that needs to be seen as a new area of experience and learning for architecture." (Nicolin. 2010. Inside front cover). It is outwith the scope of this thesis to develop the work in these references and form a study of shanty communities, dwellers and buildings. However, evidencing a possible Heideggerian direction, Nicolin points out the benefits of the shanty town are that,

> Slum morphology results from numerous small, individual decisions, rather than from planning. As density increases, the slum dweller builds upward and outward to gain area without inhibiting access. Houses are knit together or built wall-to-wall, creating residential quarters that swallow street space and convert it into private access corridors. *The prevailing culture privileges personal, qualitative space over anonymous, quantitative space.* (Nicolin. 2010. 57. My italics)

We can imagine that a society of dwellers, if provided with the means, could enact changes and build relationships with places on comprehensible scales much like that seen in the shanty towns of the world. This could embrace the 'luxury' of building one's own home and the nearness and engagement to places that is involved. Individuals building buildings as dwellers would construct a city of continually changing spaces as they alter and adjust the requirements of life. This city would consist of a society of dwellers like those of the farmhouse in the Black Forest building for themselves, both for and as a result of, their dwelling. This could be a response to Heidegger's concluding assertion in *Building Dwelling Thinking* that individuals must try on their own to concern themselves more fully with their own building and dwelling.

A self-governing, self-building, dwelling community might be unrealistic in terms of geopolitics but as an architectural and philosophical idea it is an interesting concept. It calls for a complete decentralisation of the right to build and can be seen as a physical manifestation of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. A continually building-up, altering, reappraising, heterogeneous city would be a city of builders, a city of people who remember that they are dwellers. We each perceive different variations of reality, coloured by a unique series of spatial associations. A city of dwellers would be a physical manifestation of this individualisation.

Figs 91 & 92: (Williams. 2013). Two images of a project exploring the manifestation of our building continually on an urban scale on Perth Road. This desire is not too dissimilar to the desire to keep allotments, of which Dundee has many. We tend our patch of land, commune with our neighbours, and become stewards of a place through our engagement.

Architectural control

This reading of Heidegger's texts gives power back to the agency of individuals in the environment. The environment becomes perceived as something that is, like our dwelling, fundamentally incomplete. Arguably, this architectural interpretation of Heidegger's concept of dwelling is, however, denied by the architectural profession.

In *The Illegal Architect,* Jonathan Hill criticises the profession of architecture and the professional body of architecture in the UK, the RIBA, by arguing against the enshrined 'laws' of architecture. Damningly he suggests that,

> The architectural profession claims a monopoly over a specific area of architectural production for the purpose of economic and social self-protection. The principal aim of the profession is to provide the products and practices of its members with an iconic status and a cultural value, to suggest that only the work of architects deserves the title architecture. [...] They deride any threat as ignorant or mistaken and imply that there is a truthful and correct interpretation of a fixed body of knowledge. (Hill. 1998. 16)

The profession, in Hill's view, achieves this level of control over individuals by denying that buildings need to be occupied in order to be considered architecture. We can see the manifestation of this denial and fear of the user, says Hill, in the inhabitantless images provided by architects of their buildings. Life is not being explored in this conception of architecture, only form and surface aesthetics. In this way, buildings can be seen as complete in and of themselves and not subject to the contingencies and complexities of life as judged by any occupants in the ongoing process of dwelling.

This discussion of contingency and complexity is one developed by Jeremy Till in *Architecture Depends.* Till argues that the architectural profession's desire for a sense of completion is a result of an attempt to forcefully deny the importance of the variety of individual perceptions. The starting observation of his book is that there is a gap

between the working architect's desire for autonomy and completeness, and the fact that buildings are inherently contingent upon uncertain factors. He states that this separation from the world that the architect desires is problematic since,

> It allows architects to detach themselves as humans (social, political, and ethical beings) and then look through the wrong end of the telescope, and so to see the world as an abstraction. One might think that an abstracted world can be ordered, beautified, and perfected, but in the end the real will come back to bite you. What becomes quickly apparent is that any permanent detachment is deluded. (Till. 2009. 25)

He continues to say that from the beginning stages of design to the final finishing touches of a building, architecture is dependent on external factors. However, Till argues, architects belie this contingent nature of architecture, holding up impossible claims of autonomy and completeness as achievable goals, "the will to order [is] a central feature of modernity." (Till. 2009. 34).

What is troubling about this is that it imposes a system upon individuals in which they are not considered to be important. We can see this by thinking of Nikolaus Pevsner again: he began *An Outline of European Architecture* by saying that "A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture." He goes on, "Nearly everything that encloses space on a scale sufficient for a human being to move in is a building; *the term architecture applies only to buildings designed with a view to aesthetic appeal*." (Pevsner. 1943. 15. My italics).

Pevsner's Lincoln Cathedral is, in this conception, always architecture, his bicycle shed never more than just a building. How one feels about these built artefacts is not seen as important. However if we think of my bus shelter or my tent it seems impossible to categorise one's emotional reaction to a space into two groups, one of 'quality', the other without. And if such groupings could exist, who decides where the line between the one and the other lies? Does a bicycle shed that provides sanctuary from a storm still belong to the category of mere building? And does a Gothic Venetian palazzo, that is barely noticeable in the background, surrounded by all the other canal side palazzos, still count as the highest form of architecture? With Heidegger's focus on the

importance of an individual's perception the answer is surely, 'no'. A bicycle shed can be the source of a transcendent experience, and a Venetian cathedral can be passed by unnoticed.

By raising 'architecture' to include only the profoundly beautiful, and Lincoln Cathedral *is* beautiful, is to miss the point. As Jonathan Meades notes, writing in the Guardian newspaper in 2012, Pevsner's "bent towards aesthetic totalitarianism" and the architectural line of thinking that it represents, is a major cause of the architecture profession's failure to realise good places (Meades. 2012). This perspective ignores the poetry that can be found in every spatial encounter. 'Architecture' in the definition given by Pevsner becomes little more than a myth propagated by architects to shield themselves from the terrifying richness of reality. Adhering to this concept, whereby a form is either 'architecture' or 'not architecture', that which is deemed unworthy can be discounted. Consequently the architects' illusory control over the interpretation of the built environment can be upheld.

Arguably one of the primary aims of the architectural profession is to protect their claim of authority over the domain 'architecture'. As Jonathan Hill, in *Actions of Architecture,* notes,

> To acquire social status and financial security architects need a defined area of knowledge, with precise contents and limits, in which they can prove expertise. One of the aims of the architectural profession is to further the idea that only architects make buildings and spaces that deserve the title architecture, suggesting that the user is predictable and has no part in the creation of architecture. (Hill. 2003. 3)

The image of the lone creative soul realising their vision is still prevalent and romanticised in the architectural profession, from Le Corbusier, to Hadid, to the Randian hero of Howard Roark unselfconsciously imposing their brilliance upon the inhabitants of the city. This is a self-absorbed idea that leads to buildings conceived as inwardly looking narcissistic objects, such as I perceived in Berlin's Jewish Museum. Just as Narcissus was unaware of Echo's interest in him as he gazed into his reflection, the narcissistic building is unconcerned by external factors and is equally untouchable.

This attitude of externality becomes the background of our lives. Buildings become conceived of as always existing separately from us, rather than as active participants in our existence. This enacts the mind/world separation that Heidegger rejected. We become fundamentally divorced from spaces in a technology park urbanism as seen in the mass housing that Heidegger derides.

It might at first seem that an architecture of completeness, an idea that will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, is to be striven for, but what occurs, as Till points out, is only the “marginalization of difference” (Till. 2009. 39) since the idea of completeness invariably develops in a single homogenous style due to the small pool of architectural practitioners. All that occurs is bland uniformity, the distanceless nightmare that began Heidegger’s *The Thing.* The process oriented view of the built environment, in contrast, leaves the environment as incomplete, allowing everyone to participate in its continual recreation.

Providing frameworks

Perhaps, short of complete decentralisation of building rights and means, to join Heidegger's thoughts with architectural practice, one way of putting into practice Heidegger's concept of dwelling could be to provide frameworks allowing inhabitants to build their own buildings. This could continue the benefits of self-determinism outlined by Thoreau but reduce the anarchy of a society of dwellers.

It may be that what is required is the construction of structures that encourage dwellers to build. The idea was explored by Steven Holl in one of his earliest works. A project that was never built, his proposal was for a Philippine housing project. Consisting of a series of indicative building plots given structure by a central concrete spine Holl's project suggests that the inhabitants would be permitted to build their own structures. The spine would form a major 'street' and several public squares. By forming this minimal ordering system of house plots and public spaces, Holl allows the organic development of shanty homes whilst retaining space for community action.



Fig 93: (Holl. 1989. 15). Architectural control with a light touch. Holl's project allows individual control whilst retaining an overall order.

Equally, we can look to Le Corbusier's 1920's Pessac housing development near Bordeaux. Although not intended for the same purpose as Holl's conceptual project, the result has been comparable. The design of these 51 houses near Bordeaux for French industrialist Henry Fruges has, over the years, been adapted by the inhabitants of the area.

In *Lived-in Architecture,* Phillipe Boudon notes that Le Corbusier's design has changed drastically since it first became inhabited. This might at first seem a critique of the original design, and in some ways it is, Boudon notes that,

> The impression is sufficiently pronounced for the visitor to feel that, in addition to the normal processes of ageing, there has also been a real conflict between what the architect wanted and what the occupants wanted. (Boudon. 1969. 1-2)

However, Boudon also notes that the Pessac development at the time of building was considered an experiment by both the client and the architect. It was a "laboratory, in which Le Corbusier would be able to 'put his theories into practice and carry them to their most extreme conclusions'." (Boudon. 1969. 2-3). And so it remains a laboratory, many years since its first unveiling.

Although in many ways a Corbusian apologist, Boudon argues that the project at Pessac provided a *framework* in which the dwellers could build for themselves, as responses to their dwelling, similar to Holl's Philippine proposal. Although it is frequently used as a shorthand example for the failures of the modern movement's misunderstanding of how people live, Boudon concludes that the project was not an architectural failure at all. Instead,

> [...] the modifications carried out by the occupants constitute a positive and not a negative consequence of Le Corbusier's original conception. Pessac could only be regarded as a failure if it had failed to satisfy the needs of the occupants. In point of fact, however, it not only allowed the occupants sufficient latitude to satisfy their needs, by doing so it also helped them realize what those needs were. (Boudon. 1969. 161)

In a similar argument for providing frameworks for growth, in *How Buildings Learn* Steward Brand discusses the worth of considering the practice of architecture as something that is not only deeply concerned with how buildings alter spaces but also how buildings adapt over time. He states that we too often consider our buildings as static, designed, in fact, *not* to adapt. In the period of a building's life, "Between the dazzle of a new building and its eventual corpse" is a period of potential, "when a building can engage us at our own level of complexity." This involves the evolution of the building, its adaptation to our requirements (Brand. 1994. 11). This, for Brand, results in a change in the architectural profession from being artists whose medium is building, to being the convenors of the lives of buildings. Architects in this view would not, therefore, only oversee the construction of a building and then step back admiring its completion. Instead, they would have a continual interest in leaving open the process of re-imagining and re-forming each building as time passes.

The idea of providing frameworks will reappear in Chapter Three with a more experiential rather than physical focus. However, before progressing this idea further, a fundamental flaw in Heidegger's idea for building continually, as observed in the Black Forest farmhouse, should be discussed.

Building continually provides no guarantee of dwelling

As we have seen, by building for oneself a sense of nearness is engendered through the long labour of engagement. This is what Heidegger was aiming for with his farmhouse example. However, when someone else visits the building, is there any guarantee of their dwelling there? It seems not. The Black Forest farmhouse is a manifestation of dwelling having happened but building as a dweller implies, like dwelling itself, *never finishing*. In this sense any building built by dwellers immediately becomes a ruin once it is finished and development ceases. It becomes only a symptom of dwelling having happened at some point in the past. The Black Forest farmhouse was built by dwellers but Heidegger makes no mention whatsoever as to whether it is conducive to the dwelling of *anyone else* now that it is empty. Thoreau's hut is nothing to his neighbours. There is nothing in its form that suggests encouraging the bringing near by another person. Heidegger's question "Do the houses, in themselves, hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them?" (Heidegger. 1971a. 144) used in reference to modern mass housing, in fact, still seems relevant to his hypothetical farmhouse. Can we guarantee that dwelling occurs in a city built by dwellers? Or even a single building? Once construction ceases, it seems not. Perhaps there is no more guarantee of one bringing these places near than the mass housing with which Heidegger began his discussion of homelessness. If one can use the old bridge at Heidelberg indifferently – the bridge that every member of the *Building Dwelling Thinking* audience was asked to invoke in their minds – then it must be possible to feel homeless in any situation. Perhaps the farmhouse in the Black Forest, or Thoreau's hut, or a city built by dwellers, each hold no more *guarantee* of one's bringing them near than any of the mass housing that Heidegger derides. The building strategy that Heidegger advocates, like dwelling, only exists in the journey rather than the goal.

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This sense of continual accumulation is condemned by Kenneth Frampton in *The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects.* Taking a lead from Hannah Arendt's distinction between 'work' as an unnatural state of stasis and 'labour' as an impermanent process analogous to life itself, Frampton argues that continual labour, as was seen most clearly in the labour mills of the 18th century, is continued today in our continual consumption that requires our continual labour. This, in Frampton's view, "has condemned man to perpetual movement." (Frampton. 2002a. 29). In his view, an architecture of continual building as evoked by Heidegger would be a state of continual forced consumption and waste. He worries that in such an environment of continual changes, the idea of returning home would be rendered pointless since that place would already have changed and would have become unrecognisable. However, Heidegger is not the least bit concerned with this, focussing only on what it means for an individual to dwell in the moment. The question of whether it alters the dwelling process of others apart from the builder are, for Heidegger, unimportant.

At this point in the thesis we have reached an interesting problem. A re-evaluation of Heidegger's concept of dwelling suggests that poetic engagement and recreation has been under-appreciated by architects when discussing dwelling. This poetic is key to understanding that as dwellers we are in control of the measuring, individuals are the rulers of space. We build spatial associations accumulatively as memories, and equally we continually forget these. Heidegger says that the way we build buildings should reflect this and we should build and adapt our buildings continually as the requirements of life dictate.

However, there is *no guarantee* that the environment created in this way aids the process of dwelling of anyone but the dweller themselves. Obviously the dweller engages, and has engaged, but the question, of whether anyone else who comes afterwards would dwell, is left unasked. Consequently we have still not found a satisfying architectural interpretation of Heidegger's concept of dwelling.

Heidegger's lack of interest in architecture

Part of the reason for the poverty of this interpretation of Heidegger's concept of dwelling, is that Heidegger lacked any real interest in finding architectural solutions because he believed that architecture was incapable of aiding our dwelling in any way.

Arguably Heidegger wasn't interested in, and perhaps even misunderstood the role of, architecture in the environment. Whilst Heidegger *did* use architectural terms we can see that he was not particularly interested in engaging with architectural discourse. Whilst his language is at times familiar to architects - 'place', 'site', 'building', 'dwelling' - he is tackling a far deeper and more sensitive topic than surface aesthetics. Rather, he is asking questions of what it is to be ("into that domain to which everything that *is* belongs." (Heidegger. 1971a. 143)).

He shows this in the use of the term *baugedanken,* which can be translated as 'ideas as how to build'. Heidegger begins *Building Dwelling Thinking* by saying that he doesn't "presume to discover architectural ideas, let alone to give rules for building." (*"Baugedanken zu finden, oder gor dem Bauen Regeln zu geben"* Heidegger. 1971a. 143). However, as Lefas notes in *Dwelling and Architecture,* Heidegger's use of *baugedanken* (ideas as how to build) evidences a reluctance to even use the word "architecture" at all. This is a subtlety that is missed by Hofstadter's translation of *baugedanken* as "architectural ideas" (Lefas. 2009. 47). Instead, Heidegger was saying that he doesn't "presume to discover [ideas as how to build], let alone to give rules for building." Lefas continues to suggest that this reluctance was perhaps because Heidegger was aware of Ludwig Wittgenstein's unwilling association with a particular architectural style and sought to distance himself from similar issues. In doing so, Heidegger would remain relevant to discussions of the underlying form of the environment, rather than only stylistic values (Lefas. 2009. 47). From the outset Heidegger rejects a discussion of architecture and distances himself from the possibility of any 'Heideggerian architectural style'. In any case, this would ultimately just be another product-oriented (rather than process-oriented) view of the world. Instead, what he is discussing is only ever the process of building by dwelling.

For our purposes Heidegger's lack of interest in architecture opens possibilities to develop his work. This is particularly evident with the additional observation that when Heidegger did discuss architectural ideas his understanding seems to have been lacking nuance. For instance, as previously discussed, Heidegger makes no attempt to discuss the discrepancy between the *rural* farmhouse solution to the *urban* problem of mass housing. Equally we can see the poverty of Heidegger's understanding of architecture during the passage referencing the farmhouse in the Black Forest, when he leaves unexplored the building's future appropriateness for aiding the dwelling process in others. Heidegger is not interested in the form of the building, he is interested in how the relationship of an individual to a place changes through action. We must assume that in Heidegger's view every inhabitant of the building will continue to develop it according to their needs, some aspects unchanging like the pitch of the roof, others like the room layouts changing frequently.

There is a further architectural discrepancy in that although Heidegger uses the example of a farmhouse built by dwellers as a 'true' building, elsewhere he extols the virtues of the Greek temple. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* he compares a temple to a work of great art in which "the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge." (Heidegger. 1971d. 39). For Heidegger, the Greek temple is silent, it "portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley." (Heidegger. 1971d. 40). However, this use of this temple conflicts with the message of the farmhouse. Architecturally it can be argued that whilst the latter is built by dwellers and is therefore incomplete the former is fundamentally a symbol of completeness. The classical Greek temple has been used throughout architectural theory as something almost preordained, perfect and complete. Sigfried Gideon describes the temple in *Architecture and the phenomena of transition* as being the archetypal example of a spatial conception that celebrates objects distinctly placed as complete and separate from one's experience (Gideon. 1971). This is an enactment of the mind/world split Heidegger sought to deny.

These objects radiate influence over the surrounding area. They are of externality like the pyramids before them and in architectural terms consequently not at all comparable in nature to the Black Forest farmhouse.

There is a problem with this continual lack of interest in architecture from Heidegger. He seems to think that architects, and the entire building profession, serve to distance individuals from genuine being by creating buildings that are not built by the dweller and consequently never truly dwelled in. This, however, seems to be a property unique to architecture among the arts. Heidegger is quite happy to discuss the engaging effects of poetry or painting, created by great poets and great artists, but seems to think that it is impossible for buildings to engage us in the same way. This is clearly, at the very least, an impoverished view of architecture and opens the possibility for us to develop Heidegger's thoughts.

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The vast majority of the world's greatest buildings involved an architect. Architects will remain the most skillful designers of buildings since it takes years and years of experience in the trade to be able to design a building that works in every way that it should whilst having the desired emotional effect. "I have been to a very small number of buildings that are almost perfect." says Adam Caruso of Sigurd Lewerentz's Saint Peter's church in Klippan, Sweden, in his book *The Feeling of Things,*

> They are characterised by a mastery of the act of building that has nothing to do with displays of virtuosity and everything to do with an all pervasive, existential character that fills their every pore. This character is usually indistinguishable from that of their architect, not in the conventional manner of the artist-genius and the work of art, but as a result of a completely internalised, synthetic way of working where issues of construction and thematic intent become one. The perfect buildings that I have seen are the work of old men. (Caruso. 2008. 76)

Caruso's 'perfect building' shows that architects are capable of creating profoundly moving buildings. This church, built when Lewerentz was 81, is a building that must be engaged with, as an architectural poem. Caruso says that,

> Lewerentz removes the possibility of our forming easy or conventionalised associations within the church. Instead we are confronted with brooding walls and spaces whose darkness make us strain to even understand their extent. When the rich variety of spatial conditions begin to emerge from this darkness they appeal directly to our emotions bypassing an understanding of the building within our personal inventory of experience. [...] each of us must confront the spaces of St. Peter's anew, and on our own. (Caruso. 2008. 78-79)

This is a building that, like poetry, must be engaged with, even if one is not involved in its construction in any literal sense. It doesn't exist as a present-at-hand, diagrammatic, conception worked out on paper first and then imposed on ready-to-hand, experienced, reality where it never achieves its full intent. Instead, as Caruso notes, it "represents an unprecedented integration of making and thought." (Caruso. 2008. 77).

It is important therefore, in the light of Heidegger's lack of specific architectural interest (and perhaps understanding), to read his building examples as discussing, not style or form, but ideas.

Concluding remarks - Building for Dwelling

Heidegger's rejection of the importance of architecture is a problem that must be addressed if Heidegger is to remain of interest to the architectural profession. The advocation of an individual and continual process of building makes the practice of architecture redundant. However, as we have seen Heidegger's vision is flawed. Instead, we need an architectural solution that goes beyond his call for us all to build buildings for ourselves, as seen in the Black Forest farmhouse. Although this may have been the way it was once possible to dwell, it is no longer appropriate. By considering the architectural implications of this we can see that it doesn't guarantee dwelling in any case. Frampton may be correct in his observation that Heidegger condemns us to perpetual change.

We need to go beyond the architectural interpretations of Heidegger's texts. The idea of building akin to the 'spirit of place' outlined by Norberg-Schulz is arguably a misunderstanding of Heidegger's fourfold concept as physical rather than mental. The interpretation of the vernacular qualities of the Black Forest farmhouse were not what Heidegger sought to emulate. Zumthor's rich and sensorially stimulating environments, although they encourage one's poetic engagement, remain as controlling devices intended to evoke a specific response. It might be that it is Zumthor's very success that stands in the way of his being considered by this thesis as truly Heideggerian. He cannot stand in the background and allow dwelling to occur because his buildings and his intentions are documented so thoroughly.

Instead, I will argue in the following chapter that we could embrace a particular type of emptiness in our environment that *allows us to dwell*. We need an environment that in some way allows for our continual poetic experiencing rather than prescribing a particular emotional response. The farmhouse in the Black Forest is continually modified but should be seen only as a metaphor for what we do as dwellers continually.

We want something that allows, not for the continual modification of the environment but the continual modification of *ourselves*. The building that we need to attend to, and that should be aided by our environment, is the continual building of ourselves.

In order to embrace our rich complexity, we must embrace an environment that supports the way in which we each define different interpretations of spaces. In the following chapter this will be discussed as a particular type of emptiness. This emptiness is not a simple absence but the emptiness that provides potential for an individual to fill. It is a poetic emptiness that, like the emptiness of a poem, is not complete untill experienced.

This opens a wider view of architecture. It suggests that all spatial experiences are of architectural merit. Heidegger revolutionised the way that we can think of ourselves in the environment, as active agents. This removes total control of architectural perception from the architectural profession and is replaced by a far richer whole environmental perspective in which we all exist as equals and in which we can dwell poetically.

Chapter Three: Buildings for Dwelling

An exploration of emptiness in buildings allowing the poetic process of dwelling



Fig 94: Serlio's Comic scene. (Serlio. 1611. 2nd book, 3rd chapter, fol 26).

Chapter introduction

Environments suppressing our dwelling

Architectural obsession with completeness

Emptiness, authorlessness, and incompleteness

A language of multiple fragments

Architectural multiplicity

A return to the farmhouse

Concluding remarks to the chapter

Chapter introduction

As we have seen in previous chapters, in his essays on dwelling Heidegger sets out homelessness as an issue of paramount concern that is not addressed in the creation of many new buildings. As we saw in Chapter Two he shows that one's homelessness ceases by bringing places 'near' to us. This nearness occurs through our dwelling process which can be manifest by making changes to our environment. These changes are building buildings as a manifestation of our building of memories and associations by dwelling. By using the farmhouse in the Black Forest as an example of dwelling having happened Heidegger is calling, not for stylistic copying of the house, *but for us all to build out of our dwelling*.

The understanding of dwelling as repeated *poetic* experiences, fundamentally incomplete, is almost incompatible with the common conception of architecture as a practice and profession. Poetry is, we should recall, an engaged act. One cannot skim read a poem but through its recitation we recreate what is poetic. We 'live' the poem and are able to interpret its various meanings as a result. This relationship is symbiotic, were we not able to interpret the poem we would not be able to give ourselves to it. In the light of an understanding of dwelling, much architecture is revealed as being closed and inherently stifling of our individual processes of dwelling.

Ultimately, Heidegger is saying that our relation to place is too important to be left to other people. For the philosopher our relation to places is the most important aspect of our being. His aim is that *Building Dwelling Thinking* "traces building back into that domain to which everything that *is* belongs." (Heidegger. 1971a. 143). The conversation about dwelling and building is, for Heidegger, a fundamental discussion about the nature of experiencing the world. This previous chapter of this thesis suggested that since Heidegger believed that the building profession distances individuals from places we should instead act like the dwellers of the Black Forest and build ever changing collections of individually controlled houses and communities.

Heidegger ends *Building Dwelling Thinking* by saying that the only way one can eliminate the misery of homelessness is by "trying on *their* part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature[.] This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling." (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). We have read this in Chapter Two as nothing short of a call for the decentralisation of all architectural powers to individuals. This continual modification of buildings would thereby strip away the existing barriers between building buildings and the process of dwelling. The way we dwell would be made manifest by our playing a substantial role in constructing our environment.

In this chapter we will ask what is the environment that allows - not the continual modification of our *buildings* - but the continual modification of *ourselves* through our ongoing poetic experiences of dwelling.

This is required because an implementation of Heidegger's ideas about architecture - advocating continual modification of our buildings - leads to buildings that whilst beneficial to those who live in them, give no guarantee of aiding the dwelling of others. It might be true that in the past we built like those in the Black Forest but it is not practicable in contemporary society.

We can consider the environment that more fully enables us to be poetically engaged and bringing our own interpretations, as with a poem, as being an environment that more fully supports our dwelling process. Taking inspiration from Heidegger's discussion of the jug, this environment can be considered as having an emptiness. We must ask, not, 'what would dwellers build?', but, 'what environment has the particular type of *emptiness* that allows an individual to dwell there?' This is the type of emptiness found in the jug and in the poem. It is not an absence of something but speaks of potential. Consequently, as we proceed in this thesis we see that *if Heidegger is to remain of interest to the architectural profession* then not only must architects embrace a more nuanced approach to Heidegger's philosophy but a reading of Heidegger's concept of dwelling can be extended with a more nuanced understanding of architecture.

This observation, that neither Heidegger nor architects fully understand each other, opens an interesting gap in the research, what *can* buildings do to aid our process of dwelling? We begin to depart from Heidegger's theory here, using it as a springboard to develop architectural ideas and make connections to the architectural writers and practitioners who might not previously have considered themselves Heideggerian.

First we will ask, since we are dwelling all the time - as we are being all the time - whether environments can affect our dwelling at all. Looking through a Heideggerian lens at architects like Superstudio and Rem Koolhaas in the section entitled *Environments suppressing our dwelling* we see that they have critiqued environments that are stifling of our poetic dwelling process. Additionally people like Kevin Lynch have sought to find the underlying form of environments that aid the degree to which we can become near to a place. In contrast to the type of emptiness and incompleteness that we are looking for, this chapter will argue that buildings like Libeskind's Jewish museum in Berlin that has been discussed throughout this thesis, have a type of fullness or completeness that suppresses dwelling.

In the section *Architectural obsession with completeness,* and following the previous chapter's discussion of architectural control, we will discuss the ways in which the architectural profession is obsessed with fullness and completion. This desire for completion is seen in much contemporary architecture, as well as being historically and methodologically reinforced.

We move away from this desire for completion towards a concept of emptiness in architecture, in the section *Emptiness, authorlessness, and incompleteness.* Here we gain inspiration from Roland Barthes's *The Death of the Author.* This work of Barthes's speaks of incompleteness and potential that is key to this thesis's concept of emptiness.

In the section *A language of multiple fragments,* we will speculate that a particular type of emptiness can be formed through a language of multiple fragments. This draws inspiration from the creative practice carried out throughout this thesis, as well as from other texts and art, as with previous chapters. The section *Architectural multiplicity* will study similar ideas of emptiness.

Finally, in *A return to the farmhouse,* we will look at Heidegger's Black Forest farmhouse armed with these new observations of emptiness and multiplicity and suggest that in its form, built by dwellers, is perhaps an environment in which we can dwell after all.

Environments suppressing our dwelling

We might imagine that since dwelling comes from within ourselves, then the poetic process must be achievable anywhere. One might assume that a feeling of nearness is possible anywhere depending on the degree of one's engagement with that place. One person could feel near to a place that another person passes by ambivalently. Someone lives there, someone else walks by each day, someone else has a single but profound memory of an event in that place. Everyone has their own series of 'insides'. To what extent can the form of the built environment alter this?

Alain de Botton notes in *For an Architecture of Happiness* that architects can be frustrated with the fact that our surroundings are frequently not the main factor in determining our state of mind,

> Architecture is perplexing, too, in how inconsistent is its capacity to generate the happiness on which its claim to our attention is founded. While an attractive building may on occasion flatter an ascending mood, there will be times when the most congenial of locations will be unable to dislodge our sadness or misanthropy. (de Botton. 2006. 17)

However, whilst dwelling can theoretically occur anywhere it seems that Heidegger believes that one's surroundings *do* alter a capacity for dwelling with.

Heidegger had two main residences, one near university and another, a hut in the mountains nearby. Adam Sharr notes in *Heidegger's Hut* that Heidegger claimed "an emotional and intellectual intimacy with the latter building, its surroundings, and its seasons." (Sharr. 2006. 3). It was here that, for over five decades, Heidegger wrote most of his texts. He frequently referred to his town house as 'below' or 'under' and his hut as 'above' or 'up there' reflecting both the topographical reality and the moral and philosophical purity that he perceived there (Sharr. 2006. 64). In contrast, despite the fact that his hut forms an important part of his writing and personal letters, his house is rarely mentioned.

Architecturally too it is clear that some environments *are* more engaging than others and whilst much of this might be circumstantial, as de Botton suggests, some of it might be environmental also. We can imagine for instance a place in which we cannot engage such as a hypothetical environment of an extended plane in which, featureless and immense, the ground stretches in every direction. The haze in the distance blurs the boundary of ground and sky. Dwelling in this domain, could only be considered as dwelling within an abstract placeless expanse since there would be no way to demarcate individual places. This expanse is essentially distanceless having no things or possibility of nearness. The only place it holds is the place of one's own body and, without anything onto which one can preserve one's memories, locations would be experienced as indistinguishable from one another. We could never engage since there would be nothing to engage with. For an environment to have any possibility of engaging it must provide options. Were we handed a spade then this distanceless environment might be altered, marking places by piles of earth.

In the 1960s Italian architects Superstudio critiqued the state of urban development in their *Twelve Cautionary Tales for Christmas*. Here they provide twelve visions of hypothetical cities in which, we might suggest, dwelling has been suppressed by blind subservience to technology. Each city provides no options for its residents and is unilateral in its vision for living.

The '2000-ton city' extends across the landscape as a grid of cells stacked on top of one another. Each resident lives in one cell that through a variety of means satisfies all their requirements, we are told that "All citizens are in a state of perfect equality." (Lang & Menking. 2003. 150). Should a resident ever have unworthy thoughts about their utopic imprisonment the ceiling collapses with the force of the city's namesake.

In 'Continuous Production Conveyor Belt City' the dream of every resident is to move to the newest houses which are continually under construction on the city's extremities, a feat only the wealthiest can afford. Those houses that are older are looked on with

disgust and “Only society’s rejects, mad or insane individuals, still dare to wander amongst the ruins, the detritus and rubble that the city leaves behind it.” (Lang & Menking. 2003. 158).

In the end they state that each of these twelve represent existing urban situations. If we approve of them we are named “an empty shell, a dark, humid cavity [...] not a human being.” (Lang & Menking. 2003. 161). If we reject them we can only despair in the face of their inevitable realisation in the future; Superstudio believe that the wheels of technologic subservience are already in motion.

Looking to another example of contemporary urban critique Rem Koolhaas examined the idea of substance overwhelming spatial choice in *Junk-space.* Junkspace for Koolhaas was the archetypal spatial type of the late 20th century, the shopping centre proliferation of symbols. He says that,

> Junkspace is a Bermuda triangle of concepts, a petri dish abandoned: it cancels distinctions, undermines resolve, confuses intention with realization. It replaces hierarchy with accumulation, composition with addition. More and more, more is more. Junkspace is overripe and undernourishing at the same time, a colossal security blanket that covers the earth in a stranglehold of care [...] (Koolhaas. 2004. 163)



Fig 95: (Lang & Menking. 2003. 150). Superstudio’s ‘2000-ton city’. A vast utopia in which all one’s needs are met, however should one think about leaving they are immediately crushed in their cell.

Junk-space is written in a style that acts as metaphor for how Koolhaas perceives this type of space. Sentences run on from one another in a stream of consciousness. No paragraphs break up the continual flow. In this environment - that Koolhaas sees as a symptom of commercial architecture's legacy - a sense of Heideggerian nearness is impossible.

> It is flamboyant yet unmemorable, like a screensaver [...] There is no form, only proliferation [...] it makes you uncertain where you are, obscures where you want to go, undoes where you were. Who do you think you are? [...] Junkspace pretends to unite, but it actually splinters. (Koolhaas. 2004. 162-171)

In this environment there is no emptiness and no being near. As with the experience of reading Koolhaas's essay, being in junkspace is disorienting, anything can mean anything; there is no way to find anything amongst the excess. The individual is suppressed by the space's fullness.

Arguably the proliferation of stuff outlined by Koolhaas is as equally suppressing of our dwelling as the total control of Superstudio's twelve cities. Discussing contemporary suburbia in America, Jason Griffiths in *A Guide to the Essential Indifference of American Suburban Housing* suggests that there is a sense of abandonment to be found in suburbia due to a similar proliferation of stuff.

> Conventional images of emptiness imply a physical absence or decay; here in suburbia we found the opposite. This profound emptiness was bizarrely enhanced by the very richness of suburbia – it was the most embellished houses which often felt the most abandoned. (Griffiths. 2011. 4).

This isn't an abandonment like one would normally consider a waste space, like an old warehouse for example, but a ghostliness caused by overabundance. This idea of space is reminiscent of the argument from Neil Postman in *Amusing Ourselves to Death* that "This is a book about the possibility that Huxley, not Orwell, was right." (Postman. 1986. viii). He argues that whereas George Orwell's vision in *1984* was the suppression

of the population through tyranny and concealment, Aldous Huxley's in *Brave New World* was that we would become suppressed not through oppression but through trivialisation and overabundance.

Koolhaas's *Junk-space* and Superstudio's *Twelve Cautionary Tales for Christmas* are both metaphors for the problem of contemporary architecture that caused Heidegger to decry the state of dwelling in the first place. They are critiques of the obsession with surface aesthetics, the present-at-hand conception imposed upon ready-to-hand world, the diagram confused for reality. Contemporary architecture's authoring of the complete object, as will be discussed in a few pages, only serves to suppress one's own dwelling process that requires a particular emptiness to thrive.

As we saw in Chapter One, the idea that some environments are more conducive to relating to than others is explored by Kevin Lynch in *The Image of the City.* He states that a person with a "good environmental image" can feel emotionally secure (Lynch. 1960. 4). Lynch's studies relate to the legibility of city form understood through interviews with city residents. From these interviews Lynch discerns different types of element that one perceives in the environment such as paths, edges, districts, nodes and



Fig 96: (Lynch 1960. 147) Lynch's image of Boston derived from interviews with locals. The map shows paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks illustrating how people relate to the places within the whole. A stronger mental image, argues Lynch, gives a stronger feeling of belonging.

landmarks. Without these, he argues, one is left without any sense of place. For instance, remarking on experiences of "formless" Los Angeles one interviewee remarks that "it's as if you were going somewhere for a long time, and when you got there you discovered there was nothing there, after all." (Lynch. 1960. 41). This bleak appraisal of LA is of a place without places, in which we are without the ability to fix our memories of places and bring places near to us.

In order to bring places near to us we have to be able to construct our own sense of the meanings, narrative, and experiences in the environment. A building that does this for us makes our own decisions impossible. Visiting the Jewish Museum in Berlin I was struck by its intense fullness. I felt cowed into experiencing only what I was told by Libeskind to experience. As in a theme park, architectural 'events' are encountered - 'The Garden of Exile and Emigration', 'The Holocaust Tower' - and then exited by the same door. Like a ride one is expected to experience these, react appropriately, then leave suitably impressed in a state of appropriate contemplation. Comparable to a shopping centre one is pressed from all sides by the correct interpretation, except these are not sales techniques but symbols intended to put one in a somber mindset. The building plan is taken directly from a shattered Star of David, a form of symbolism also used by Libeskind in the Imperial War Museum, Salford, where a shattered globe reassembled stands for much the same meaning. In the Jewish Museum this leads to confusion, "the route through the upstairs is a muddle" notes William JR Curtis writing for *The Architectural Review*, "and the matter is not improved by the confused presentation, which is not worthy of the subject matter. [...] Never in the history of humanity has so much meaningless geometry been produced by so few architects." (Curtis. 2011. 116-117). Throughout the Berlin Museum adjacent to the inaccessible 'Holocaust Voids' are expositional plaques insisting that the architect Daniel Libeskind envisioned these voids as representative of absence and loss.

In the book *Counterpoint Daniel Libeskind,* Paul Goldberger provides an elaboration on these unilateral symbols,

> Three underground ‘roads’ symbolize three paths in the history of German Jews. The first leads to the dead end of the holocaust tower, the second to the garden of exile, and the third to the stair of continuity and exhibitions [which] represent the continuation of Berlin’s history. (Goldberger. 2008. 32-34)

I saw this building as so full of its own unilateral symbolic intent that my own poetic connections were impossible to make. Poetic experiencing requires an openness to interpretability; this invites us to be part of the experience, not subject to it. In the Berlin Jewish Museum poetic experiencing was impossible. Consequently it was a building that I felt impossible to be ‘inside’. It was always separate from me, an object I could never touch. This is a building that, like a shopping centre blasting music and advertisements, continually demands that one receives and accepts rather than interpret and create. In contrast we can look at Libeskind’s early drawings known as micromegas and chamberworks, which almost seem to demand one’s participation. For Martin Woessner writing *Heidegger in America*, Libeskind’s early drawings were magical. In fact he connects this work to Heidegger’s writings in terms of their desire to engage (Woessner. 2011. 259). It is clear that at some point a great change in approach occurred in Libeskind’s oeuvre from engagement to exclusion.

A culture that produces iconographic objects full of their own significance in the vein of much commercial architecture can *only* occur as a product of a culture that conceives of their built environment as objects distinct from experience. These forms are seen as ideals of contemplation rather than environments of experience. Even though we *do* inevitably end up seeing these objects as experiential, their primary and original aim is that of removed object and statement. In environments such as these, dwelling becomes an incidental outcome rather than explicit aim. We need instead something that allows an emptiness so that we, as dwellers, can engage more fully.





Top - Fig 97: Chamberworks horizontal drawing VII (Libeskind. 2001. 50)
Bottom - Fig 98: (Goldberger. 2008. 23) Outside of the Berlin Museum.

Architectural obsession with completeness

Whilst the essence of our being is of incompleteness and engagement, our celebrated architecture strives to be seen as complete, full, and unilateral. In the previous chapter this was discussed as the profession's desire to deny the importance of individual agency. Now we shall explore the formal, historical, and methodological means by which this is realised.

Arguably architecture is often seen as a means of denying our essential incompleteness. It is perhaps the greatest tragedy of architecture that it is continually incapable of reconciling its need to be finished with its inhabitants' need to remain incomplete. For if we were complete we would not be capable of accumulating new memories and experiences. Where then does our desire for completion in our buildings come from? It might be that, confronted by the terrifying richness of reality, the idea of being complete is seductive. Perhaps we aim for the idea of completion in our buildings in the vain hope that we will obtain completion in ourselves. In *For an Architecture of Happiness*, Alain de Botton alludes to the fact that our tendency for collecting things of beauty is a consequence of our desire to attain for ourselves the qualities we see in the objects. He argues that we often desire to purchase an object to absolve ourselves of some flaw that we feel is present in our own character. However, this desire is always doomed to fail. "Owning such an object may help us realise our ambition of absorbing the virtues to which it alludes," he says,

> but we ought not to presume that those virtues will automatically or effortlessly begin to rub off on us through tenure. Endeavouring to purchase something we think beautiful may in fact be the most unimaginative way of dealing with the longing it excites in us[...]. (de Botton. 2006. 152)

In terms of buildings it seems that in desiring a complete object we might be attempting to 'cure' our own existential incompleteness. The complete building fosters the fantasy that we are complete and whole when in many ways we are fragments. This can only lead to one's sense of disillusionment and self loathing in the long term as we realise that, as dwellers, we are *fundamentally incomplete* and can never live up to some idealised life where we are as unambiguous as a complete building.

The appeal of a minimalist home, for instance Pawson House designed by the famous minimalist John Pawson, is its claim that its clean lines will provide a lifestyle that is controlled, ordered, and rational. ‘You could be a complete person!’ Despite appearances, however, this style is not of the *tabula rasa*. It has not the potential of a clean sheet of paper but the sheen of a surface that exposes one’s dirty fingerprints. Disorder can only increase through its occupation. The concept of completeness in our buildings is unhelpful, it succeeds only in pointing out how unsuitable we are for stasis, it distances us from our environment. The solution to our existential homelessness is not to be found in owning completed objects but, as Heidegger says, by remembering that we are dwellers, critically incomplete, continually accumulating.





Figs 99 & 100: (Pawson. 2002) The desire for a life without existential complications evidenced by the purity and sense of completion in the forms of bathroom and kitchen.

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Architecture is not generally thought of as incomplete. In much the same way that Aesop's fables are illustrative of the way the world is experienced, we can look at the origin myths that the architecture profession tells itself as a way to explore current views. Throughout the history of architectural theory, origin myths have been utilised to add credence to an idea. Joseph Rykwert states that the desire behind defining the primitive hut comes from an appeal to historicism.

> Whether in ritual, myth or architectural speculation, the primitive hut has appeared as a paradigm of building: as a standard by which other buildings must in some way be judged, since it is from such flimsy beginnings that they spring. These huts were always situated in an idealized past. (Rykwert. 1972. 190)

Many propagators of these historical appeals are documented in Rykwert's book *On Adam's House in Paradise*. Their central tenet is the belief that in order to create the best buildings we must look to the first principles of architecture to understand how we acted before the corrupting influence of modernity. They evidence, in Rykwert's words, a desire that, "[...] a return to the "preconscious" state of building, or alternatively to the dawn of consciousness, would reveal those primary ideas from which a true understanding of architectural forms would spring [...]." (Rykwert. 1972. 28). And since etymology is an exploratory technique engaged by Heidegger in his study of language it is perhaps relevant here.[1]

18th century architectural theorist Marc-Antoine Laugier imagined a series of attempts by which an early human endeavoured to find comfort within the harsh world.

> Beside a tranquil stream he sees a meadow; the fresh turf pleases his eye, the tender down invites him. [...] but presently the sun's heat begins to scorch him, and he is forced to look for shelter. A neighbouring wood offers the cool of its shadows, [...] thick clouds obscure the air, and fearful rains stream in torrents down on the delicious wood. The man,

1 Both assume the inherent 'truth' of humankind's actions in times long past. Vitruvius in fact took his origin of architecture back to groups of humans clustering around fires and developing language and buildings synchronously.

> inadequately sheltered by leaves, does not know how to defend himself [...] A cave comes into view: he slips into it; finding himself sheltered from the rain he is delighted with his discovery. But new defects make this dwelling disagreeable as well: he lives in the dark, the air he has to breathe is unhealthy. He leaves the cave determined to compensate by his industry for the omissions and neglect of nature. Man wants a dwelling which will house, not bury him. Some branches broken off in the forest are material to his purpose. He chooses four of the strongest, and raises them perpendicularly to the ground, to form a square. On these four he supports four others laid across them; above these he lays some which incline to both sides, and come to a point in the middle. This kind of roof is covered with leaves thick enough to keep out both sun and rain: and now man is lodged. True, the cold and the heat will make him feel their excesses in this house, which is open on all sides; but then he will fill the in-between spaces with columns and so find himself secure. (Rykwert. 1972. 43-44 Quoting from Laugier's first edition of *Essai sur l'architecture*. 1753.)

Laugier's aim, in using origins as authority, is to state that the temple form, complete with columns, entablature, and pediment, is essential to architecture. (Rykwert. 1972. 44). His version of man was at one with nature and therefore the temple/shelter form must come from nature. The image that accompanied his text, shown on the following page, develops the message of the purity of the temple form. In this image mankind, depicted as innocent cherub, is presented the building by the personification of architecture. This is not an architecture earned in increments, but given completely. Although Laugier's protagonist tries several natural features first, when he comes to build he builds, immediately and without error, a classical Greek temple.

Corbusier too used a very similar example in *Towards a New Architecture.* "Primitive man has brought his chariot to stop, he decides that here shall be his native soil." (Le Corbusier. 1923. 69). What transpires is the construction, immediately and without trial or error, of a temple form replete with flattened ground, cleared trees, rectangular boundary, symmetry, elegant proportions, and entrance axis. Le Corbusier's primitive builder builds a sophisticated and complete form by which "he has brought in order", in contrast to the disorder of the surroundings (Le Corbusier. 1923. 71).

Fig 101: The personification of architecture and the primitive hut, after Laugier (Rykwert. 1972. 45). Architecture arrives fully formed, given to human kind in their innocence.

It should be no surprise that architects are obsessed with the complete object and pure idea rather than the incomplete process of being. The method of the working architect has, since Renaissance times when the ‘master builder’ became a separate profession to on-site worker, been one of a separation from the experience of the building. This conception of the architectural profession can be seen as an appropriate enactment of the metaphysical tradition of mind/world split that Heidegger sought to undermine. From a detached position a building is conceived in the mind, and then built in the world. The final product stands as testament to the vision. However, the building must always be an imperfect rendition of the essential idea conceived first on paper. Many architects have, of course, succeeded in creating beautiful, meaningful buildings but the profession is nonetheless almost as perfect enaction of the mind/world split, an intellect imposing completed products on the world, as one could hope to find.

This conception of what architects do, as being a top-down realisation of preconceived design onto the world rather than ground-up building as dwellers, can also be seen throughout contemporary world views. In the bestselling *The Greatest Show on Earth*, Richard Dawkins uses architecture as the exemplar form of top-down design. “An architect designs a great cathedral. Then, through a hierarchical chain of command, the building operation is broken down into separate departments, [...] until the cathedral is built, looking pretty much like the architect’s original drawing.” (Dawkins. 2009. 217). According to this view of the profession, architecture is seen fundamentally as an act of imposing objects that were completed in the mind prior to commencement of construction. The work which occurs in the architecture office encourages this association with the idea of completeness. The way that some architects conceive their work unsullied by life, particularly evidenced by the architects’ model, pristine and virginal white, attest to the fact that a profession has become convinced that human nature can be overcome by the complete object.

This is particularly enhanced by the profession’s methods of working, especially the reliance on the tools of production, namely the plan and section. Jeremy Till states in *Architecture Depends* that “What is clear is that the drawing, in all its rigid two-dimensionality and spatiality, cannot begin to presume to be the same as the building in

all its sociality and temporality." (Till. 2009. 111). The mind/world separation can result in the creation of objects in the Heideggerian sense, of being conceived only as their dimensional, quantitative aspects. Till continues,

> Architectural space may not be physical in the scientific sense of the word, but as long as it is conceived in the shadow of form, the objectlike qualities will stick around space. Such an understanding of space aligns precisely with the Cartesian view of the world. [...] At one level the measurement of space is a benign, and useful, activity; it is necessary to know the area of a room so that, say, one can understand roughly how many people can occupy it. But the measurement of space has a nasty way of becoming the dominant criterion of space. (Till. 2009. 120)

Additionally Jonathan Hill in *Actions of Architecture* notes that,

> Architects build drawings, models and texts. They do not build buildings. However, to claim authority over building, architects often discuss architectural drawings as if they are a truthful representation of a building. But all forms of representation omit as much as they include. Texts, drawings, models and photographs are partial, providing contradictory and elusive information. (Hill. 2003. 130)

For Hill the gap between the architect's drawing and the building "is an uncomfortable truth to be forcefully denied because it threatens their authority over architecture (Hill. 1998. 20). This is an almost perfect enactment of the problem Heidegger saw occurring: the present-at-hand diagrammatic conception of the world becomes confused for reality, whereas the ready-to-hand, the experienced, is what is real. We always know the hammer, to use Heidegger's example, through use, through swinging it and it becoming an extension of our body. Although the hammer does have quantifiable dimensions and weight, these are secondary.

This observation, that the methods of architectural production in the office contribute to separation and subsequent object creation, is one that is explored by Bruno Zevi in *Architecture as Space.* He states that the rendering of spaces into two-dimensional drawings results in a conception of architecture that belies its three-dimensional complexity. The greatest fault with architectural critique is thus that,

> buildings are judged as if they were sculpture and painting, that is to say, externally and superficially, as purely plastic phenomena. It is not merely an error of critical method; it is a misconception arising from the lack of a philosophical position. (Zevi. 1957. 19)

This, states Zevi, reduces everything to pictorial values. In doing so, what is unique and special about architecture is lost. Architecture is fundamentally inhabitable, it is fundamentally made to be lived amongst and engaged with. Like Till, Zevi notices that, by disregarding this, the tools of the architect serve to undermine the beauty of architecture. Obviously, and as already mentioned, many architects do in fact overcome this obstacle, evidenced by any building that one finds to be meaningful or near. However, it remains the case that the separation of an architect from the building process has permitted the fallacy of buildings as 'complete' objects to endure. It has resulted in the idea that the form of the plan, or the elevation, is itself capable of signifying an idea rather than encouraging one to read one's own ideas into the space. This reduces the critical practice of architecture to the creation of objects that have a specific absolute and unilateral meaning and therefore remain forever separate from us, unpoetic through the denial of our own engagement. The elevation of the building becomes intended to be read from afar, its three-dimensional actuality never quite living up to its two-dimensional conception. Zevi notes that "most histories of architecture are full of observations that have nothing to do with architecture in this specific meaning [of architecture as space]. They devote page after page to the façades of buildings which in effect are sculpture on a large scale." (Zevi. 1957. 28). This aids a creation of a complete product that directly enacts the mind/world divide instead of embracing the fact that buildings are always experienced by a variety of individuals with different spatial sensibilities.

Zevi claims that the drawings of architects can never attain the richness of space that exists in reality. He provides an analysis of St. Peter's Basilica in Rome by Michelangelo to illustrate this point. He shows 9 figures, each an interpretation of the plan of St. Peter's.



Top - Fig 102: a traditional plan view of the building.
Middle from L-R Figs 103 - 106: A ‘design plan’ simplification; an inverse design plan; the interior space at ground floor level, treating it as a homogeneous whole; the same ground level but considering only the outside space not bounded, as it should be, by the surrounding buildings in another ‘inside’ created by the piazza.
Bottom from L-R Figs 107 - 110: Indicating the “fundamental structures” involved in the building; emphasising the cross shape of the plan.; emphasising the central zone and surrounding aisles; emphasising the importance of the vaults and cupolas.

Each of these is, Zevi states, unsatisfactory, although together they are each complimented by the others. None of these however, states Zevi, comes close the the actual experience of being in Rome, in St. Peter’s Basilica. (Zevi 1957. 47-53)

The trouble it seems, architecturally, is that all too often buildings are conceived of as present-at-hand and then imposed upon ready-to-hand reality, as though the diagrams of my photomontages could have come first and then given rise to the artefacts. However, the real artefact is always experienced as ready-to-hand and the diagram, the present-at-hand, follows as a lesser representation. Although the present-at-hand can be complete, the ready-to-hand never can. As much as architects might wish their buildings to be manifestations of their diagrammatic conception they will always become experienced and interpreted by individuals who bring the element of lived experience.

Emptiness, authorlessness, and incompleteness

Instead of a building being conceived of as complete and full of its own unilateral meaning, we could consider an architecture of emptiness. This is the particular kind of emptiness that was discussed by Heidegger in regards to the jug, and that we found in the poem. It is not the literal emptiness of the jug that he was interested in but the figurative emptiness, which allowed the jug's appropriation by an individual. The creation of this kind of emptiness in space would be an architecture that allowed, even encouraged, the process of dwelling to continue. We have seen that our dwelling is in some way essentially incomplete since we must "ever learn to dwell" (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). Were it possible to 'complete' dwelling then it would become a state of stasis and cease to be true dwelling. An environment of emptiness could be an environment that, like our dwelling, is essentially incomplete in some way since we each construct our own interpretation of it. Consequently, and as with the essential incompleteness of poetry discussed in Chapter One, this continual re-interpretation places us firmly as beings-in-the-world.

We can understand Heidegger's concept of emptiness - the emptiness that is a precondition for dwelling - by reference to the concept of 'authorlessness' developed by Barthes in the essay *The Death of the Author.* Barthes suggests that separating a text from any analysis based on the author's intentions or personal history frees the reader to interpret the text, making its potential meaning greater. Here, *narrative* is conceived as an act of speech that demands one's concession whereas *language* is something that separates the intention from the work, allowing the work to become read by others. Narrative has a demanding voice, a soap box proclamation whereas language has a passive voice allowing for an interpretation. This concept of language results in the *death of the author,* who becomes seen as a separate entity to the work. Consequently the individual's interpretation is seen with raised importance. "As soon as a fact is narrated no longer" Barthes says, "the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins." (Barthes. 1968. 142). On one hand we have authorial narrative that is full of specific intention and forces an opinion, on the other, the language itself that provides an emptiness and potential for interpretation. Through this,

Authored	Authorlessness
Narrative	Language
Full	Empty
Closed	Open
Restrictive	Expansive
Complete	Incomplete
Unengaging	Poetically Engaging

Barthes casts off the weight of authorial intention. Once a text is released to the world any intention by the author becomes moot since we, as co-creators in reading, recreate it every time.

Jonathan Hill, whose thoughts on the architectural profession have been discussed several times, describes the author in Barthes's text as someone proposing "the belief that an image, word or object is the carrier for a fixed message determined by the author." (Hill. 1998. 26). It is this sense of authorial weight and fixed message, of which Hill finds a parallel in the architectural profession, that Barthes rejects.

As with Heidegger's assertion that "It is language that tells us the nature of a thing, provided we respect language's own nature." (Heidegger. 1971a. 144). Barthes believes that language is more than just a medium for speech, "...it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is, through a prerequisite impersonality [...] to reach that point where only language acts, 'performs' and not 'me'." (Barthes. 1968. 143). Language is seen by both men as opening possibilities for interpretation.

The consequence of this is that, as with the earlier comments on poetry in Chapter One, we can perceive written work as created by the *reader,* in that instant, rather than by an author. Barthes says of reading that "there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is eternally written here and now." (Barthes. 1968. 145). This removes the author's stamp from the work, emptying it of the interpretation that would otherwise be forced upon the reader. Additionally, this authorless text can be seen as richer and without limit. He says, "Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text

becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing." (Barthes. 1968. 147). Without authorial intention the work becomes open, empty of a fixed interpretation.

For a visual example we can turn to the work of Magritte whose painting 'The Mysteries of the Horizon' is on the front cover of *Poetry, Language, Thought.* We see that Magritte's work draws one in to question it, or as Nikos Stangos suggests in *Concepts of Modern Art* "Magritte's paintings are argumentative; they question one's assumptions about the world, about the relationship between a painted and a real object [...]" (Stangos. 1994. 133). By exploring the unreal, Magritte draws the observer into questioning reality. In doing so the experience of questioning the artefact is the *real* experience of the art, not any singular meaning by the artist. The artefact is without author and consequently can mean many more things to many people. This rejection of any unilateral interpretation is reminiscent of Francis Bacon's comments on narrative in art that "The moment the story is elaborated, the boredom sets in; the story talks louder than the paint." (Reed. 2001. 213).



Fig 111: Magritte's 'The Mysteries of the Horizon' (Heidegger. 1971). We are asked to question our own reality and, like poetry, the art exists in our own living of the experience.

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We are on the way to finding a parallel with the spatial experience of dwelling. We can see this authorlessness as the particular type of emptiness that we are searching for. It allows the poetic recreation and engagement necessary for our dwelling. As with poetry, an experience in space has to be engaged with by the individual. When seeing a space where one is free to interpret, in emptiness, the whole history of one's memories and associations come to bear upon the place. The interpreter creates the world.

Barthes goes on to discuss the relative richness of interpretable experiences compared to prescribed ones. The reader has an ability to gather complex memories and associations into one moment that an author cannot. Barthes describes the reading of a Greek tragedy where the individual characters do not fully understand the events on stage. The only place that the work truly exists, he argues, is in the mind of the viewer. The play is, he says,

> woven from words with double meanings that each character understands unilaterally [...] there is, however, someone who understands each word in its duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of him – this someone being precisely the reader [...] Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focussed and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. (Barthes. 1968. 148)

In this statement Barthes is suggesting that a reader-centred view of creative work is inherently richer and more complex than an author-centred view. Consequently we can argue that the relative fullness of intention that is found in work that *speaks* and has an obvious authorial intent, is less stimulating than the emptiness found in work that allows itself to be *read*. The audience of this play are allowed to dwell within the play.

In the built environment many buildings can be conceived in a similar fashion. Whilst the buildings may be objects conceived of as complete objects ‘speaking their intent’, what is *real* about these buildings is the space between, understood only by the viewer existing between them in the same role as the reader of Barthes’s play. We walk through the environment, existing precisely where the buildings do not. Each building is like the characters in the play, preoccupied with themselves; this can also be seen in the narcissism of Libeskind’s museum. However, we, situated between these objects, can see the whole environment, and we can hear “the very deafness of the characters speaking in front of [us.]”

A consideration of the environment as ‘without author’ can be seen as something beautiful and empty; it is incomplete till the moment we engage with it. As Barthes notes it is more expansive and contains more potential than a closed, ‘authored’ space. In this open space we can be poetic.

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Continuing the spatial analysis of authorlessness we can turn to Calvino's *Invisible Cities.* The distinction between authorial voice and personal interpretation is seen in the city of Tamara which, full of narrative, is contrasted against the emptiness of the surrounding nature (Calvino. 1972. 11-12). This is a city of signs, a city of significance. It is "thick with signboards jutting from the walls." We hear that it is entirely comprised of things that talk about other things. This signification takes many forms, whether signs indicating shops or architectural styles indicating palaces and temples. Consequently, the observer is overwhelmed and cannot see the reality of the place,

> Your gaze scans the streets as if they were written pages: the city says everything you must think, makes you repeat her discourse, and while you believe you are visiting Tamara you are only recording the names with which she defines herself and all her parts.

This is a city of an overwhelming predominance of icons where there is only one story permitted. The traveller is not permitted to have their own image of Tamara since what Tamara is, is shouted at every scale from every corner. Calvino contrasts this against the surrounding countryside that remains silent. Once the traveller leaves Tamara they see that "the land stretches, empty, to the horizon; the sky opens with speeding clouds." In the context of this city this emptiness is a figurative emptiness, a silence of authorial intent that allows the traveller to make their own patterns in the clouds, "you are already intent on recognizing figures: a sailing ship, a hand, an elephant." The authorlessness found in the nature around Tamara allows you to make your own patterns. Once you are outside, "trees and stones are only what they are."

The idea that we find a sense of authorlessness in nature is discussed by Lucy Lippard in *Overlay*. Lippard suggests that we find it hard to separate "visually and intellectually" nature and ancient art due to their perceived emptiness of intention (Lippard. 1983. 12). Contemporary authored objects require comment, whereas nature simply is. However because we are separated from the intention of ancient art we read it as empty of this intention and it becomes, like the area outside Tamara, interpretable and personal.

Lippard suggests that “Ancient art, wiped clean of its class and religious content by the ages, seems almost natural in its distance - a distance that allows it to become, paradoxically, more intimate than the art of our own times.” (Lippard. 1983. 11).

Calvino’s Tamara introduces themes that require further study for the idea of authorlessness. It is a city that, like Libeskind’s museum, is *full* of something and consequently does not permit the poetic process of dwelling. This poetic process, as discussed so frequently in this thesis, requires interpretability of symbols in order to be fully in-the-world. In Tamara this is stifled. Unlike Heidegger’s jug, that whilst it consists of material, shape and colour is in fact *essentially empty*, what Tamara consists of overwhelms an individual with its fullness. Tamara is made of “things that talk about other things”, and this chattering stifles one’s perception, we are told that “the city says everything you must think”. In order to bring things near we have to be able to construct our own sense of what it means to us. A thing that does this for us makes our own decisions impossible.

This is, incidentally, precisely what Robert Venturi says about Las Vegas in *Learning From Las Vegas.* Structured for the requirements of car users, Venturi remarks that “This architecture of styles and signs is antispatial; it is an architecture of communication over space [...]” (Venturi, Scott-Brown & Izenour. 1972. 8).

A language of multiple fragments

What is the architectural counterpart to Barthes's authorless text? The environment that most fully permits the dweller to construct new and personal experiences is an environment that is silent of authorial voice. It allows poetic interpretation. Attempts to solicit the creative user have been carried out by various architects in the past: Le Corbusier's free plan allows free movement within a building; Kahn's unmeasurable 'silence' permits reflection. However, one way to progress the idea of how to allow poetic interpretation is to study the nature of an authorless text.

Calvino's *Invisible Cities* provides a story of the great Kublai Kahn seeking to gain knowledge of his empire from Marco Polo who tells him of 55 different cities, each with different characters. Each of these cities, in the words of Kevin Lynch in *A Theory of Good City Form,* "exaggerates the essence of some human question, and for each there is a form, brilliantly and surprisingly conceived, that fulfills and informs that question." (Lynch. 1981. 72). However, in one reading of this book, it becomes evident that each of these 55 is in fact an aspect of one place, Polo's native Venice. Although Tamara is a place of authorial abundance, Calvino's view of Venice as a whole is very different.

Aware that a single representation cannot convey the whole, Calvino provides us with multiple visions of Venice. As Calvino tells this story from a variety of viewpoints, one's engagement becomes richer as the experience is told and retold over and over again and we begin to get lost in the richness of the multiple images that provide something greater than the sum of their parts. It is precisely the variety of viewpoints that Calvino provides that makes his interpretation of Venice so alluring. Venice is described as a place of rich stories and history as in the case of Zaira that consists of,

> relationships between the measurements of its space and the events of its past [...] The city, however, does not tell its past, but contains it like the lines of a hand, written in the corners of the streets (Calvino. 1972. 9)

It is described also as a place that is only knowable through experiencing it as in the case of Zemrude where,

> If you go by whistling, your nose a-tilt behind the whistle, you will know it from below: window sills, flapping curtains, fountains. If you walk along hanging your head, your nails dug into the palms of your hands, your gaze will be held on the ground, in the gutters, the manhole covers, the fish scales, wastepaper. (Calvino. 1972. 58)

It is described as a place continually under construction as in the case of Thekla where the construction is continual so that the destruction cannot begin (Calvino. 1972. 115). His Venice is never finished, it is retold incessantly, the reader understands that every traveller and every inhabitant has their own versions of Polo's tales. Consequently Calvino questions the nature of knowledge, any view must inherently be multiplicitous, lest it stifle this richness. We are asked to question our own interpretation. Each city is just one version of Venice (of life?) that is ultimately authorless since it consists of an infinite retelling of personal stories. It has a language based on multiplicity rather than unilateralism. We perceive its emptiness as a consequence and can dwell within it.

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Taking inspiration from this we can begin to explore the idea of a language of multiple fragments as a method towards the particular type of emptiness required for our poetic dwelling.

This language should not be read as simply an advocation of abundance, as with Koolhaas's *Junk-space* or of 'fragmented' geometries. The term 'fragments' here refers to an incompleteness rather than a formal fragmentation. It can draw from writing techniques in that its meanings, rather than its form, embrace different perspectives and individual agency. Whilst it is perhaps optimistic to make direct connections from literature to art and architecture perhaps an analogue could be made. We learn from Barthes, read through a Heideggerian lens, that we can dwell within the text. There

is a skillful indeterminacy in a poem, a positive aspect of incompleteness. This acts as an invitation to engage and in the moment of re-creation by the reader, one finds a wholeness to the text.

Due to the inherently collaborative nature between text and reader, the image of what is being described becomes, in a way, 'triangulated' between a variety of fragmented associative points. What actually *is* physically, cannot be described in words, so the reader is drawn in by suggestive language and their own memories and associations. The text is then considered authorless because it leaves room for interpretation. It is fragmented in the sense that it has gaps in its meaning that are available to the reader.

For instance, looking again at Morgan's poem *For Bonfires* we are told some details but specifics are sparse. The economy of language here allows our own memories of bonfires, dogs, heavy air, and red suns to fill out the experience. *My* bonfire created by this poem is in a specific place, I know the character of the gardener and the dog. Had the image been of something fixed and whole then we would not be permitted to enter.

This is also precisely what Heidegger achieved in his texts regarding dwelling, both in the message and methods. His view of dwelling is that we must try on our own to bring dwelling to our minds (Heidegger. 1971a. 159). We must therefore place ourselves in the world. His text is intended as an inspirational springboard to encourage us to think our dwelling. The method of this message is his rhetoric that loops and cycles, never precisely stating *how* to dwell since this would be, in Barthes's terms, to close the text. The fourfold for example, so frequently shied away from and discussed in Chapter One, provides not a direct explanation of perception, but a hint and suggestion that asks to be followed through by the reader.[2]

2 Additionally, sometimes more than one translation of Heidegger's texts are available. In Günter Figal's *The Heidegger Reader* (2009), the translator provides a different translation of Heidegger's The Thing from the one provided in *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Re-reading a well known text which frequently has different subtleties of interpretation is an uncanny experience, especially with a text as nebulous and indeterminate as Heidegger's. Some terms in the different translation seem more appropriate, others less so. The impression one is left with is that both are accurate in different ways. *The Thing* becomes a greater entity.

I attempted to achieve this in my own work on Perth Road in Dundee. The potential for engaging with a language of multiple fragments can be seen in my sketches, montages, and models. They are missing parts, richly heterogeneous, a collection of fragments that ask for the viewer's completion. The work is not given to any one person as complete. Thus it was intended that the viewing of the work demands one's poetic engagement.

The sketches were kept deliberately rough so as to convey only an impression of the place. At the moment of their creation they were more concerned with the process of forming the relationship with the place than the finished product (as with Heidegger's Black Forest farmhouse) but now they ask a question of the viewer about *their* relationship to that place. The montages collected the fragments of individual photos and reassembled them along lines of perspective leaving gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies. Additionally, on closer inspection, it is evident that time passes between each individual photograph. Overlaid on these are collected figures, Barnett Newman, Richard Serra, a group from a Superstudio image, Caspar David Friedrich's Wanderer, each hinting at an area of intellectual focus beneath the surface aesthetics. The viewer is asked to engage, to question.



Fig 112: (Williams. 2013) The montages are an attempt to draw one into the perception of the place.

Figs 113 & 114: (Williams. 2013) Fragments of material, meaning and time collected together ask the viewer to question their perception and reality in an attempt to encourage their own dwelling in the places which I explored.

Figs 115 & 116: (Williams. 2013) Exhibitions allowed the various interpretations of Perth Road to be seen by many people who know the area in their own way. My mistakes were pointed out to me, in one case a mislabelled street, evidencing the engagement of local residents with my work.

By seeing each of the artefacts together in one place my image of the area became larger than the sum of its parts, just as in our experience we ‘see through’ to all of our past experiences and memories.

The models too embraced this language, either, as in the case of the scale model, through the fragmentation of form and embracing of different materials, or in the model where form was simplified through a collection of fragments of scales and meanings. Each step is individually represented, giving overtones of repetition, re-engagement, and ongoing processes. This second model was particularly successful also because it simply didn't look like Perth Road, although it retained some major features. It therefore demanded a degree of unpacking by the viewer.

Seeing all these together in an exhibition added a further layer of fragmentation. The places could be seen in a variety of interpretations, as photographs, architectural plan and section, as sketches, as montages, as screen prints, and as models. The qualities of the places, and of the overall area, could additionally be questioned by viewers who brought their own version of Perth Road to the event. As with Heidegger's texts the exhibition was intended to act as a springboard prompting others to consider their own dwelling.

The idea of looking at the same place again and again to explore subtly different perspectives is explored by Cézanne in his series of Mont Sainte Victoire and was introduced in Chapter One. Visble from his studio the mountain became the focus of a series that developed between 1890 and 1905 and saw Cézanne experimenting with various new techniques (Düchting. 1989). When looking at these, one finds oneself drawn into the work. By providing various versions of the subject one is asked to project one's own views onto the work and to compare differences. We are asked which of the versions is 'more' real, the faint sky coloured mountain of figure 119, the ominous and domineering mountain of figure 121, or the bulbous almost fatty mountain of figure 124. It is, of course, all of these and none of these. Cézanne sees it differently each time, revisiting and reappraising it with each iteration. For our purposes, in Cézanne's series, like Calvino's cities, each individual artefact is less important than the nature of knowing that is explored by the entire series.



Figs 117 - 124: clockwise from top left. (Düchting. 1989. 214-223). In a multiplicity of interpretations Cézanne asks us about the nature of knowing the mountain. We are asked to participate, adding our own reality as supplement to the one he provides.

Architectural multiplicity

The observation that an environment with a particular type of emptiness allows our poetic dwelling, and that this might be found in environments that are richly heterogenous and consist of various fragments, serves to link various figures in the architectural profession with Heidegger's texts where no connections had previously been evident.

Architecture is already suited to being considered as having a language of multiple fragments. If we think of the way that Barthes's play only exists in the mind of the audience, architecture too really exists as the space between things, experienced by users. It is a collection of fragments through which we exist. This is similar to Jonathan Hill describing the idea of montage as an architectural strategy. Taking inspiration from Barthes and *The Death of the Author,* Hill says that,

> the reader can remake any book, but montage makes this possibility explicit. Just as the reader can make a new book through reading, the viewer can make a new architectural project through viewing, and the user can make a new building through using. (Hill. 2003. 5)

We can be 'inside' these buildings in a way that others never allow. Relph discusses a psychological state of 'existential outsideness' that occurs in some spaces. "Existential outsideness involves a selfconscious and reflective uninvolvement, an alienation from people and places, homelessness, a sense of the unreality of the world, and of not belonging." (Relph. 1976. 51). In contrast with this Zevi notes that, "in architecture we are dealing with a concrete phenomenon which is entirely different [from any other art form]: here, man *moving about within the building,* studying it from successive points of views, himself creates, so to speak, the fourth dimension, giving the space an integrated reality." (Zevi. 1957. 27). Combined with the layering of memories upon memories discussed throughout this thesis, step by step repeated poetic engagements, arguably the perception of the environment is fundamentally a collection of fragments and something that should be embraced.

However, frequently in architectural discourse the fragmentary, and the implications of incompleteness that it conveys, is denied. Instead of embracing a multiplicity of ideas the concept of fewer over-arching ideas is seen as stronger. We have seen that both Superstudio and Koolhaas critique a situation in which individual appreciation is suppressed in the face of a *single overwhelming idea.* Each case is to some extent about not providing options through unilateral spatial conceptions.

As we saw in Chapter Two, Jeremy Till argues that architects are terrified of the disorder of the world. Developing this idea further we see that for Till this is because "[Entropy] denotes a condition of ongoing uncertainty and with it the potential decline into disorder, something beyond the jurisdiction of any professional body." (Till. 2009. 104). Consequently the architectural profession seeks to impose ideas of wholeness and unilateralism in order to defy the continual chaos of experience. He says that "One aspect of the modern project, in its quest for purity and unfettered ideals, can be seen as an ongoing battle to halt the processes of entropy." (Till. 2009. 104). He asks for architects to consider working *with* disorder rather than deny its existence. Thus the design would be filled with potential since it is, to some extent, incomplete, fragmentary,

> [...] building the unfinished compels the architect to project multiple actions onto the building. Where the functionalist or behaviourist architect attempts to determine use in a fixed and singular manner, the architect of the unfinished mentally inhabits the spaces of their future building in myriad ways in order to test them for their openness to appropriation, and then makes adjustments when the whole feels too constricted. (Till. 2009. 108).

Till is arguing for an architecture with an abundance of possibilities, each 'open to appropriation'. A way that we might embrace this is through an architecture of multiple fragments.

A handy visual analogue for this is provided by Sebastiano Serlio's theatre scenes developed in *The Book of Architecture* (Serlio. 1611) and shown on page 44. The scenes are named the 'Satyric', 'Noble', and 'Comic'. Each of these scenes is comprised of a perspectival 'street' of some sort. The Satyric presents a rural peasants' hamlet;

the Noble a classical city; and the Comic scene presents a merchant city. They are sometimes discussed as analogues for vernacular European urbanism (Shane. 2005. 20-21); in addition we can here interpret Serlio's scenes as forming an argument that the architectural fragment is more conducive to benefiting human nature.

The peasants' hamlet portrayed in the Satyric scene consists of perspectival lines roughly formed by a line of trees among which thatched roofed huts are nestled. The use of the term *Satyr* here invokes Greek mythology of half goat, half human creatures, suggesting that these inhabitants are seen to be less than human. Consequently if considering each scene as influencing human nature, here we have a depiction of humans as being reduced to beasts.

In contrast with this bestial scene we can look to the order and grace of the Noble scene. This depicts Serlio's impression of classical Rome. The street is clearly defined, geometrical and built of stone. Religious monuments and palaces line the perspective and in contrast to the Satyric's external setting the Noble is a scene of interior space. We are permitted a view 'out' of the city through the arched city wall. Whereas the sky in the Satyric scene is full of clouds and birds, the sky of the Noble scene is clear. Here the environment has been tamed by humans. Everything is controlled and internal, to the point that even the sky is forgotten. We can infer that this scene consists of a depiction of humans as approaching godliness. However, a single dilapidated tenement hints that we can never achieve this lofty height.

Between these two extremes is the Comic scene. Here is a heterogeneous mix of fragments, from brothel to church. This is a merchant city (Venice perhaps and therefore another iteration of Calvino's *Invisible Cities*?) and it displays signs of impermanence and change. A corner of a shop is opened up to the street, timber is used as a construction material, a flag blows in the wind. Although it is largely internal, we are not shown an outside for instance, the sky is populated with birds and clouds. This is a rich and complex scene made for the poetry of various individuals. It is both inside and

outside, geometric and disordered. Like Heidegger's poetic dwelling it is a celebration of the complexities of life. Between gods and beasts, the earth and the sky, we can perhaps read the Comic scene as a depiction of humankind's dwelling nature.

The impression we get from the Comic scene is one of continual change and adaptation forming a rich mix of building types. What Serlio provides is an image of space that has multiple fragments and allows the particular type of emptiness that is required for poetic experiences. Serlio provides us with a visual image that embraces an environment in which Heidegger's dwelling can take place, not as a continual modification of the environment, as in a literal reading of the farmhouse in the Black Forest, but as the continual modification of *ourselves* as dwellers.







Figs 125 - 127: Serlio's Satyric, Noble, and Comic scenes. (Serlio. 1611. 2nd book, 3rd chapter, fol 25-26).
Perhaps a view of humans as beasts and gods, between these, in rich complexity are humans as fragments.

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The appeal of multiple fragments is also discussed in more contemporary times. For instance Yoshiharu Tsukamoto of Toyko based architects Atelier Bow-Wow explores the richness of heterogeneous Tokyo environments in *Pet Architecture*. Documenting buildings that occupy tiny almost left over spaces within Tokyo's density. Tsukamoto says, "We aimed to establish one new category in urban structure by giving them a certain name not by negatively considering them as openings [...]" (Tsukamoto. 2002. 9). In these pet buildings, so named because they exist at the feet of their larger neighbours, Tsukamoto finds something that people engage with, everyone he interviewed having their own suggestions for their own, much loved, pets. Arguably we can see that dwelling is allowed to occur in these small fragmented moments. It is not their formal fragmentation that is so appealing but the juxtaposition of characters in the environment. Their idiosyncratic nature allows the city dweller to reappraise their environment and tend to the continual building of their memories and experiences.



Fig 128: Diagram and location plan of a 'pet' building (Tsukamoto. 2002. 105). We are told that in one instance a pet building, in this case a diner, makes one feel as though "you had become the hero (heroine) in the famous scene of the movie 'Titanic', pretending the entire city block as a luxury liner, the Titanic." (Tsukamoto. 2002. 104)

Fig 129: (Tsukamoto. 2002. 104). The bow of the ‘Titanic’.

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Some architects have embraced a design approach involving multiple fragments not just in the analysis of spaces but also in the designs of their buildings. The following examples are representative of many more and have been chosen partly due to their intellectual approach and partly due to my own preferences.

Hans Scharoun attended the same conference at which Heidegger presented *Building Dwelling Thinking*. This lecture appears to have had a great impact upon Scharoun who occasionally cited Heidegger afterwards and also post-rationalised some of his earlier work as being broadly Heideggerian (Blundell Jones. 1995. 136). Peter Blundell Jones notes in *Hans Scharoun* that,

> Scharoun did not consider his buildings as isolated objects but as places. Rather than imposing a particular plan shape for aesthetic or constructive reasons and then dividing it up according to functional needs, as many architects do, he tried instead to allow each function to determine its particular form, and to grow his overall plan our of the relationship between functions and site. (Blundell Jones. 1995. 12)

The forms of his buildings might develop not as a whole idea into which lesser ideas would be fit but as accumulations of "advantageous combinations of elements". (Blundell Jones. 1995. 117). This is a process of accumulation in keeping with the creation of my sketches, montages, and models, and as with the building of the Black Forest farmhouse, echoing the step-by-step process of dwelling in a place. However there is more to the way in which we can dwell in Scharoun's work.

At this conference in 1951 Scharoun presented a proposal for a school at Darmstadt. This building was never built but in it can be seen various ideas that influenced his later work. The richness and particular kind of emptiness that we are searching for in this building come from the myriad of small places that exist as potential meeting places,





Top - Figs 130 - 131: (Blundell Jones. 1995. 139) Model views of the proposed school by Scharoun. Multiple options are provided allowing for the potential of emptiness.

Bottom - Fig 132: (Blundell Jones. 1995. 138) Plan view of the proposed school.

or places for imagination. The spaces externally are every bit as carefully crafted as those internally; this is a building one would remain ‘inside’. Blundell Jones notes the remarkable nature of the open zones that act as circulation spaces; they are,

> more than mere passages [...] but rather of a whole series of carefully modulated spaces, sometimes more open sometimes more closed. He can take a passage and by widening it, punctuating the space with a level change and opening it visually with a view, turn in into a meeting place. (Blundell Jones. 1995. 142)

This variety of options allows the building to be appropriated by those who inhabit it. It embraces multiplicity and indeterminacy. We can see it, like Barthes’s text, as having greater potential than if it were closed off to this level of user control.

This attitude of creating potential to engage is one shared by Herman Hertzberger. In a similar fashion to Holl’s framework for a shanty town in the Philippines, Hertzberger designs to structure the potential for individual interpretation in his buildings through embracing multiplicity. This, like Barthes’s text, permits the spaces to be appropriated by those who use them. For instance, he discusses the organisation of an office area that offers “the opportunities, including basic fittings and attachments etc., for the users to fill in the spaces according to their personal needs and desires.” (Hertzberger. 1991. 24). This results, claims Hertzberger, in each employee feeling a sense of stewardship over their area. We can suggest in a Heideggerian sense the employee is near to this area through their poetic engagement encouraged by the nature of the design. Hertzberger says, “The architect can contribute to creating an environment which offers far more opportunities for people to make their personal markings and identifications, in such a way that it can be appropriated and annexed by all as a place that truly ‘belongs’ to them.” (Hertzberger. 1991. 47). To fail to do this, he suggests later in the book, is to suppress creativity (poetry?). He decries the fact that in our buildings and our cities we prescribe functions and interpretations upon spaces and cause uniformity,

> What makes the old canal-houses so livable is that you can work, relax or sleep in every room, that each room kindles the inhabitant's imagination as to how he would most like to use it. [...] the potential for individual interpretation is inherent due to their greater polyvalence. (Hertzberger. 1991. 147)

For Hertzberger this occurs through embracing the potential multiplicities in spaces. Level changes should be embraced rather than smoothed. Changing conditions such as found on buildings' thresholds deserve an elaboration, a neither here nor there type of space in which one might choose to linger. Both of these moments for instance can be utilised as impromptu seating areas. Offering places to sit, he notes, is perhaps the "most elementary provision" of encouraging individual interpretation (Hertzberger. 1991. 177). Hertzberger seeks to densify his environments with varieties of possibilities. Unlike Pawson House shown earlier that is unilateral, Hertzberger's ideas take joy in multiplicity and fragments analogous to life itself.

Alvar Aalto too recognised the requirement for a rich complexity to be acknowledged in the design of buildings. "Imperfection is in some sort essential to all that we know of life", he said,

> Nothing that lives is, or can be rigidly perfect: part of it is decaying, part nascent. . . . And in all things that live there are certain inequalities and deficiencies, which are not only signs of life but sources of beauty. (Coates. 1997. in Pallasmaa. 2011. 14)

Juhani Pallasmaa notes in *Alvar Aalto Houses* that for Aalto "genuine and true homes are expressions of the dweller's personality rather than that of the architect's. The objects of home should be associated with the inhabitant's past, appreciations, and memories instead of being an aesthetic choice by the designer" (Pallasmaa. 2011. 14). He goes on,

> Many homes of the modern era can be experienced as too controlling and aesthetically predetermined to permit the inhabitant's personal adaptation and lifestyle. After all, there is a distinct contradiction, conflict, and tension between the concepts of "architecture" and "home." Whereas architecture is a product of deliberate design and aesthetic aspirations, home is a projection of personal life. Aalto's houses, on the other hand, contain a

> benevolent margin for unconstrained and liberated life. Even the detailing and furnishing, light fittings, and everyday objects he designed project this relaxed and unrestrained ambience [...] (Pallasmaa. 2011. 14)

This interpretation of Aalto's houses by Pallasmaa shows that Pallasmaa believes the houses to have the sort of emptiness that we have seen as Heideggerian. The emptiness is achieved by the "benevolent margin" of Aalto's fragments that allows for our "past, appreciations, and memories."

Sarah Menin and Flora Samuel, in *Nature and Space: Aalto and Le Corbusier,* state that Aalto is "interested in the roots of the notion of harmony in a more precarious dialogue of the disparate, which allowed 'other' forms of order, such as the organic model, to effect the whole" (Menin & Samuel. 2003. 51). Aalto's buildings, whilst not necessarily influenced by a fragmented *geometry* as is frequently the case in Scharoun's work, evidence the essence of multiple fragments that act as a means towards the type of emptiness in which we can poetically dwell. For instance in Villa Mairea, a house for a private art collector client, Aalto allows a complexity and openness, both between internal spaces and the boundaries between inside and outside. He expressed that it was an "experimental laboratory" for his ideas of art collecting (he spoke of the difficulty of presenting art in a way that wasn't merely in an annex for "scotch and soda" and was instead integrated with normal life) and integrating many ideas into a complex organic whole (Schildt. 1997. 225). Ultimately it is a place that embraces rather than denies the inherent complexity of our living process, our dwelling. These buildings, and the language of multiple fragments they represent, allow for a variety of potential experiences. The potential for poetry is increased and we are consequently permitted to be more *in* their environments. We can be in the containing emptiness of the building.

A poem is not generally thought of as fragmentary, and even when it is, it is usually highly structured. However, it is the variety of possible interpretations that cause it to be considered here as consisting of fragments. It is not a one-liner but contains a rich depth. Architecturally, a building like Libeskind's museum is generally considered to be 'fragmentary' but we see it here as being *only* formally so. It is a one-liner and shouts its meaning too loudly, closing off other possible interpretations. A building that allows

this need not have a fragmentary formal language, a simple beautiful room can engage a person for a lifetime. My bus shelter, only a bus shelter, has become an object of enormous significance for me.

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On Perth Road what allowed my dwelling, apart from the deliberate focus placed on it by this study, was the richness of its various fragments. Personally, materially, historically, socially, the list of fragments could continue. Perth Road is a place of vast variety in which one can find one's own poetry.

For an exploration of fragments on an urban scale we can turn to Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter who discuss the idea that planners and architects should embrace what we might call multiple fragments in *Collage City* (1978). They call for a rejection of the totalitarian whole for a democracy of fragments. If we reappraise this book with a Heideggerian lens we see that constructing by the accumulation of ideal fragments moves away from architectural totalitarianism of authorship toward various small fragments in which one is free to dwell.

The authors state that the ideals of architecture that emerged in the early part of the 20th century, ostensibly of completion as discussed earlier, can never become manifest on an urban scale. They argue that instead of holding onto the dream of a complete utopian solution to our urban situation we need "imperfect action now" (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 105). Like Aalto writing above, they reject the concept of any perfectly conceived solution and instead argue for the benefits of a collage of multiple fragments. In the chapter 'Collision City and the Politics of 'Bricolage'' they criticise the concept of 'total architecture' or 'total design' remarking that it would neither be plausible nor desirable to create such a system. They link the idea of 'total architecture' or 'total design' to 'total politics' and remark that, far from being a positive ideal any utopia demands compliance and is ultimately stifling. (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 87). They point out that we have, to a large extent, rejected the concept of 'total politics' as unsound, but fail to grasp that its "physical counterpart", 'total design', is a similarly flawed concept. Total politics is never subtle or rich enough for our freedom, we require politicians

who embrace nuance and complexity, and so it is with our buildings. The lack of this understanding is a problem, they say, since architecture is always seen as "aiding and abetting an in some way benign or decorous social order." and a desire for a complete utopian totalitarianism can be seen as oppressing this.

As an example they contrast Louis XIV's Versailles and Hadrian's Villa Adriana saying that,

> if the one [Versailles] is certainly an exhibition of total architecture and total design, the other [Villa Adriana] attempts to dissimulate all reference to any controlling idea; and, if here there is absolute power under two impersonations [Louis XIV and Hadrian], then one might even feel constrained to digress and to ask which is the more useful model - for us. (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90)

For Rowe and Koetter, Versailles, and thus Louis XIV, celebrates total design, an overwhelming adherence to what Heidegger would see as a present-at-hand entity imposed upon ready-to-hand reality: a model confused for truth. They say that Versailles is representative of "the triumph of generality, the prevalence of the overwhelming idea and the refusal of the exception." (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90).

In contrast to this they suggest that Hadrian, despite being comparably powerful to Louis XIV is revealed by Villa Adriana as someone,

> apparently, so disorganized and casual, who proposes the reverse of any 'totality', who seems to need only an accumulation of disparate ideal fragments (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90)







Top - Figs 133 - 134: (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 88-91). Versailles. Echoes of Serlio's Noble scene and total control
Bottom - Figs 135 - 136: (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 88-91). Villa Adriana. Echoes of Serlio's Comic scene and poetic potential

Thus whilst Versailles is “the complete unitary model [...] the ultimate paradigm of autocracy [...] a complete political power, undeviating in its objectives” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 90-91). Villa Adriana, the collection of ideal fragments, is “the apparently uncoordinated amalgam of discrete enthusiasms” (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 91).

Rowe and Koetter extend these two opposing personality traits through the philosophies of Isaiah Berlin and Claude Lévi-Strauss, both of whom wrote about similar opposing psychological orientations. On the one hand, there is the desire for a complete solution and on the other an accumulation of ideal parts. For Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) these are termed the scientist and the bricoleur respectively.

The scientist embarks on a deductive, product-led mentality to solve a task. The bricoleur mentality is an inductive, process led, making do with what is to hand to suit the task. The Sun King would be considered a scientist and Hadrian a bricoleur,

> Simply, the scientist and the ‘bricoleur’ are to be distinguished ‘by the inverse functions which they assign to event and structures as means and ends, the scientist creating events ... by means of structures and the ‘bricoleur’ creating structures by means of events.’ (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 103)

Scientist	Bricoleur
One Big Idea	Many ideas
Total design	Collection of Fragments
Louis XIV	Hadrian
Libeskind	Scharoun
Zumthor	Aalto
Pevsner	Barthes
	Heidegger

Rowe and Koetter state that the model of the architectural profession has recently tended toward the scientist world view as seen in the cases of Gropius and Mies van der Rohe, and we might now add Daniel Libeskind as well as various other contemporary architects.

However, the bricoleur in fact has a far more appropriate mentality for building our environments. This is "far more of a 'real life' specification of what the architect-urbanist is and does then any fantasy deriving from 'methodology' and 'systemics'." (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 104). The bricoleur, "creating structures by means of events" is *exactly* the process carried out by the dweller of Heidegger's farmhouse in the Black Forest and it is exactly what happens in the day to day repeating of poetic engagements we enact as dwellers. It is also inherently fragmentary. It recalls once again Ingold's idea, first introduced in the introduction to this thesis, that "the forms of buildings arise as a kind of crystallisation of human activity within an environment" (Ingold. 2000. 186). Rowe and Koetter, however, continue this discussion architecturally.

They go on to discuss that the planning of cities should resemble the bricoleur's mentality since there is *never* enough knowledge about such a complex system to accurately conceive a complete 'scientist' solution. For Rowe and Koetter this is evident in the same way that the idea of total politics, a complete ideology, has become understood as never sufficiently nuanced. They point out that although we have become aware that the idea of 'total' politics is unsound, it is evident that we still think that the "physical counterpart" of total politics, total urbanism, is a desirable possibility.

> For, if the notion of a 'final' solution through a definitive accumulation of all data is, evidently, an epistemological chimera [...] if the inventory of 'facts' can never be complete simply because of the rates of change and obsolescence, then, here and now, it surely might be possible to assert that *the prospects of scientific city planning should, in reality, be regarded as equivalent to the prospects of scientific politics*. (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 105)

Planning, they say, cannot be scientific any more than politics can. We are constantly making do, accumulating new information as we progress. Whereas mass housing can be seen as symptom, cause, and manifestation of our homelessness, an environment of multiple fragments could be symptom, cause, and manifestation of our dwelling.

As an example of a city built by bricolage they provide us with an image of Rome. They look to "the contradiction of seventeenth century Rome, to that collision of palaces, *piazza* and villas, to that inextricable fusion of imposition and accommodation, that highly successful and resilient traffic jam of intentions, an anthology of closed compositions and *ad hoc* stuff in between" (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 106). They offer this Rome, the Rome of the Nolli plan, of the *ad hoc* in between, "as some sort of model which might be envisaged as alternative to the disastrous urbanism of social engineering and total design." (Rowe & Koetter. 1978. 107). This Rome, as mentioned by Freud is a rich changing complex place. The history of change is evident in its street patterns and spatial language. Rowe and Koetter are saying that an iterative constructing of fragments as opposed to a wholesale implementation of total design is a more fitting way to structure change of our environment. In this way we can connect them to Heidegger and postulate that their theories provide an understanding of built environments which is conducive to dwelling in.

A return to the farmhouse

One dwells, in a manner akin to Barthes's co-creative reading, in a process of poetic recreating. An understanding of dwelling puts mankind in the world rather than apart from the world. This diversion from a mind/world understanding of the world as separate from us, to a Heideggerian in-the-world thinking changes architecture from full to empty and consequently from stifling to aiding our dwelling process.

The understanding and design of built environments as found in the works of Serlio, Scharoun, Aalto, and Rowe and Koetter allow us to engage due to their particular type of emptiness discussed throughout this thesis. This is the emptiness that we need in order to poetically dwell. The way that we experience these places is built up in a process of bricolage, step by step, in a repeated process of poetic engagement.

It might, in the end, be that the inhabitants of Heidegger's Black Forest farmhouse built a house that is conducive to our dwelling. In Rowe and Koetter's terms they built the farmhouse as a collection of ideal fragments. Consequently we can see that Heidegger's farmhouse in the Black Forest may, in fact, be more suited to the dwelling of others than mass housing. However, this is *not* due to the relationship that its owners had with it but due to its fragmentary nature. It might have that particular emptiness that hints of incompleteness and potential. If we were to build by dwelling, the buildings we build could be seen as having this emptiness since they do not speak of a single intention but a myriad of moments. Buildings built in this fashion tend towards an impression of emptiness because they are built from the ground up as iterative responses, like my sketches. They would be without an over-arching complete concept planned from a position of mind/world separation as the traditional role of architecture understands building design. They would be ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand entities. They would be readable as a rich palimpsest of the history that had existed there.

Through the process of building accumulatively, perhaps over several years or decades the history of change would be evident. In *In Praise of Shadows*, a philosophical treatise on architecture and aesthetics, Jun'ichirō Tanizaki finds joy in the dark corners found in many traditional Japanese homes. These places by their nature require exploration,

experience and poetic inhabitation. They are incomplete in a way that only inhabitation can fill, and even then only temporarily (Tanizaki. 1977. 7). There is a mystery to them, like Magritte's questions posed in his paintings. Tanizaki suggests that time stands still when experiencing these since one is so thoroughly engaged, "And even we as children would feel an inexpressible chill as we peered into the depths of an alcove to which the sunlight had never penetrated." (Tanizaki. 1977. 33).

Additionally there is a depth that is created by long use and change. Tanizaki discusses what is so alluring about an artefact that has this depth

> As a general matter we find it hard to be really at home with things that shine and glitter. The Westerner uses silver and steel and nickel tableware, and polishes it to a fine brilliance, but we [in the East] object to the practice. While we do sometimes indeed use silver for teakettles, decanters, or saké cups, we prefer not to polish it. On the contrary, we begin to enjoy it only when the lustre has worn off, when it has begun to take on a dark smoky patina. (Tanizaki. 1977. 18)

We might find an architectural implication of Heidegger's concept of dwelling by embracing this richness. This, as with the Black Forest farmhouse's fragments and Tanizaki's patinas, allows us to engage poetically. Part of what is captivating about a sketch is that one can 'see through' to the thought at work. We can see the embodied process and we are able to access the thought. We are able to dwell within it. In this way we would have more with which to engage in spaces. This would be in a similar way that we find ourselves engaging with artefacts made by hand or other engaged processes. We should not aim to make architecture complete. The life that is found in the fragmentary, the idiosyncratic, should be what we strive for. As with the farmhouse, buildings that embrace multiple fragmentary views are more suited to aiding our dwelling process.

Concluding remarks to the chapter

Heidegger's comments on the farmhouse in the Black Forest, if taken literally and as explored in Chapter Two, suggest that we should build continually.

However it takes a long time for a society to build by dwelling and demands our continual building. The architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling, as explored through Heidegger's texts, my creative practice, and architectural theory, suggest ways in which architects could build environments that are more amenable to dwelling. We shouldn't aim to regress to a pre-division-of-labour period of an idealised agrarian past, ardently building as dwellers in the mountains, as Heidegger would have wished, nor should we continue to build with little consideration of how we bring places near. Instead of going backwards to a pre-industrial age, rose tinted and illusory, we could look forward to an architecture that does what dwellers do. The architectural profession, through an understanding of Heidegger, should be able to make evident more quickly what dwellers do slowly. This understanding would construct a particular kind of emptiness found in fragments that embraces potential and multiplicity. If this were the case, we would thereby allow ourselves to be set free to perceive the environment on our own terms.

This needn't be a design manifesto, as though we could say, "If we do 'A' then 'B', an environment that aids dwelling will result." Instead, the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling could be read as suggesting that a language of multiple fragments could be used as a manner of architectural critique. We could say, "This building is better than that building because it exhibits the qualities of fragments and is consequently more conducive to dwelling."

The creation of environments in which we can dwell by building an emptiness and incompleteness is this thesis's understanding of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. This can be realised by the accumulation of the ideal fragment. In a similar way to the emptiness and authorlessness found in texts, material patina, or language of multiple fragments in art, architectural richness must also be of fragments.

A sense of emptiness, potential, perhaps found in the fragmentary, must be created in order for an environment to be engaged with. This emptiness is that which is conducive to individuals bringing places near. Some buildings help an individual remain near to an experience. However it is not just fixing our memories that is required, a building must leave the inhabitant free. Heidegger says that these buildings are not objects that we read symbolism into, objects that are separate from us. Nor are they expressions of authorial meaning first conceived then built, as the example of Dawkins's top-down illustration conceives architecture. Fullness suppresses the individual. A building for dwelling in must have the essential emptiness that promotes the freedom of individual dwelling.

This cannot *guarantee* dwelling, nothing ever can, but it does not suppress dwelling through overly prescriptive authorial voice.

Concluding Remarks

On the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling

Chapter outline

Summary of Heidegger's dwelling.

Deductions of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling.

- Interpreting Heidegger's farmhouse

- An architectural interpretation

Impact of thesis upon the architectural profession.

Implications for future research.

Chapter outline

The aim of this dissertation has been to reappraise the later period philosophy of Martin Heidegger in an architectural light. This has been focussed on Heidegger's concept of dwelling, particularly on his less frequently quoted essay *...Poetically Man Dwells...* and the concept of *poetry* that was illuminated through creative practice. This has served to unravel previous architectural interpretations of Heidegger's dwelling and suggests new links through the resultant concept of emptiness found through authorlessness and fragments. This shift towards viewing our dwelling as poetic also brings architectural writers and practitioners who may not have considered themselves Heideggerian firmly into the discussion of the architectural implications of his concept of dwelling. We can now connect the writings of Barthes, Hertzberger, and Rowe and Koetter to Heidegger's texts in an architectural fashion. In this concluding chapter we will see these discussions summarised and the potential impact this research might have.

Heidegger's latter period of work shares with architecture a focus on the concept of place. However, forging links between the philosophy of place and the production of places has an inherent intellectual tension. How can philosophical theory wisely be applied to creative practice? Although Heidegger's work has been explored architecturally before, most notably by Christian Norberg-Schulz (1980. 1985), due to underlying differences in philosophical positioning between the architectural profession's and Heidegger's conception of the environment, Heidegger's philosophy was always interpreted by architects with the aim of finding methods to create *products* rather than *processes*. Whereas Heidegger says we make places meaningful to ourselves through what we might call the processional experience of being, Norberg-Schulz says that places can be made by uncovering meanings already present in the site. He says, "The existential purpose of building (architecture) is therefore to make a site become a place, that is, to uncover the meanings potentially present in the given environment." (Norberg-Schulz. 1980. 18). This undermines the central idea of Heidegger's that individuals poetically construct their own world image.

Heidegger's thoughts on the nature of 'place' were amongst the most important in history (Casey. 1997). The fact that the architectural profession, those tasked with the creation and conservation of places, so misunderstands his philosophy is a problem that requires addressing. Even though some of what Heidegger says appears to be to the detriment of the architectural profession, as we have seen, an understanding of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling could ultimately serve to deepen our appreciation of how we relate to places.

By using creative practice (physical thinking) to explore dwelling in the physical world this research explored relationships to places in a 'hands-on' fashion. This correlates directly with Heidegger's philosophical ideas of embodied, ready-to-hand, reality. As we have seen, this idea that one must be 'in' the world to study the world's effects has been described by a biographer as "studying the laws of free fall whilst falling" (Safranski. 1998. 107). Through this process I developed an understanding of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling that embraces this being-in-the-world. The focus on this *poetic* aspect of dwelling, and the subsequent connection I made between Heidegger and ideas of authorlessness and fragments, provide new insight to the architectural understanding of dwelling.

This thesis has been structured so that an understanding of Heidegger's texts were explored first, both through textual analysis and self reflective creative practice. This exploration was documented in Chapter One and illuminated the focus on poetry in his texts that has hitherto been largely ignored or misunderstood by architects. From this we can conclude that the discussions of dwelling that are based only on products are incapable of assisting our dwelling as explored in Heidegger's philosophy. Following this, the implications that a poetic view of dwelling has on architecture were explored in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two what Heidegger says about building for ourselves and why this conflicts with the architectural profession's views of total control was explored. In Chapter Three the way that we might reconcile these two ideologies - neither of which fully appreciates the other despite their common interest in 'place' - was explored, with a focus on emptiness, authorlessness, and multiple fragments as a means of allowing the poetic dwelling process to occur.

In this concluding chapter the content of these discussions will be briefly summarised. I will provide a summary of Heidegger's dwelling interpreted through my own research practice, in which I carried out creative and textual reflections influenced by Heideggerian philosophy. This interpretation led to my focus on the poetic engagement with places. Following this I will describe the architectural deductions that we can make from these conclusions involving both an analysis and critique of Heidegger's architectural interpretation, and a solution that comes from a position of greater architectural insight.

Progressing further than the thesis summary this concluding chapter will then consider the impact that this work may have on the architectural profession. I believe that this thesis alters the way that Heidegger may be used by architects. Following this I will discuss the potential implications that a reinvigorated interest in Heidegger's philosophy, now understood as a poetic process, could have on the architectural profession, particularly in the potential for future speculative research into dwelling and sustainable development.

Summary of Heidegger's dwelling

As a means toward understanding Heidegger's philosophy I began by trying to document my dwelling in the area in which I lived and worked. Through what was essentially an existential site survey I began to realise that the process of engaging *was itself* dwelling. It was this poetic process that was dwelling's essence and by attempting to document dwelling I *was*, in fact, dwelling. The focussed engagement with places through creative practice illuminated the idea the dwelling is carried out through concern. We are always dwelling but engage with places to different degrees.

This shifted the view of what dwelling is away from considerations of the aesthetic conversations of Norberg-Schulz or Zumthor, that are so typical of the architectural profession's obsession with surface aesthetics, and into a view of human interaction and engagement.

Heidegger began his discussion in *Building Dwelling Thinking* with a worry that the problem of homelessness was not being sufficiently addressed. First presented as a lecture in 1951 he stated that there was a gulf between the way that we dwell and the way that we build buildings. Consequently our ability to engage with places is reduced and we are left in a state of existential homelessness. This had occurred because we more frequently consider our environment as its objective, present-at-hand, abstractions rather than its qualities that are appreciated through lived experience.

With this worry, Heidegger reflects a lament that occasionally runs through architectural discourse. Lewis Mumford, also writing in 1951, discussed the separation between emotions and facts in his book *Art and Technics*. He stated that, "man's spiritual life is limited to that part of it which directly or indirectly serves science and technics: all other interests and activities of the person are suppressed as "non-objective", emotional, and therefore unreal." (Mumford. 1951. 13). He then questioned a world without an appreciation of subjective qualities, "[…] if everything except technics is a nebulous whimsy, what is left of man except a living corpse […]?" (Mumford. 1951. 36). Other

books such as Rasmussen's *Experiencing Architecture* (1959), and more recently Junhani Pallasmaa's *The Eyes of the Skin* (2005) also develop the idea that the sensorial and ineffable aspects of space are as important as the aesthetic and the utilitarian.

However, Heidegger's ideas about dwelling progress further than these in exploring how it is that we dwell as a poetic process. This poetic nature of dwelling is a sense that our experience in the world is one of active involvement rather than passive reception of stimulating environments. Reality is a dance in which we are all involved. Or, to put it another way, there are no spectators in dwelling.

The opposite of poetry in this sense is not prose. Poetry, understood by this thesis, stands for an act of engagement. Painting can be poetic, as can an experience of the environment. The opposite of poetic would be something like ambivalence, or non-experiential. As with a poem that should not be read silently but out loud, poetic dwelling is fundamentally to be experienced. It is in the recreation by the reader that a poem's rhythms and meanings come into being, outside of the moment of recitation a poem is just symbols on paper. In this way the reader is incorporated into the poem, a part of its existence. We have discussed Frost's *Atmosphere* and Edwin Morgan's *For Bonfires* earlier in this thesis, now we can look to Morgan's sound poem *The Loch Ness Monster's Song* (Morgan. 1973b. 66) as a poem that is enhanced when audibly recited.[1]

> Sssnnnwhuffffll?
> Hnwhuffl hhnnwfl hnfl hfl?
> Gdroblboblhobngbl gbl gl g g g g glbgl.
> Drublhaflablhaflubhafgabhaflhafl fl fl –
> gm grawwwww grf grawf awfgm graw gm.
> Hovoplodok – doplodovok – plovodokot-doplodokosh?
> Splgraw fok fok splgrafhatchgabrlgabrl fok splfok!
> Zgra kra gka fok!
> Grof grawff gahf?
> Gombl mbl bl –
> blm plm,
> blm plm,
> blm plm,
> blp.

On the page the poem looks impenetrable, except for the pleasing arrangement of unusual letter combinations. Audibly however, the wet surfacing, lonely roaring, and subsequent re-submerging of the monster, leaving only a *blp* on the water's surface, becomes evident. The poem has a greater impact when experienced than when glanced at ambivalently.

1 Readings by Morgan are recommended and widely available online, for instance at: http://www.poetryarchive.org/poetryarchive/singlePoem.do?poemId=1683 [accessed 04/07/13]

The idea of poetry is also of something richly multi-layered. There is depth that goes beyond the surface values. Shira Wolosky writes in *Art of Poetry: How to read a poem* that “poetry is a language in which every component element - word and word order, sound and pause, image and echo - is significant, significant in that every element points toward or stands for further relationships among and beyond themselves. Poetry is a language that always means more.” (Wolosky. 2001. 3).

This engaged and multi-layered poetry is something that Heidegger found in the experience of the environment. Reading Heidegger we understand that we dwell more fully when we engage with places in a poetic fashion continually revising and reappraising our experiences with focussed concern rather than ambivalence.

It was my experiences with creative practice that made this interpretation of Heidegger evident. The act of sketching became understood as analogous to the process of dwelling in that they are both types of engagement that deepen one’s relationship with places. Just as the way a sketch slowly builds up, we can understand Heidegger as noting that we are continually making piecemeal memories of places in our minds.

However, we are also continually losing connection with places as we forget our relationship with them, either through our absence or our ambivalence. Dwelling is therefore fundamentally impossible to complete in any way, underlined by Heidegger’s finishing statement of *Building Dwelling Thinking,* that the real plight of dwelling is that we must *continually* concern ourselves with dwelling lest we become homeless. This is at once cause for dismay and celebration. On the one hand Heidegger says that the human condition is one of incompleteness and we will never feel whole no matter what our lives consist of. On the other hand there is joy to be found in the continual poetics of experience, and new possibilities are always opening.

This key focus on poetic engagement being the foundation of our dwelling - elaborated upon by this thesis - suggested possible alternative interpretations of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. It unravels many previous interpretations by those in the architectural profession showing them to be concerned more with surface aesthetics and sensorially stimulating environments than with the more nuanced understanding of the process of dwelling and how we might encourage this.

A view of ourselves as poetic raises the importance of elements in the environment that were not previously considered architectural, a puddle in the pavement, an overhanging bush. A study of one's poetic experiences in space must conclude that trees and cliffs share architectural merit with columns and walls. Therefore, an interpretation of Heidegger might have a focus on all space as interior space. We are always inside a space, the distinction between interior and exterior, even of man made or natural, is in this view secondary.

In order to enhance a poetic view of the environment we must release the perception of the environment from the grip of an authorial intention that demands we adhere to its concepts. This would be a kind of emptiness that hints at potential to dwell within. The concept of architectural emptiness, developed by this thesis is directly related to the ability for a dweller to poetically engage with a place. It is not the literal emptiness of a space that is of concern but the figurative emptiness that provides potential for interpretation. A poem asks questions of an individual who engages with it and a view of ourselves as poetic demands that the environment does not provide all our answers with a figurative fullness. The opposite of this emptiness is not solidity but unilateralism because in the unilateral only one voice can be accepted and we are all dwellers with our individually nuanced perceptions. The idea of buildings having symbolic pronouncements can be seen in a Heideggerian light as impediments of dwelling. This view raises the importance given to individual agency in the perception of the environment. Heidegger's philosophy becomes an empowering idea of the importance of our own interpretation and recreation.

Deductions of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling

One of the limitations of this thesis has been the lack of opportunity to build my own building, my own house by Walden pond or Black Forest farmhouse. This is something that I plan to develop in my own building practice that currently involves renovating my own house. However, it has been possible to extrapolate from the artefacts that I engaged with, such as sketches and photomontages, to larger artefacts like buildings since the constant factors were the central importance of experience and interpretation.

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- Interpreting Heidegger's farmhouse.

Discussed in Chapter Two, Heidegger used the example of a farmhouse in the Black Forest of Germany as an archetypal example of how dwelling was once carried out. This, like his etymological explorations of the terms building and dwelling, shows how the world had been in the past, before what he saw as the corrupting influence of modernity. This farmhouse was built by dwelling. Like our dwelling process it was built through the ongoing process of changes based on individual requirements. Like the sketch or photomontage the farmhouse develops moment by moment, building up the whole from various small decisions. What results is a building that is a palimpsest of the inhabitants' lives. The changes over time are written in the building's form and a sense of belonging has been engendered through ongoing labour and concern. Equally, the house should be considered as continually developing as the lives of its inhabitants change. We build, dwell, and think in a tripartite condition of "long experience and incessant practice" says Heidegger (1971a. 158).

For Heidegger it seems that this emphasised the weakness of the architectural profession since it seeks to impose buildings atemporally. These are built in an instant and then considered complete. This separates the inhabitants from having a real concern of their environment, their poetic engagement is suppressed allowing them to tend towards

homelessness. Additionally in the desire to retain control of a professional field, and as discussed in chapter two by Hill (1998. 2003) and Till (2009) the architectural profession frequently denies the importance of individual agency in buildings.

However, there are major problems with Heidegger's example that must be addressed. Whilst the farmhouse is an example of how dwelling occurred in the past, Heidegger does not elaborate on how these lessons might be appropriated for a contemporary solution. If we were all to build our own houses, continually and never completing, we would surely end up with an anarchic system of sprawling shanty towns. Although we may have built like this in the past, as Frampton notes, Heidegger's view of building condemns us to perpetual movement (Frampton. 2002a. 29).

Additionally, whilst one would find one's own home emotionally close, there is no guarantee that anyone else would feel concern for it. Heidegger's farmhouse, indeed the entire farm, is an island. Heidegger is calling for individuals to be in control of their environment, but this only works if we revert to an idealised agrarian past. If his philosophy is to remain of use to the architectural profession - and there is no reason to suggest that this is what Heidegger wanted - a middle ground must be found where the *poetic engagement of individuals is encouraged* in a contemporary understanding. This is not a solution that demands the continual construction of buildings but one in which we are allowed the continual construction of *ourselves*, our memories and perceptions.

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- An architectural interpretation.

Discussed in Chapter Three is a kind of emptiness that first became clear in Heidegger's example of the jug. This is a kind of emptiness that allows for potential using, and is aligned more to the emptiness of a piece of paper, not the absence in an empty cupboard. Allowing the poetry of experience in a kind of emptiness can be seen in the work of Roland Barthes who writes in *The Death of the Author* (1968) that the consideration of a text as being without authorial voice - we can suggest this is an

emptiness - provides far richer possibilities than considering only a single strict definition defined by the author, that we can see as a kind of fullness. Like poetry the authorless text lives in the individual as much as it exists on the page.

Our experiences in the environment could similarly be seen as fundamentally authorless. In the Greek tragedy described by Barthes only the watching audience sees between the actions of the characters. Only the audience understands the significance of the misunderstandings and soliloquies, those characters in the play do not. Similarly, in spatial terms, whilst buildings comprise parts in the environment it is precisely the space *between* the buildings where we understand the environment and our place in it. It is where the buildings are *not* that we are poetic. A view of emptiness in the environment could be used as a basis for spatial critique. Buildings like Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin can be seen as full of symbolic intent, becoming impediments of our own poetic processes.

Those spaces that have this emptiness more fully allow for an individual's interpretation and can be seen as those that more fully allow our poetic process of dwelling. A way to encourage this emptiness could be to encourage a focus on a language of multiple fragments. Like Barthes's play, Calvino's *Invisible Cities,* Cézanne's series of paintings of Mont Sainte Victoire, or my own exhibition of images relating to Perth Road, a variety of fragments of meaning and form provide gaps that allow one to enter with one's own interpretation. We are invited in as poetic participants not just ambivalent viewers.

The observation brings architects like Atelier Bow-Wow into the discussion of Heideggerian dwelling. They write about and document many multi-layered *ad hoc* solutions to the extraordinarily dense population conditions in Tokyo in their book *Pet Architecture* (Yoshiharu. 2002) and can perhaps become seen as contemporary Heideggerians, without their prior knowledge. Architects such as Hans Scharoun evidence buildings that embrace multiplicity, complexity, and choice. Hertzberger's philosophy of allowing individuals to use spaces in varieties of ways can be seen as

unwitting manifestation of a Heideggerian thought. Equally Alvar Aalto and other architects who embrace the richness of life, rather than deny it and attempt to conceive a building to suppress indeterminacy, can perhaps now begin to be seen as Heideggerians.

On an urban scale of these architectural implications, writers such as Rowe and Koetter, who discuss the value of a series of fragmentary utopias rather than a single totalitarian whole in *Collage City*, are brought into the discussion of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. They argue that any 'solution' to urban development is impossible since the system is fundamentally too complex. In place of this they advocate *ad hoc* piecemeal development that is familiar from my interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy.

Previously architects appealed to Heidegger through exhibiting a sensuous material choice. Zumthor's statement regarding his thermal baths project in Vals, Switzerland, about which he said, "the mahogany in the changing rooms looks a little bit sexy, like on an ocean liner or a little bit like a brothel for a second, perhaps." (Spier. 2001. 22) is a good example. However, this building remains over-full of the symbolic intent to create these emotions, leaving little room for reactions other than he prescribes.

The creation of spaces that allow the individual to poetically engage is more fully realised by those architects who develop conditions where interpretability is allowed. Although tactile materials are undoubtedly pleasant they remain unilateral in their purpose. Consequently, the language of multiple fragments, as seen in the examples above, to name just a few, is perhaps a more Heideggerian approach that embraces a variety of potential uses and supports our continual poetic dwelling process.

Impact of thesis upon the architectural profession

Seen in the light of this thesis, architectural studies that include Heidegger's philosophy should not be concerned only with a discussion of the product but also how this affects the ongoing and incomplete process of dwelling. It has been shown in these pages that this is not at all about vernacular architecture or the spirit of place, as suggested by Norberg-Schulz. Nor is it about a tactile material language.

Instead this research opens up possibilities for further discussions and research. Primarily, Heidegger could be used in other discussions about the agency of individuals in the environment. This might occur in terms of individuals physically constructing their own environments, although as we have seen this can lead to problems and is not viable on a global basis. In the past, we engaged with places through building them. However this continual building can not engender a lasting system in which dwelling is encouraged since it is only interested in itself. Additionally in contemporary times self-building is less practicable, so what is required is the kind of buildings which do not suppress our poetic process of dwelling through their symbolic fullness. I believe that an alternative reading of the architectural implications of Heidegger's concept of dwelling is in the construction of environments by architects that attain towards emptiness, thereby allowing individuals to poetically construct their own relationships to places.

Implications for future research

After the conclusions drawn by this thesis, that a language of multiple fragments is one way to open a building to dwelling and is a manifestation of a desirable authorless and empty environment in which we are free to dwell, I believe that we can speculate that Heidegger may have relevant implications on contemporary discussions of sustainable environments. This section is speculative but could provide grounding for future research.

This speculation, based on the research of this thesis, is not in keeping with the way that Heidegger is sometimes discussed as an environmentalist so a distinction should briefly be made. This view often comes from a misunderstanding of his words 'spare' and 'preserve' that suggest once again that one is sparing and preserving something *physical* rather than one's memories and associations. David Seamon provides a good example of this misunderstanding. Dwelling, he says, "is sparing and preserving - the kindly concern for land, things and people as they are and as they can become." (Seamon. 1979. 92). This is not in keeping with Heidegger's philosophy. As we saw in Chapter One, we spare and preserve our memories.

Equally, the incorrect association drawn by some between Heidegger and vernacular architectural styles sometimes places him alongside those who state that self-building is inherently low-tech and sustainable. This is found in the premise of books like Olsen's *Handmade Houses – A century of earth-friendly home design,* that express an idea linking simplicity, recycled materials, handmade products, and ecological awareness in a mix that is assumed to be self evident. Olsen says that "these daring, boldly creative designers and builders [...] sought to create a simplified, down-to-earth kind of house amid a world of political and environmental upheaval and rapid technological transformation." (Olsen. 2012. Inside front cover). There is frequently a tendency from such view points to equate simplicity with integrity and ecology, in opposition to complexity and rampant capitalist consumption.

This linking of low-tech and ecology is an easy one to make but as pointed out by Stuart Walker in *Sustainable by Design* is fundamentally flawed. He notes that one of the aims of many sustainable strategies is to regain some kind of kinship with nature. These strategies often argue that "through the right effort and right judgement, we can regain this lost idyll." (Walker. 2006. 18). However, Walker suggests that this feeling of loss, a manifestation of Heidegger's ideas of homelessness perhaps, are in fact part of the human condition and have been expressed throughout time. What else is the story of Adam and Eve's ejection from Eden except a suggestion that we had what we desire and somehow lost it? Walker says that,

> These ideas are anything but new, in fact they are a constant theme throughout human history. Our yearnings are always for a paradise that has been lost through our own making – through foolishness, corruption and greed; such stories appear time and time again in the world's mythologies and religious texts. (Walker. 2006. 18)

There are many points on the benefits of handmade houses that Olsen and this thesis are in agreement on. The relationship that the builder develops with the house for instance. However, it should be noted that this needn't have anything to do with ecological sensitivity, we might as well equate hand made buildings to low density urban sprawl rather than low impact material choice. Olsen argues that handmade houses have a feeling of primitiveness and are always "low-tech, if not anti-tech." (Olsen. 2012. 11). Whilst it is true that joy might be found in "taking control of your life" (Olsen. 2012. 12) primitiveness needn't be a prerequisite of building one's own home.

The way in which Heidegger might contribute to the contemporary discussion of sustainable design is through the idea of stewardship. To think back to the sense of belonging I felt in my tent and on my bike whilst cycling in France, and the care that I extended towards these two things, suggests a Heideggerian approach to looking after that which one perceives as 'near'. The process of dwelling engenders a sense of ownership of places in an individual and this could possibly be explored as a means for embracing sustainable desires. We often consider only 'nature' as that which should be preserved whilst ignoring our major habitat, the city. Arguably this results

in the fetishisation of nature as some kind of 'other' thereby pushing it out of our day to day consciousness. Kemal and Gaskell note in *Nature, fine arts, and aesthetics* that in large city parks and public nature reserves, "This democritization of nature, though, has increasingly taken the form of individuals consuming the product 'natural landscape.'" (Kemal & Gaskell. 1993. 16). How might we instead reintegrate a desire for stewardship of our environment in an urban context?

In *Nature by Design* David Orr argues that we need a rethinking of our material culture and the way we interact with the world before any real progress can be made in sustainable design. "The greatest impediment to an ecological design revolution is not, however, technological or scientific, but rather human." He says,

> A real design revolution will have to transform human intentions and the larger political, economic, and institutional structure that permitted ecological degradation in the first place. [...]The success of ecological design will depend on our ability to cultivate a deeper sense of connection and obligation without which few people will be willing to make much difference. (Orr. 2004. 23)

This deeper sense of connection is *precisely* what is engendered by Heidegger's concept of dwelling. For Heidegger dwelling is an ideal relationship that we can have with places. This is also one goal of the ecological movement.

Additionally, Heidegger's philosophy is of the oneness of all things, the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals each exist symbiotically with one another. This places individuals firmly as part of the world, not separate from it. "Separation is unwelcome because it allows people to feel an artificial superiority over the world and over other humans, perhaps encouraging them towards inappropriate attempts at control," notes Adam Sharr (2007. 86). This awareness of being a part of an overall system could be required in order to become a truly self sufficient society.

The connection between individual control, belonging and stewardship, and the desire for sustainable solutions could perhaps be explored further in my work after the completion of this PhD.

Heidegger stresses the importance of one's poetic relationship with places. It is possible that the contemporary global focus on sustainability could provide an opportunity for a renewed interest in the importance of Heidegger's philosophy. This might be a view of sustainability that is based, like the research carried out in this thesis, on ideals of experiential qualities, continual incremental change, and poetic engagement.

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